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1. Introduction  
The recent financial crisis is considered to be a regulatory failure. The current 
regulation is the Basel II regime, which is a regulation for global operating banks that 
was established by the G10 countries. Although the Basel regime is currently 
implemented by a lot of members, more and more countries are implementing the 
Basel II rules. The current crisis raised a lot of drawbacks and questions regarding 
the rules. Some global banks had a lot of trouble during the last year and need 
financial support although the reported financial ratios were almost stable. One of the 
problems was the level of capital required by banks in order the meet the Basel 
capital requirements. Some experts argued that capital requirements on Basel II are 
cyclical and tend to reinforce business cycle fluctuations. Others assert that the 
requirements are too conservative and offer possibilities for bank managers to report 
better ratios than the real situation is. A lot of banks used the Basel rules for hedging 
risk exposures using structured investment vehicles and therefore reduce their 
capital requirements, although the real risk does not decrease. This has also been a 
big topic in recent newspaper reports and forced the European Commission to 
publish possible changes of Basel II and work on Basel III. Furthermore new voices 
were raised against the calculated ratios under the current Basel Regime. Beside the 
Tier 1 capital ratio, a second ratio, which should be called “Leverage Ratio”, could be 
introduced in order to meet the new challenges. A leverage cap could restrict banks 
from holding large leverage is the simple argument. On the other hand, a cap on 
leverage may dampen the growth of banks and their profitability because many 
banks are run as privately owned businesses. As a private investor this could 
increase the fees charged by the bank, in order to raise capital due to new capital 
requirements. In this master thesis I describe the past developments and current 
suggestions for Basel III. Furthermore I analyze the banks balance sheets by testing 
the leverage ratio.  
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1.1. Aim and Methodology 
The regulatory requirement sets a minimum level of capital that the institution has to 
hold. The degree of that requirement is binding and depends on the type of 
institution. The Basel Accord of 1988 applies different credit risk weights by different 
positions. A bank that falls below the minimum adequate level is classed as 
undercapitalized.  
 
A Leverage ratio requirement may also affect the asset allocation of banks that are 
constrained by the requirement. Banks are therefore likely to reduce low-risk 
weighted assets such as treasuries and increase riskier assets such as equities in 
order to gain from a stock market boom. One of the advantages of a leverage ratio 
should be the transparency of reporting and the simple calculation method to 
compare the ratio globally. The Tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of a bank’s core equity 
capital to its total risk-weighted assets. Is that ratio really a good and transparent 
indicator as banks can increase their risk-weighted capital ratio without raising 
capital? Considering the difficulties of complex financial products it is a priori not 
certain that the risk-based capital ratio is really a good indicator and better than 
simple ratios in capturing the overall risk of a bank due to regulatory arbitrage 
incentives. 
 
The US leverage ratio is defined as a minimum ratio of Tier 1 capital to total adjusted 
assets of 3% for strong (under the BOPEC rating system of bank holding companies) 
and of 4% for all other banks. The total risk-based capital ratio (sum of Tier 1 and tier 
2 capital divided by risk-weighted assets) should be at least 8%. The ratio applies 
only on a consolidated basis and does not account for off-balance sheets exposures. 
Such off-balance sheet activities do not appear on bank balance sheets but expose 
banks to risk.  
 
During the financial crisis some voices were raised that Basel II is pro-cyclical. 
Regarding the Diamond/Dybvig model (1983) a bank with deposit insurance can 
provide liquidity insurance to a firm, which can prevent a liquidity crisis for a firm with 
short-term debt. On the other hand, in the second Basel II pillar liquidity risk means 
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risk regarding an asset that cannot be traded quickly enough in the market. An 
example for such a risk is reflected by a widening in the bid/offer spread for asset-
backed securities. The problem of the model is that there is no distinction between 
systematic and unsystematic risk. A big bank could take a high leverage because in 
a financial crisis a systemic bank is provided by the government and would get 
financial support. There are incentives for banks to have higher debt, which could 
create moral hazard. But what is the best way to restrict leverage? Is Leverage a 
good complement measure to the risk-based capital model of Basel II? 
 
In this thesis I examine the roles of different leverage ratios in banking regulation. I 
use different leverage ratios (simple & complex ratios) and take those ratios to 
compare US and European banks to Austrian banks. Leverage ratios should bear a 
significant negative relationship to the risk of subsequent bank failure. Are the most 
complex ratios (risk-weighted ratios) better than those naïve Leverage ratios as an 
effective predictor of bank failure over time and do the simpler ratios outperform the 
“complex” ratios? 
 
The research is collected through Fed historical data, Central bank data, Federal 
Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER) of the Fed of St. Louis, 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of the Fed of St. Louis, Equity Research 
from global banks such as Citigroup or JP Morgan, International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, the Austrian National Bank Statistics and Reporting, 
Statistics from the International Monetary Fund, Bloomberg data and research 
papers. The data for Austrian banks is collected via annual and half-year reports. For 
international banks I also used annual and half-year interim reports and Bloomberg 
for calculating the ratios because big banks are better covered by Bloomberg than 
small listed firms. 
 
1.2. Structure 
I divide the thesis into three main parts. The first section will address the aspects of 
Banking regulation, the historical development of the Basel rules and pricing in 
general. Furthermore in this section Basel III suggestions and possible calculations of 
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a Leverage ratio are discussed. In the second part I will discuss the commercial 
banking sector. In this chapter I discuss the possible differences to investment 
banking and show the current market situation, especially the last financial crisis and 
the role of liquidity and government bonds, i.e. sovereigns. In the third and last part I 
examine the leverage ratio of European, American and Austrian banks.  
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2. Banking Regulation  
Before 1933 times could be described as the period of free banking in the US. The 
regulation which exists prior to 1933 was the National Bank Act of 1863, which was 
largely ineffective.1 The regulation of the Banking Act of 1933 reduced the rate of 
entry into commercial banking (comparison of the periods 1921-1935 to 1936-1962) 
by 50%.2 In Europe, especially in Germany, the German Banking Act, which was also 
valid for Austria, was established in 1934 as we will see below. Generally, the 
banking regulation changed very slowly in history and often originated after a crisis. A 
good example for historic confidence in science is the efficient market hypothesis by 
Fama (1969), which was criticized but not fully rejected by many authors in the past. 
The hypothesis is connected with the Basel regulation and will therefore be shortly 
discussed. 
 
2.1. Efficient market hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis indicates that financial markets are efficient, which 
means that at any time security prices fully reflect any information available about a 
company and send signals for capital allocation. There are three forms of the efficient 
market hypotheses, the weak form, in which the information set covers just historical 
prices, the semi-strong form, in which any publicly available information (for example 
earnings announcements) is available and the strong form, in which also ‘insider’ 
information is available at any time.3 
 
The efficient market hypothesis was important for designing the regulation of the 
Basel Accord on Banking Supervision by the Basel Committee. The riskiness of 
banks’ holdings will be judged by market prices and ratings from private agencies 
(i.e. Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch). According to the EMH such rating 
contains reliable information. During the financial crisis much criticism arose, 
regarding the validity of the EMH. 
 
                                                 
1 See Peltzman (1965), p. 11. 
2 See Peltzman (1965), p. 48. 
3 See Fama (1969), p. 383. 
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94% of the S&P 500 firms are rated in the US, while only 53% of the firms have a 
credit rating in Europe, for example the DAX-30. Therefore most European banks 
should use the Internal (IRB) Approach rather than Standard Approach because the 
Standard Approach includes higher capital requirements for unrated securities. The 
risk weights of firms might only be feasible if rating agencies across the world act 
consistently across issuer category (corporates versus sovereigns) and through 
time.4 The disclosure of Basel II, especially the third Pillar should provide investors 
with all relevant information to assess investments. The question is why investors 
had made poor decisions before the crisis, although such information was 
accessible? The answer is clear because there are already information asymmetries 
in the market. Furthermore some investors did not read the prospectus carefully. Due 
to the complexity of products such as Mortgage-Backed-Securities, Asset-Backed-
Securities or Collateralized Debt Obligations, ‘rational’ investors failed to understand 
the risks or the securities during the sub-prime mortgage meltdown.5 A lot of experts 
now believe that the efficient market hypothesis is no more valid. Some professionals 
argue that only the strong form of the hypothesis is wrong, others believe that all 
forms are no longer valid and justify this by the crisis. Malkiel (2003) argues that 
markets are efficient, because they do not allow investors to earn above-average 
risk-adjusted returns.6 In my view financial markets do not operate perfectly due to 
asymmetries of information and principal-agent problems. 
 
2.2. Crisis as a trigger for regulation in history 
Mishkin (2007) outlines five categories of factors that cause financial crises. Theses 
factors are:7 
• an increase in uncertainty due to a failure of an important financial institution, 
• asset market effects on state of firms’ Balance Sheets , 
• problems in the banking sector,  
• an increase in interest rates, and 
• Government Fiscal Imbalances. 
                                                 
4 See Danielsson et al. (2001), p. 12. 
5 See Schwarcz (2007), p.6ff. 
6 Malkiel 2003), p. 5. 
7 See Mishkin (2007), p. 206f. 
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All of these factors are interesting and show that banks play an important role in the 
economy. Furthermore there is an interaction between these points. Uncertainty due 
to a failure of an institution, a stock market crash or recession is not new in history. A 
crisis would make it harder for banks to separate good credit risks from bad ones and 
causes adverse selection. Due to effects of asset prices on balance sheets, banks 
will have fewer resources to lend and bank lending will decrease. If banks do not 
trust each other, a bank panic could occur. Due to the decline of bank lending during 
a crisis, the supply of funds available to borrowers decreases, and the interest rates 
grow. The results are adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit 
markets. If people will not buy government bonds anymore, and there is a fear that 
those bonds could default (for example during the Argentine crisis 1999-2002), banks 
have to buy them and this would affect their balance sheets.8  
 
The banking crisis of 1931 was the primary motive to establish a state supervision of 
all banks. The peak of crisis was the Black Friday on Wall Street which initiated the 
Great Depression (1929-1939). A direct response to this was the US Banking Act of 
1933 (Glass-Steagall Act named after the legislative sponsors Carter Glass and 
Henry B. Steagall), which established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) as a temporary agency and separated commercial from investment banking. 
The US Federal Reserve System was established through the Federal Reserve Act 
in 1913.9 In Austria, the Creditanstalt-Bankverein AG, which was established 1855, 
got also into trouble and triggered a bank run on German banks in 1931.10 The 
Creditanstalt-Bankverein AG was financially restored by the Austrian Republic, the 
Austrian National Bank and the House of Rothschild (an influential family of bankers 
in Europe) and merged with the Wiener Bankverein in 1934.11 The response to the 
bank runs was the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) in December 1934. 
This Banking Act was also valid in Austria until 1979 and was replaced by the 
                                                 
8 See Mishkin (2007), p. 206ff. 
9 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2020), URL: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/#Consultative_Group, 
 retrieved January 25th, 2010.  
10 See BaFin (2010), URL: 
 http://www.bafin.de/cln_171/nn_720486/EN/BaFin/Legalbasis/History/history.html#doc721614bodyText1, 
 retrieved April 1st, 2010. 
11 See AEIOU (2010), URL: 
 http://www.aeiou.at/aeiou.encyclop.c/c796078.htm;internal&action=_setlanguage.action?LANGUAGE=en, 
 retrieved April 1st, 2010. 
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Austrian Kreditwesengesetz of 1979. In January 1994 the Kreditwesengesetz was 
again replaced by the Federal Banking Act (Bankwesengesetz).12 
 
In 1974 the troubled German bank Herstatt was forced into liquidation. Due to foreign 
relations, especially some banks had released payment of DEM to Herstatt in 
exchange for USD. Due to counterparty risks banks did not receive their USD 
payments. This was the trigger for the G10 countries to form a committee under the 
name Bank for International Settlements (BIS).13 
 
The savings and loan crisis between 1980 and 1994 in the US has been the greatest 
banking collapse since the Great Depression. 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) is sometimes mentioned for introducing and 
the establishment of the Basel II Capital Accord.  
 
The current financial crisis, which began in 2007, was triggered through liquidity 
failures of the market. Lehman Brothers is an example of a financial service firm, 
which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2008. Northern Rock and IndyMac are two 
examples of bank nationalizations due to the crisis. In Austria, the Hypo Group is the 
latest example of nationalization.  
 
2.3. Basel I regulation and weaknesses 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (formerly Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices) was established by the central-bank 
governors of ten14 countries (G10) in 1974, which has now eleven members because 
Switzerland joined the G10 in 1983.15 
 
                                                 
12 See OeNB (2010a), URL:  
 http://www.oenb.at/de/ueber_die_oenb/wirtschaft/das_handbuch_der_oenb/finanzwesen_und_banken/oesterre
 ichs_kapitalmarkt/wie_hat_sich_oesterreichs_kapitalmarkt_entwickelt_.jsp, retrieved April 1st, 2010. 
13 See Contingency Analysis (2010), URL: http://www.riskglossary.com/link/basle_committee.htm, retrieved 
 February 25th, 2010. 
14 The G10 (Group of Ten) is made up of eleven members which are United States, United Kingdom, 
 Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Canada and Belgium. 
15 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b), p. 1. 
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The first meeting was held in February 1975 and the first report published in 
September 1975 set Principles for the Supervision of Banks and joint ventures 
between host and parent authorities (Report on the supervision of banks’ foreign 
establishments – Concordat).16 
 
The Committee’s members today are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The Committee’s Secretariat is based at the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel, where the name of the ‘Basel Accords’ comes from. The Basel 
Committee has four sub groups. The sub-committees are: 
 
• The Standards Implementation Group 
• The Policy Development Group 
• The Accounting Task Force 
• The Basel Consultative Group17 
 
Especially the Policy Development Group and the Consultative Group are important 
for implementing and developing capital ratios. Seven working groups are supporting 
the Policy Development Group. One of the subgroups is the Working Group on the 
Definition of Capital. This subgroup is working on the quality, consistency and 
transparency of capital, in particular the most important Tier 1 capital. The Consulting 
Group is publishing banking supervisory issues by contacting supervisors around the 
world.18 
 
To strengthen the stability of the international banking system a first consultative 
document was published in December 1987. Following these comments the Basle 
Capital Accord (Basel I), which was published in July 1988, was amended in 
                                                 
16 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009b), p. 1f. 
17 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), URL: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/#Consultative_Group, 
 retrieved January 25th, 2010.  
18 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), URL: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/#Consultative_Group, 
 retrieved January 25th, 2010. 
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November 1991, July and December 1994 and April 1998.19 The original text of the 
consultative document was changed only marginally. In the Basle Capital Accord, for 
example, preferred stock was divided into non-cumulative perpetual and cumulative 
preferred stock and the first one is included in the core capital while in the 
consultative document, there was no distinction.20 The Basel I Accord, which was 
applied in end-1992, established a minimum capital ratio (capital to risk-weighted 
assets) of 8% and a core capital ratio (core capital which is Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets) of 4%.21 The wish of the member countries was to set a precise 
ratio which could be used as an international indicator for comparison. The proposal 
of 1987 outlined that a low minimum boundary of that ratio would be difficult to reach 
for some banks in short-term. On the other hand a high ratio would not strengthen 
the balance sheets of the banks.22  
 
This is an interesting point, because banks are almost operating on an international 
basis, as discussed later. Therefore the big topic of today, the internationalization of 
banks was not as important as it is today. 
 
The tier 1 capital under Basel I covered: 
• equity capital  
o issued and fully paid-up ordinary shares/common stock and 
o non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (excluding cumulative 
preferred stock)  
• disclosed reserves  
o retained earnings,  
o surplus capital i.e. share premiums,  
o general and legal reserves and 
o minority interests in the equity of subsidiaries.23 
 
For calculating the risk-weighted capital ratio, goodwill will be deducted from Tier 1 
capital. Direct investments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiaries and 
                                                 
19 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 2. 
20 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1987), p. 4. 
21 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 13. 
22 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1987), p. 18. 
23 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 3. 
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investments in capital of other banks and financial institutions (at the discretion of 
national authorities) will be deducted from total capital.24 
 
Under Basel I, hybrid (debt/equity) instruments are quoted under Tier 2 capital, which 
was in detail:25 
• undisclosed reserves 
• asset revaluation reserves 
• general provisions/general loan-loss reserves 
• hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments (for example: long-term preferred 
shares in Canada, perpetual subordinated debt and preference shares in the 
UK or mandatory convertible debt instruments in the US) and 
• (fixed-maturity) subordinated debt 
 
Furthermore the Tier 2 capital must not be over 100% of Tier 1 capital. The 
subordinated debt must be under 50% of Tier 1 capital. The general provisions/loan-
loss reserves are limited to a maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. The capital 
base is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital minus deductions as goodwill, 
investments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary companies and 
investments in the capital of other banks and financial institutions.26 
 
In April 1993 the Basel Committee issued a paper with emphasis on the treatment on 
market risks. The Committee suggested modifying the definition of permanent capital 
by adding a Tier 3 capital regarding subordinated debt. There are three differences to 
the tier 2 subordinated debt. 
• The minimum maturity is shorter (two years). 
• The debt is valued at par (compared to amortised over the last five years). 
• There is a lock-in feature, which means the debt is available to absorb losses 
if allotted capital falls below an early-warning level of 20% above the 
minimum.27 
 
                                                 
24 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 6. 
25 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 14f. 
26 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 14f. 
27 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1993), p. 10f. 
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The BIS published a research paper that pointed out that between 1990 and 2001 
banks mostly issued subordinated debt with a maturity that is longer than 10 years.28 
Therefore the influence of Tier 3 capital was only marginal. The reason for a lock-in 
was that short-term debt is more appropriate for trading activities. The proposal 
comprised to limit the Tier 3 capital by 250% cap of Tier 1 capital allocated to support 
securities trading-book risks. The alternative to that was that Tier 2 plus Tier 3 capital 
should not exceed Tier 1 capital.29 Subordinated Tier 2 debt is amortised in its final 
five years of maturity, which is nothing else than a call option. Tier 3 subordinated 
debt is not amortised.30 As mentioned subordinated debt should not exceed 50% of 
Tier 1 capital, it should therefore not exceed 2% (50% of the maximum of Tier 1 
capital ratio) of risk-weighted assets irrespectively of the total capital requirement 
filled by Tier 1 equity. An empirical analysis of G10 banks show that on average 
banks hold 3.6% of risk-weighted assets in subordinated debt.31  
 
In November 1991 a Basel amendment was published to include the general 
provisions or loan-loss reserves in the capital, precisely in the Tier 2 capital, for 
calculation of the ratio. General provisions are used against the possibility of future 
losses but only not yet identified losses should be added to the capital.32 In January 
1996 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a possibility for banks 
to use Tier 3 capital at the discretion of the national authority. Tier 3 capital consists 
of short-term subordinated debt with a maturity of at least two years and must be 
unsecured and fully paid up and can only be used as permanent capital to absorb 
losses in the event of insolvency. Furthermore it should not be repayable before the 
authority agrees and should be subject to a lock-in clause which means that interest 
and principal must not be paid if the bank falls below or remains below its minimum 
capital requirement. Moreover the Tier 3 capital is also limited to 250% of the Tier 1 
capital. The Tier 3 capital could only be part of eligible capital if it could be used to 
cover and support market risk.33 
 
                                                 
28 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 2. 
29 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1993), p. 11f. 
30 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 6. 
31 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 7. 
32 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1991), p. 2. 
33 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996), p. 7f. 
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In April 1999 the first working paper was published by a Research Task Force 
specialising in capital requirements and bank behaviour. The group analysed the 
impact of the Basel Accord of 1988 with focus on minimum capital requirements and 
capital ratios.34 The report documented that the average total capital ratio (ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets) of the major G-10 banks rose from 9.3% to 11.2% 
between 1988 and 1996. However the reasons are controversial. Banks raised 
capital and boosted retained earnings in booms and cut loans in economic 
downturns. There is evidence that weakly capitalised banks sometimes reduce 
lending activities to lower risk-weighted assets and therefore increase the capital 
ratios. An important point is that innovations in the market, for example 
securitisations, made it possible for banks to use structured finance to increase their 
risk relative to minimum capital levels, but to avoid the limitation of capital 
requirements. 35 This is an important point, because such construction would make 
capital ratios no more meaningful and useless. The outstanding amount of, for 
example, non-mortgage securitisations of the ten largest US banks was roughly $200 
bn in March 1998. In Europe the amount surged from $8.5 bn in 1995 to $41 bn in 
1997.36 The distribution of the capital ratios of the G-10 banks narrowed between 
1988 and 1992 and widened again to a higher level in 1996. 37 
 
In June 1999 the Basel Committee published a paper regarding supervisory lessons 
to be drawn from the Asian Crises. The Committee identified some issues which are 
relevant for future supervision. One of the topics was that capital levels of Basel I 
should be tailored to the riskiness of the bank. Attention should be drawn on core 
principles dealing with risk weightings, which should be individually changes and 
implemented by member countries.38 
 
The first consultative paper regarding a proposal for a new Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II) was published in June 1999. The paper exhibited proposed changes, for 
example the introduction of three pillars, to replace the 1988 Accord.39  
 
                                                 
34 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a), p. 1. 
35 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a), p. 2ff. 
36 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a), p. 3. 
37 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a), p. 43. 
38 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999b), p. 1ff. 
39 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999b), p. 1. 
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The Committee outlined the following weaknesses of Basel I: 
• For too long a time focus was set on credit risks while neglecting the market 
risks. As above mentioned, the increase of innovations changed the situation 
of banks regarding risk-weighted assets. 
• A bear market and differences of the measurement in certain countries made 
it necessary to align capital ratios on a global basis.  
• Degrees of credit risk exposure are not sufficiently calibrated for the 
differentiation of borrowers’ and default risks. Borrowers are classified in risk 
categories and there are no differences in credit ratings of individual 
borrowers. 
• The arbitrage of regulatory capital requirement and divergences between true 
economic risk and risk measured in the 1988 Accord.  
• Some problems due to modern innovations regarding risk mitigation 
techniques.40 
 
The second and the third consultative paper for a new proposal of the Basel Accord 
were published in 2001 and 2003 where the most relevant points of Basel II were 
mentioned. Appendix 1 summarized the development of the capital ratios. 
 
As discussed above, the working paper of 2003 handled the problem of subordinated 
debt. A further interesting point is that between 1990 and 2001, 5,600 issues of 
subordinated debt took place, which represented 50% of total banking assets of 210 
banks in ten analyzed countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US).41 A further not surprising point is that the 
highest amount of subordinated debt was issued with roughly $60 bn between 1999 
and 2001.42 
 
The 2004 working paper studied bank failures in Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US during the past 30 years. 90% of the 
analyzed banks reported capital ratios above the requirements imposed by the 
supervisor. The working group recorded as a reason that loss provisions were not 
                                                 
40 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999b), p. 8f. 
41 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 1. 
42 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), p. 66. 
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included in asset impairment and therefore capital ratios were overvalued. While 
small institutions or parts thereof were historically usually liquidated, large 
commercial banks which were in trouble were rescued through mergers, capital 
injections and/or increased government control.43 
 
In June 2006 the Basel Committee published the Basel II revised framework, 
including elements of Basel I of 1988, the amendment of November 1995 and the 
Application of Basel II Trading Activities & Double Default Effect of April 2005. 
 
                                                 
43 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p. 1f. 
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2.4. Basel II regulation 
On the 30th of June 2006 the European Commission published two directives relating 
to Basel II and transposing the new capital requirements into European law. The two 
directives (Banking Directive 2006/48/EC and Capital Adequacy Directive 
2006/49/EC) came into effect as of the 1st of January 2007.44 Basel II was 
incorporated into Austrian national law by the Solvency Regulation 
(Solvabilitätsverordnung) and the Disclosure Regulation (Offenlegungsverordnung), 
by which changes were effected in the Austrian Banking Act (Bankwesengesetz).  
According to Figure 1 the 2006 Accord included three pillars (Minimum Capital 
Requirements, Supervisory Review Process and Market Discipline) rather than just 
one like Basel I. 
 
 
 
 
2.4.1. The first pillar 
The first pillar represents the minimum capital requirement for credit, market and 
operational risk. The total capital ratio (capital defined as the Tier 1 and tier 2 capital 
                                                 
44 See Directive 1006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
 the business of credit institutions and on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. 
The Capital Accord of Basel II 
 
 
PILLAR 1 
 
Minimum 
Capital 
Requirements 
 
 
PILLAR 2 
 
Supervisory 
Review 
Process 
 
 
PILLAR 3 
 
Market 
Discipline 
 Figure 1: The three pillars of Basel II
 Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 6. 
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to risk-weighted assets), which is also called the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), 
must be at least 8%, which is stated in Equation 1. Tier 2 capital is capped by 100% 
of Tier 1 capital. The equity capital and published reserves from post-tax retained 
earnings should be at least 50% of the total capital base of the bank. The minimum 
capital requirement is defined by multiplying the capital requirements for market risk 
and operational risk by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8%) 
and adding the sum of the risk-weighted assets for credit risk.45 Tier 1 capital ratios 
have to be, as mentioned, at least 4%. The minimum ratio of core capital to risk-
weighted assets is not defined, because for most countries the core capital is the 
same as the Tier 1 capital. The calculation of a core Tier 1 capital ratio compared to 
a Tier 1 capital ratio is shown in Equation 2 and 3. 
 
capital
∑ credit risk‐
weighted assets +12.5* (capital charge for market +operational risk)
≥8% 
Equation 1: Total Capital Ratio (incl. market and operational risk) 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 12. 
 
core Tier 1 capital
∑ credit risk-weighted assets
  Tier 1 capital
∑ credit risk-weighted assets
 
Equation 2: Core Tier 1 Capital ratio Equation 3: Tier 1 capital ratio 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) 
 
The risk weights are dependent on the exposure of the asset type. For calculation of 
the capital requirements for credit risks, banks can choose to use a standardized 
approach or an internal ratings-based approach, which must be approved by the 
bank’s supervisor.46 
 
The definition of equity capital has not changed since Basel I. The amount of Tier 1 
capital is made up of: 
• paid-up share capital/common stock 
• reserves 
• minority interests in the equity of subsidiaries 
• innovative instruments (such as irredeemable non-cumulative preferred 
shares or instruments that incorporate a step-up provision) 
                                                 
45 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 12. 
46 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 19. 
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• other capital instruments 
• surplus capital from insurance companies47 
 
Innovative instruments are limited by 15% of Tier 1 capital of that institution, net of 
goodwill. An example of innovative instruments is non-cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock, which is also called irredeemable non-cumulative preferred shares.48 The 
Minority interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries in the form of a 
Special Purpose Vehicle49 (not confounded with equity of subsidiaries) and should 
only be included in Tier 1 capital if the underlying meets the following criteria:50 
• issued and fully paid 
• non-cumulative 
• able to absorb losses within the bank on a going-concern basis 
• junior to depositors, general creditors, and subordinated debt of the bank 
• permanent 
• neither be secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity 
• callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years with 
supervisory approval 
 
Tier 2 capital consists of: 
• undisclosed reserves 
• revaluation reserves 
• general provisions/general loan-loss reserves 
• hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments 
• subordinated debt51 
 
Hybrid capital instruments have to be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up, not 
redeemable at the initiative of the holder, and available to participate in losses 
                                                 
47 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 230. 
48 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 243. 
49 An SPV is defined as a legal entity in the form of a limited partnership, a limited liability company or a trust 
 created by an originator i.e. a company to transfer assets to the SPV for a specific purpose, for example 
 securitization transactions. 
50 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998), URL: http://www.bis.org/press/p981027.htm, retrieved 
 February 25th, 2010.  
51 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 14ff. 
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without the bank being obliged to cease trading.52 Hybrid securities are for example 
convertible bonds or cumulative preference shares which are Tier 2 capital. Other 
examples are mentioned above, for example long-term preferred shares in Canada. 
Most preferred shares are cumulative, which means that dividend payments are 
accumulated until they are finally paid. The difference to non-cumulative is clear, but 
issuance of those securities is more complex. Institutions use that, to meet the capital 
standards. In the last few years, some institutions issued non-cumulative preferred 
shares because for such preferred equity institutions have the incentive to pay 
dividends in order to send a positive signal to the market and investors expect a fixed 
payment. This situation gives banks more flexibility in financial stress. There will be 
no penalty if non-cumulative preferred shares are not paid. On the other hand 
common equity holders cannot get dividends if preferred shareholders have not 
received dividends. Banks could therefore issue non-cumulative preferred shares, 
which are qualified as Tier 1 capital, to increase the Tier 1 capital ratio. Subordinated 
debt, as mentioned, is normally the major part of Tier 2 capital. 
 
The Tier 3 capital is made up of short-term subordinated debt covering market risk. 
Tier 3 capital is also limited to 250% of bank’s Tier 1 capital that is required to 
support market risks. Therefore a minimum of 28.5% of market risks must be covered 
by Tier 1 capital.53 Asset revaluation reserves i.e. latent gains on unrealized 
securities are subject to a discount of 55%. 
 
Deductions from capital are again: 
• goodwill (deduction from Tier 1 capital) 
• increase in equity capital resulting from a securitization exposure such as that 
associated with expected future margin income resulting in a gain-on-sales 
that is recognized in regulatory capital as documented in paragraph 562. 
(deduction from Tier 1 capital) 
• investments in subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial activities which 
are not consolidated in national systems (deduction 50/50% from Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital)54 
                                                 
52 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 246. 
53 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 16. 
54 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 17. 
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Where no deduction applies, the risk-weight of banks’ holdings of other capital 
instruments will be 100%.55 
 
The core capital, in Austria used for reporting, does not include innovative 
instruments such as non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, which is a dividend for 
preferred shares that will not be accumulated if it is not paid. Innovative instruments 
are also called hybrid securities in the Austrian Banking Act, as defined in Article 24 
(2) 5 and 6 of the Austrian Federal Banking Act. What is also an important point is 
that dividends which could be included in the equity capital should not be of fixed 
maturity. Hybrid Tier 1 capital represents innovative and non-innovative instruments 
are qualified under minority interests in the IFRS equity. All in all, innovative 
instruments such as non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock fall under Tier 1 
capital, indirect investments over SPV are limited with 15% of Tier 1 capital and non-
innovative fall also under Tier 1 capital while convertible bonds or cumulative 
perpetual preference shares as hybrid capital instruments fall under Tier 2 capital.  
There are three approaches under Pillar I to calculate the capital requirements for the 
credit risk: 
• Standardized Approach (SA) 
• Foundation IRB Approach (FIRB) 
• Advanced IRB Approach (AIRB) 
 
Measuring the market risk, value at risk calculations can be used. Regarding the 
operational risk under Pillar I, there are the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the 
Standardized Approach (STA) and the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA).56  
 
2.4.2. The second pillar 
Pillar II concerns banks on the one hand and Supervisors on the other hand. The 
second pillar postulates banks to implement a risk management system and to 
assess their capital adequacy relative to the risk profile, especially regarding the 
compliance with the minimum standards. Supervisory authorities have to evaluate 
                                                 
55 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 18. 
56 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 1ff. 
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credit institutions via supervisory review and evaluation process. They have to 
assess the risk profile of the banks and qualitative factors like strategy or 
management. The areas which are treated under Pillar II are risks that are not fully 
captured in Pillar I (e.g. credit risk concentration), factors that are not taken into 
account in Pillar I (e.g. interest rate risk in the banking book) and factors external to 
the bank (e.g. business cycle effects). The Supervisor may require banks in some 
circumstances to hold their own funds in excess of the minimum level under Pillar I.57 
 
The supervisory review process is based on four principles:58 
• Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) 
Banks should assess their capital adequacy in relation to the risk profile as 
mentioned and should have a strategy for maintain the capital levels. 
• Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) 
Supervisors should evaluate capital adequacy assessments strategies of the 
banks, monitor their compliance by capital ratios and should intervene if it is 
necessary. 
• Supervisory Measures 
Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios and should have the allowance to require banks to hold capital in 
excess of the minimum in Pillar I. 
• Supervisory Intervention 
Supervisors are allowed to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital falling 
below the minimum levels and should maintain an action plan. 
 
  
                                                 
57 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 204ff. 
58 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 205ff. 
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2.4.3. The third pillar 
Under the third Pillar, Market Discipline, banks have to ensure disclosure 
requirements on transactions and their risk strategies. The disclosure topics are:59 
• Source of application 
• Capital structure 
• Risk exposures 
• Risk assessment processes of different risks (market risk, equities, credit risk, 
operational risk) 
• Interest rate risk in the banking book 
• Credit risk mitigation techniques 
• Securitisation 
• Capital adequacy of the institution and 
• IRB approaches 
 
The aim of the third Pillar is to discipline the market participants.  
                                                 
59 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 226ff. 
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2.5. Basel II weaknesses 
Jimenez and Saurina (2006) show that the capital requirement for banks under Basel 
II increases during a recession, because the probability of default increases. One 
way to lower the procyclical effect is adjust loan loss provisions by a stress test 
included in the second pillar of Basel II. Banks should use the provisions in good 
times as reserves for loan losses during a recession.60 But in recent newspapers we 
saw different examples, which indicated that the reserves were not enough to cover 
the losses. 
 
Excessive lending during a boom on the one hand and too conservative credit 
policies during a recession on the other hand, make a banking regulation even 
harder to handle.61 It is difficult and costly for a bank to raise fresh external capital in 
bad times and this will force it to cut back lending activities, which will contribute to a 
worsening of the initial downturn.62  
 
Goodhart (2005) shows, that the CAR for the IRB is lower during good times with 
strong growth than the standardised approach. Moreover, the variance of the IRB 
approach is higher. During a recession, the CAR for the IRB is higher than for the 
others. This is very important because banks want to shift their portfolio to a better 
rating and therefore use the IRB instead of the standardised approach. The rating 
might be better, but then the risk curve is also steeper. This is again an argument for 
the pro-cyclicality of Basel II.63  
 
The problem is that only one single risk curve will be used in the Basel II framework, 
rather than a family of risk curves. Therefore the ratio of a capital charge for an AA 
credit and a BBB credit will be treated in the same way as an AA credit and a second 
AA credit, which was downgraded during a recession to BBB.64 Kashyap and Stein 
(2005) underlined the cyclicality in capital charges, which depend on a bank’s 
                                                 
60 See Jimenez/Saurina (2006), p. 91f. 
61 See Jimenez/Saurina (2006), p. 94. 
62 See Kashyap/Stein (2004), p. 18. 
63 See Goodhart (2005), p. 123f. 
64 See Kashyap/Stein (2004), p. 21f. 
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customer mix and the used credit-risk models. They suggested setting the CAR down 
from 8% to 6%, whenever the GDP growth falls below a threshold.65  
 
Northern Rock had a concentration of assets in mortgage products of 75%, just 
before 2007. The rate of asset growth was around 25% before 2007. The 
concentration of mortgage products would have reduced their capital requirements 
under Basel II because mortgage products are treated as low-risk assets. The 
objective of the management of Northern Rock was to force mortgage products and 
drive their expansion. In 2007 the Tier 1 capital ratio was around 11% of risk-
weighted assets, but only 2% of total assets, because the risk-weighted assets were 
only 16.7% of total assets.66 This example demonstrates one of the problems of 
Basel II. 
 
Another suggestion is to use a smoothed trend of asset prices to estimate the gap 
between the current asset price and its fundamental value that could solve the 
problem of cyclicality. The problem is that this would be inconsistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis. Goodhart (2005) suggested relating the capital requirement on 
bank lending to the rate of changes of asset prices, for example the CAR on 
mortgage lending is related to the rise in house prices (relative to Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Price Inflation).67  
 
2.6. Basel III reform package 
Between 2006 and 2009 no significant paper regarding the capital adequacy ratios 
were published by the Basel Committee. 
 
In January 2009 the Basel Committee published a consultative document with 
proposed enhancements to the Basel II framework to strengthen the response to the 
financial crisis. The proposal suggested using higher risk weights for re-securitization 
(especially collateralised debt obligations) exposures.68 The idea of an introduction of 
                                                 
65 See Kashyap/Stein (2004), p. 28f. 
66 See Blundell-Wignall/Atkinson/Lee, (2008), p. 9. 
67 See Goodhart (2005), p. 126. 
68 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009c), p. 1. 
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a leverage ratio, beside the current capital ratios, to intensify evaluation of capital 
adequacy under stressed conditions was mentioned for the first time.69 The 
introduction of a leverage ratio similar to equity/asset ratio but with focus on off-
balance sheet exposures was also mentioned in the IMF paper published in February 
2009. The idea behind it is to constrain excessive leverage in the upswing, as it was 
the case between 2003 and 2007.70 
 
Based on the consultative document of July 2009, the Basel Committee published a 
paper with emphasis on revisions to the Basel II market risk framework. Due to 
innovations, some risks are no more captured. Therefore the measures for risks in 
the trading book, for example for unsecured credit products, should be included. This 
paper was the first one suggesting to change the Basel II framework due to financial 
crisis.71 In this paper, there were no improvements regarding a new leverage ratio.  
 
Month Year Item 
January 2009c Consultative Document  
(Proposed enhancements to the Basel II framework ) 
July 2009d Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework 
December 2009a Consultative Document 
(Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector) 
 Table 1: The development of the Basle Accord between 2006 and 2010 with focus on the first Pillar 
  (Capital Adequacy Ratios) 
 Source: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
In December 2009 the Basel Committee published again a consultative document to 
strengthen the regulation standards. This reform package should draw lessons of the 
recent financial crisis. The most significant problem had been the excessive on- and 
off-balance sheet leverage on the one hand, and not enough liquidity i.e. own capital 
funds on the other hand. The pro-cyclical effect of leverage strengthens the crisis 
instead of weakening it. The liquidity shortages in the banking system were 
transferred to the whole financial system und real economy, resulting in a credit 
                                                 
69 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009c), p. 25. 
70 See IMF (2009), p. 13. 
71 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009d), p. 1. 
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crunch. Due to bad liquidity, the public sector had to intervene with capital injections, 
guarantees and in the worst case by nationalisation.72  
 
Moreover, the Basel II Committee suggested using long-term data horizons (i.e. 
through the cycle) to estimate probabilities of default and introduced downturn loss-
given-default estimates to calibrate risk functions for converting loss estimates into 
regulatory capital requirements. This should be used to dampen the cyclicality effect 
of the minimum capital requirement.73 
 
The three agreements reached in the September 2009 meeting considered the 
following elements:74 
• First of all, the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base will be 
raised. Under the current approach, banks could hold as little as 2% common 
equity to risk-based assets, before application of regulatory adjustments. 
• Secondly, the risk coverage ratio of the capital framework will be 
strengthened, especially regarding credit risk exposure arising from 
derivatives, repos, and securities financing activities.  
• Thirdly, a new leverage ratio would be included. This measure regards the 
Pillar I and should help to fight against excessive leverage in the banking 
system. The discussion is not yet finalized because other suggestions were 
raised to use the leverage ratio under Pillar II and not under the strict capital 
requirements. 
• The fourth and fifth suggestions concern measures to increase capital buffers 
in good times and a global minimum liquidity standard i.e. liquidity coverage 
ratio. 
 
The leverage ratio should be introduced as a supplement measure to the risk-based 
ratios of Basel II. This new ratio should avoid destabilizing the financial system by 
constraining the leverage in the banking sector and should be a non-risk-based 
“backstop” measure. For using the leverage ratio the Basel Committee defined the 
capital as the Tier 1 capital or the predominant form of Tier 1 capital (common shares 
                                                 
72 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 1f. 
73 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 66f. 
74 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 2f. 
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and retained earnings which is common Tier 1 capital) as relevant. Items that are 
deducted, for example goodwill or deferred taxes should be made from the capital 
and from the total exposure.75 Current adjustments concerned only the Tier 1 capital 
or a combination of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital but did not regard the common equity 
component of Tier 1 capital. Therefore banks could report high Tier 1 ratios, although 
they have low levels of common equity. This leverage ratio is net of provisions and 
valuation adjustments. It is not allowed to reduce the exposure using physical or 
financial collateral. Off-balance sheet items, which were included, have to use a flat 
100% credit conversion factor. It is an important factor that off-balance sheet items 
are included, because this was also a major source of leverage during the crisis, 
which will be discussed later. To standardize the accounting of IFRS and US GAAP 
regarding the netting of derivatives and repurchase agreements, some adjustments 
should be made.76 
 
As mentioned above, some banks reported high Tier 1 ratios but had low common 
equity. Due to lost confidence, the Basel Committee suggested to use tangible 
common equity (exclusive goodwill from common equity, because that is not 
realisable in insolvency).77 Under the current approach, some countries implemented 
a common equity to risk-based assets ratio (inclusive goodwill), which must be at 
least 2%.78 Citigroup, for example, issued common stock and exchanged preferred 
for common shares. Such shares are called mandatory convertible preferred shares, 
which are part of the common equity under Basel II. As a result the bank increased 
their tangible common equity.79 By such a conversion a bank can avoid taking 
additional money but would not bring in more cash. This would only satisfy 
regulators.80 Furthermore the financial crisis showed that credit losses and write-
downs came out of retained earnings, which are part of the tangible common equity. 
Therefore Tier 1 capital base should only be the sum of common shares and retained 
earnings.81  
                                                 
75 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 61f. 
76 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 13. 
77 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 13. 
78 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 4. 
79 See Citigroup Inc. (2009), URL: http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090227a.htm, retrieved         
 January 25th, 2010.  
80 See Solomon (2009), URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124165234893993679.html, retrieved          
 January 25th, 2010. 
81 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 4. 
  28 
 
Share premium (stock surplus) could be included in the common equity, i.e. as a part 
of Tier 1 capital, if the shares giving rise to the capital in the way that firm raises 
capital in excess of the nominal value of the shares which is paid by shareholders for 
a share i.e. what the shareholder pays in excess of the nominal value of a share. 
Preferred shares are excluded and must be included in the capital to which it relates. 
Minority interests are also excluded from the common equity. Furthermore, there 
should be no adjustments of common equity regarding unrealised gains or losses on 
debt instruments, loans, receivables, equity, own use properties and investment 
properties (available-for-sales reserves). Goodwill and other intangibles, as 
mentioned above, are deducted from the common equity component of Tier 1 and 
are net of any associated deferred taxes.82 Deferred tax assets on future profitability 
due to accounting purposes to be realised should be deducted (net of deferred tax 
liabilities) from the common equity. Deferred tax assets which do not rely on the 
future profitability i.e. prepayments to tax authorities (receivables from the local 
taxing authority) should be added to the relevant sovereign risk weighting. 
Investments in own shares (treasury stock) should also be deducted from the 
common equity. If investments in other financial institutions exceed the value of 10% 
of the common stock of that institution, the whole amount must be deducted from the 
common stock. If the common stock of all other financial institutions in aggregate 
exceed 10% of the bank’s common equity (after all adjustments), then only the 
amount above 10% should be deducted.83 Cash flow hedge reserves from the 
common equity which are not recognised on the balance sheet should be reduced 
from the common equity part. Changes in the fair value of all liabilities, which are due 
to changes in the credit risk of the banks, should be filtered out. The current filter only 
applied to Tier 1 level reduction of gains and losses on liabilities which are fair 
valued. Pension fund assets should also be deducted. This is because benefit 
pension funds could absorb losses on a going concern basis.84 Table 2 summaries 
the baseline proposal for implementing a leverage ratio. 
 
  
                                                 
82 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 23. 
83 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 24f. 
84 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 26. 
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Issue Baseline proposal plus additional options 
Definition of capital Tier 1 capital and the predominant form of Tier 1 capital and additional  total 
regulatory capital as defined 
Exposure: Valuation 
adjustments and provisions 
Exposure measures follow accounting treatment i.e. net of provisions and other 
valuation adjustments 
Cash and cash-like 
instruments 
Include cash and cash-like instruments and additional exclude liquid assets as 
defined by the WGL 
Off-balance sheet items and 
written credit derivatives 
Include the identified Off-balance sheet items with a 100% credit conversion 
factor (CCF). Written credit protection is included at notional value and additional 
apply a lower CFF for unconditionally cancellable commitments (or Basel II 
standardised CFF) 
Credit risk mitigation and on-
balance sheet netting 
Do not reduce exposure for physical or financial collateral and do not allow on-
balance sheet netting 
Items deducted from the 
capital measure 
Consistency between the capital and exposure measure 
Securitisations Use accounting data and additional accounting on-balance sheet exposure plus 
underlying loan portfolio securitisations that have been de-recognised 
Other derivatives (excluding 
credit derivatives) 
Do not allow any netting (accounting or regulatory) and additionally Basel II 
netting 
Repurchase agreements and 
securities finance 
Do now allow any netting of repo and reverse repo positions and additionally 
Basel II netting for repo-style transactions 
 Table 2: Summary of the baseline proposal for a leverage ratio 
 Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 65f. 
 
Non-cumulative perpetual preferred shares are also included in Tier 1 capital in the 
suggestion for strengthening the resilience of the banking sector but other innovative 
instruments such as step-ups are excluded. The use of call options need to be 
approved by supervisory. Tier 2 Capital will be simplified by removing sub-categories 
and set criteria. Tier 2 Capital will need to meet the minimum standard of being 
subordinated to depositors and general creditors. Subordinated debt has to be issued 
and paid-in, is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer and has an 
original maturity of at least 5 years. There must be no incentives to redeem. For loan-
loss reserves, the cap of 1.25% of total risk assets will be eliminated.85 The 
amortisation will be done on a straight line basis during the final 5 years to maturity. 
Tier 3 Capital will be eliminated. Non-innovative hybrid capital will no longer be 
                                                 
85 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 21. 
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included in Tier 1 capital.86 Table 3 gives an overview of the changes from Basel II 
and the Basel III proposal. 
 
BASEL II BASEL III 
Paid-up share capital/common stock Paid-up share capital/common stock 
Reserves Reserves 
Minority interests (in the equity of 
subsidiaries) 
- 
Non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock  Non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock 
Instruments including a step-up provision 
(currently limited to 15% of Tier 1 Capital) 
- 
Other capital instruments - 
Surplus capital (from insurance companies) - 
Undisclosed reserves - 
Revaluation reserves - 
General provisons/loan-loss reserves (up to 
1.25% of total risk assets) 
General provisons/loan-loss reserves 
Hybrid capital instruments Non-eligible hybrid Tier 1 securities 
Perpetual Subordinated debt Subordinated debt 
 
Short-term subordinated debt 
 
- 
 Table 3: Basel II versus Basel III capital base 
 Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 1ff. 
 
The key adjustments regarding deductions of Tier 1 capital are shown in Table 4. 
While there is no change between Basel II and Basel III proposal regarding the 
deduction of goodwill and other intangibles, there is a slight change in the deduction 
of deferred tax assets. Under Basel III, deduction of Tier 1 capital is only allowed for 
deferred tax assets which are used for future profitability. Investments in financial 
entities (i.e. cross-shareholdings between domestic banks) changed significantly 
under the Basel III proposal. Deductions must be made for investments in 
unregulated entities, while under current requirement, deductions are lower and such 
investments are deducted only 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from total equity capital, net 
                                                 
86 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 15f. 
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of intangibles. Under the current proposal, 100% of excess expected losses are 
deducted from Tier 1 capital. Under the current approach, only net unrealized losses 
on marketable securities are deducted from Tier 1 capital, while under Basel III, both 
unrealized gains and losses are deducted from Tier 1 capital. 
 
Deductions of Tier 1 Capital 
 Basel II Basel III 
Goodwill and 
other intangibles 
Only goodwill will be deducted from 
T1 common equity (net of impairment 
and amortization) 
Deducted from T1 common equity (net 
of deferred tax liabilities) 
Deferred tax 
assets 
Deferred tax assets (exceeds 20% of 
Tier 1 capital) ex for eligible collective 
provisions are deducted and netted 
off  
Deducted from T1 common equity (net 
of deferred tax liabilities) when future 
profitability is required. (if not e.g. tax 
prepayments included in sovereign risk 
weighting) 
Investments in 
own shares 
(Treasury shares) 
Shares held on behalf of third parties 
are not deducted, all others are 
deducted 
Deducted (including the look-through 
basis for index securities) 
Investments in 
banking, 
financial, 
insurance entities 
outside 
regulatory scope 
50/50 deducted from Tier 1 and Tier 
2 net of intangibles 
Deducted if it falls outside scope of 
regulatory consolidation (100% 
deduction from Tier 1 for excess 
expected losses) 
 Unrealized losses on securities (net) Unrealized gains and losses on 
securities 
 Table 4: Deductions form Tier 1 capital (Basel II versus Basel III) 
 Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Citigroup Inc. (2010), p. 7. 
 
The overall objectives of the leverage ratio, supplement to risk-based ratios, are:87 
• dampen excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement, 
• promote more forward looking provisions, 
• conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector 
that can be used in stress and 
• achieve a broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from 
periods of excess credit growth. 
                                                 
87 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 7. 
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One negative aspect is that Basel III suggestions could enlarge counterparty credit 
risk exposure due to strengthened requirements, for example mark-to-market losses 
due to credit valuation adjustments.88 Therefore the gap between the denominator 
and numerator of the Tier 1 capital ratio would be widened. 
 
The proposal also comprised some changes in the definition of capital, but did not 
suggest any specific cap of a leverage ratio and further details on the procedure of 
calculations. In the next chapter I will formulate the suggestions for a calculation 
mentioned most often.  
 
The pro-cyclical effect of leverage was also a topic of the Geneva report on the world 
economy in January 2009. The loss spiral is a simple concept to explain the 
mechanism. If the prices of assets of a bank fell, the net worth would fall faster than 
the rate at which the asset falls in value. To compensate, the banks could sell their 
assets.89 The second concept, which also explains that leverage is pro-cyclical, is 
called margin/haircut spiral.90 The difference between the current market price of a 
security and the price at which it is sold is called the haircut in the repurchase 
agreement (repo), which is a money market instrument in which the selling party 
agrees to repurchase a security in the future.91 The maximum restriction on leverage 
is determined by the haircut. If the haircut of a repo is 2%, the first bank can borrow 
$98 for $100 worth of securities. To hold $100 worth of securities, the second bank 
must come up with $2 of equity. Therefore the maximum permissible leverage 
(assets to equity) of the first bank is 50. If a shock reduces the haircut to 4%, the 
permitted leverage will be reduced to 25, therefore the bank will have to raise new 
equity.92 The new rules could cut down the core Tier 1 ratios of the European banks 
Lloyds Banking Group and Credit Agricole to nearly 4%. Barclays Tier 1 ratio could 
fall to 5%. Analysts at Credit Suisse believe that the Tier 1 ratio could be reduced 
from 9.6 to 8.1 by end of 2012. The effects of Basel III in relation to higher funding of 
equity capital, could cost European banks roughly $200 bn. The Basel III proposal 
                                                 
88 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a), p. 28. 
89 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009), p. 15f. 
90 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009), p. 16. 
91 Morris/Shin (2008), p. 11. 
92 See Morris/Shin (2008), p. 12. 
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would affect the capital ratios on both sides, the numerator will be reduced due to 
reduced capital while the denominator will rise due to higher riskiness of assets.93 
Moreover if prices drop, the lending channel will run short. Therefore margins 
increase and the risk also increases, which leads to higher external funding costs 
and forces banks to be risk-averse. When many financial institutions de-lever their 
positions simultaneously, liquidity will be reduced. Both of the spirals lead to pro-
cyclicality of leverage. Empirical results for big US investment banks show that 
leverage is high when the balance sheet is large and vice versa. The leverage ratio 
can reinforce an asset price shock.94 To counter the problem Brunnermeier et al. 
(2009) suggest to take leverage, maturity mismatch and estimates of bank credit 
expansion into account using the CAR measure.95 Therefore the CAR should be 
multiplied by a factor which relates to macro-prudential/systemic risk. This factor 
would increase the capital requirements during leveraging and decrease during 
periods of deleveraging. It is suggested that the focus for the capital ratio should be 
tier 1 ratio rather than tier 1 and tier or core tier 1 capital.96 In the case of Northern 
Rock, Shin (2008) reported the importance how the leverage ratio is calculated. He 
recorded, as presented in figure 2, that the leverage with common equity in the 
denominator is the best one while shareholder equity (common equity plus preferred 
shares) and total equity (shareholder equity plus subordinated debt including 
deposits) could distort the real picture how levered an institution is.97 Under Basel II 
capital requirement, subordinated debt and preferred shares are used as buffers 
against loss. On the other hand, subordinated debtholders and preferred 
shareholders are only another class of creditor to the bank because they do not have 
control of the operations of the bank as common equity holders. Northern Rock’s 
Leverage on common equity increased from 22.8 in June 1998 to 86.3 in December 
2007 while the leverage on total equity was roughly only 40 in December 2007.98 
Bear Stearns had a leverage ratio (total assets to shareholders equity) of 33.5 when 
it collapsed in 2007.99  
                                                 
93 See Slater (2010), URL: http://in.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idINIndia-45850920100202, retrieved 
 February 3rd 2010.  
94 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009), p. 16f. 
95 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009), p. 29. 
96 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009), p. 30f. 
97 See Shin (2008), p. 16ff. 
98 See Morris/Shin (2008), p. 25f. 
99 See Katz/Katz (2008), URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aYJZOB_gZi0I , 
 retrieved May 27th , 2009. 
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The traditional view on financial regulation neglects the importance of externalities by 
actions of one financial institution that impacts another, for example the balance 
sheet maturity mismatch. Two ideas are suggested. The first one is that constraints 
on the composition of assets could be made. The second idea is to limit the raw 
leverage ratio, rather than risk-weighted assets. Constraints of building-up leverage 
during good times could be used as a dampener in the financial system. On the one 
hand this raw leverage ratio could work for the debtor and creditor as well on the 
other hand such a leverage ratio does not take into account the riskiness of the 
assets.100 
 
 
 Figure 2: Northern Rock’s Leverage 
 Source: Shin (2008), p. 16. 
 
The latest example of nationalisation in Austria was the Hypo Group Alpe Adria. On 
the 14th of December 2009 the sixth largest Austrian bank, sorted by total assets, 
was nationalised by the Austrian government to avoid a bank collapse. The 
shareholders BayernLB, Grazer Wechselseitige (Austrian Insurer) and the Austrian 
                                                 
100 See Shin (2008), p. 20f. 
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state of Carinthia will inject about €1 billion. The most significant reason given was 
bad loan provisions that caused a loss of more than €1 billion in 2009. This was the 
second time that Austria had to rescue a bank because Kommunalkredit had also 
been nationalised in November 2008. BayernLB has writedowns on its investment of 
€2.3 bn. The Austrian government injected €450 m.101 
 
2.7. Leverage ratio 
Formally capital ratios were introduced in regulation in the US in 1981. Before 1981 
minimum requirements for capital itself were set. The FDIC set the minimum primary 
capital (initial investment of shareholders, retained earnings and capital reserves) 
standard at 5% of total assets for larger regional institutions and 6% for community 
banks.102 The Basel Capital Accord of 1988 determined that the minimum capital 
ratio of banks (total capital to risk-weighted assets) should be 8% by end of 1992.103 
This was the first time that the risk-weights were introduced. The Tier 1 capital ratio 
was set to be at least 4%. The sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital will be the capital 
base. Tier 1 capital elements are permanent shareholders’ equity (issued and fully-
paid share capital/common stock and perpetual non-cumulative preference shares) 
and disclosed reserves (share premiums, retained profit, general reserves and legal 
reserves). Tier 2 capital is the sum of undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation 
reserves, general provisions (as explained below), hybrid capital instruments and 
subordinated debt.104 The core capital is the Tier 1 capital.105 The Basel Committee 
recommended the risk-weighted approach for international comparison reasons 
allows off-balance-sheet exposures to incorporate it in the measure and does not 
deter banks to hold liquid assets with low risk.106  
 
For the Basel II approach there were suggestions to use a supplementary capital 
measure, i.e. leverage ratio or a large exposure limit in the first pillar or allow 
                                                 
101 See Bryant/Wilson (2009), URL: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/75467b10-e917-11de-a756-
 00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1, retrieved December 20th, 2009. 
102 See Gilbert/Stone/Trebing (1985), p. 14. 
103 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), p. 2. 
104 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 13ff. 
105 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 3. 
106 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), p. 7f. 
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supervisors to force banks to operate above the minimum capital requirement.107 The 
Basel II Committee set the minimum capital requirement for credit, market and 
operational risk again to 8%. This ratio is called total capital ratio und is defined as 
the regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. The Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of 
the Tier 1 capital, which has remained unchanged since 1988. The Tier 1 capital 
remained the same as clarified in Oct. 1998. The Tier 2 capital is limited to 1.25% of 
risk-weighted assets under the standardised approach which was incurred in the 
amendment of 1991. The Tier 3 capital has remained also unchanged since Sept. 
1997. The total risk-weighted assets are defined by multiplying the capital 
requirements for market and operational risk by 12.5 which means the reciprocal of 
the minimum capital ratio of 8% and adding the risk-weighted assets for credit risk.108 
 
As Bernanke reported, banks are well capitalized with at least Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets at 6% and a minimum Tier 1 tangible common equity ratio (excl. 
goodwill) of 4%.109 
 
Currently, three countries are using or planning to use a leverage ratio, which are 
US, Canada and Switzerland. The calculation differs in all countries. The US 
leverage ratio is calculated by dividing the Tier 1 capital to total adjusted assets 
(derivatives netting) on a consolidated basis and does not include off-balance-sheet 
exposures. The ratio should be at least 3% for “strong” rated banks and 4% for all 
other banks. The Leverage ratio is therefore an indicator of how close the bank is to 
insolvency. The Canadian leverage ratio is calculated by dividing the total assets 
(including off-balance sheet exposure) by its Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. The multiple 
should be smaller than 20 which is a ratio on a reverse basis of at least 5%.110 
 
The FINMA, the Swiss Supervisory Authority, has introduced a ‘new’ leverage ratio to 
limit the leverage of banks, especially for Credit Suisse and UBS which are Swiss 
systemic banks. The Swiss Leverage ratio is calculated by dividing the Tier 1 capital 
to total assets and set a minimum of 3% at consolidated level and 4% at individual 
                                                 
107 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p. 3. 
108 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), p. 12. 
109 See Bernanke (2009), URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090511a.htm#f5, 
 retrieved January 25th, 2010. 
110 See Financial Systems Department of the World Bank’s FPD Vice Presidency (2009), p. 2. 
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level. The SNB suggested that leverage over 20 is not prudent in good times, which 
means that the capital base should be at least 5% of the total assets. To leave the 
banks enough time in the ongoing turbulent time, these targets should be applied as 
of 2013 at the earliest.111 
 
It is not yet formulated whether the leverage ratio will be monitored by supervisors 
under Pillar II or a strict requirement under Pillar I of the changed Basel Accord. The 
study of Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000) pointed out that a leverage ratio predict 
bank failure over one- or two-year time horizons. On the other hand, risk-weighted 
ratios tend to perform better indicators over the longer horizon than leverage 
ratios.112  
 
Therefore the calculation is not yet defined for an implementation. The calculations 
are summarized in the equation 4 to 6. Equations 4 to 6 show an overview of the 
current minimum capital requirements of the ratios, beside the fact that the minimum 
capital requirements vary throughout countries.  
 
ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ
ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ 2% 
Equation 4: Minimum Common equity ratio 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) 
 
ܶ݅݁ݎ 1
ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ 4% 
Equation 5: Minimum Tier 1 capital ratio 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) 
 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ሺܶ݅݁ݎ 1,2 ܽ݊݀ 3ሻ
ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ 8% 
Equation 6: Minimum Total Capital ratio  
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) 
 
Equation 7 to 9 show the new calculations under the Basel III approach with different 
adjustments as mentioned. The Tier 3 capital, for example was abolished and the 
composition of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital changed. 
 
                                                 
111 See SNB (2009), p. 7. 
112 See Estrella/Park/Peristiani (2000), p. 50. 
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ܥ݋݉݉݋݊ ݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ ݎܽݐ݅݋ ൌ
ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ ሺ݊݁ݓሻ
ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ ݔ% 
Equation 7: Common equity ratio under Basel III 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a) 
 
ܶ݅݁ݎ 1 ݎܽݐ݅݋ ൌ
ܶ݅݁ݎ 1 ሺ݊݁ݓሻ
ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ ݔ% 
Equation 8: Tier 1 ratio under Basel III 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a) 
 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ݎܽݐ݅݋ ൌ
ܶ݅݁ݎ 1 ൅ ܶ݅݁ݎ 2 ሺ݊݁ݓሻ
ݎ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൒ ݔ% 
Equation 9: Total capital ratio under Basel III 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a) 
 
The leverage ratio (LR) should be, according to BIS, a non-risk-sensitive, 
comparatively simple monitoring and control measure. The most important 
calculation of a Leverage ratio is the second Leverage ratio that is Tier 1 capital to 
total assets. The other two calculation methods are summarized in Equation 11 and 
12. Using the common equity or the Total capital rather than the Tier 1 capital could 
also be valued to see the best calculation method and possible differences if there 
are any.  
 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ݎܽݐ݅݋ 1 ൌ
ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ ሺ݊݁ݓሻ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 
Equation 10: Leverage ratio 1 
Source: Own view according to Swiss, Canadian and US measurement 
 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ݎܽݐ݅݋ 2 ൌ
ܶ݅݁ݎ 1 ሺ݊݁ݓሻ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 
Equation 11: Leverage ratio 2 
Source: Own view according to Swiss, Canadian and US measurement 
 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ݎܽݐ݅݋ 3 ൌ
ܶ݅݁ݎ 1 ൅ ܶ݅݁ݎ 2 ሺ݊݁ݓሻ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 
Equation 12: Leverage ratio 3 
Source: Own view according to Swiss, Canadian and US measurement 
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2.8. The Austrian Banking Sector 
Under the Austrian Banking Act a credit institution refers to an institution authorised 
to carry out banking transactions under Austrian federal law (Article 1 (1) Federal 
Banking Act). Such transactions include activities like: 
• accepting funds from other parties for financial management and depository 
purposes 
• carrying out non-cash payment- and billing transactions 
• granting loans and closing loan-related contracts 
• taking custody of securities and managing these for customers 
• issuing different means of payment (e.g. credit cards, checks) 
• issuing securities (e.g. bonds) 
 
The Austrian banking sector is divided into three main categories (single-stage, two-
stage and three-stage banks) and eight sectors. Single-stage banks are independent 
of superior institutions holding. This means joint stock banks (Aktienbanken pursuant 
Article 51 Federal Banking Act) like the BAWAG P.S.K. AG or Unicredit Bank Austria 
AG, state mortgage banks (Landeshypothekenbanken pursuant Article 11), building 
and loan associations (Bausparkassen pursuant Article 4), Special purpose banks 
including severance funds, real estate funds and investment companies 
(Sonderbanken pursuant Article 93) and branch offices (Zweigstellen pursuant Article 
28) refer to single-stage banks.113 Special purpose banks are corporations with 
specific tasks, especially financing exports (OeKB), granting investment loans, 
managing investment funds, issuing credit cards or preparing severance funds.114 
Two-stage sector banks are defined as having a number of credit institutions and one 
superior institution with certain interference abilities and responsibilities. This must 
not be a corporate group. It does only mean that a superior credit institution 
consolidates its financial statements. The superior institutions have the coordination 
and liquidity management function, which means that it can control the liquidity of all 
institutions through compensatory operations. Under this category, Savings Banks 
(Sparkassen pursuant Article 56) e.g. Erste Bank AG and Volksbank credit 
                                                 
113 See Schnabler (2007), p. 2f. 
114 See Schnabler (2007), p. 4. 
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cooperatives (Volksbanken pursuant Article 69) e.g. ÖVAG are included.115 The 
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives (Raiffeisenbanken pursuant Article 558) belong to the 
three-level sector in Austria. The lower stage of individual Raiffeisen banks exists in 
all of the states (provinces). The holders of the ownership rights in the competent 
state banks of the province in which they are situated constitute the second level of 
the sector. The nine state-banks hold ownership rights in the superior (third level) 
central institution, namely the Raiffeisen Central Bank.116  
 
In Austria, 51 Joint stock banks and private banks head offices (784 branch offices), 
55 savings banks (997), 11 state mortgage banks (997), 545 Raiffeisen credit 
cooperatives (1689), 68 Volksbank credit cooperatives (478) and 4 building and loan 
associations (43), 92 special purpose banks (11), 29 member State credit institutions 
(5) are covered by the OeNB in the fourth quarter of 2009.117 In Austria, in total 855 
head offices and 4172 branch offices are registered.118 
 
Table 5 compares the total assets of the Austrian banking sector between 1995 and 
2008. At the end of December 2008, joint stock banks had the largest market share 
in terms of total assets (29%) by €308 bn out of €1047 bn total assets, followed by 
Raiffeisen cooperatives and savings banks, which accounted for 25% and 17% of 
total assets. Total assets increased sharply from  €390 bn to €1047 bn from 1995 to 
2008. In 1995 the largest banking sector had been savings banks by one third of total 
assets. The total assets of special purpose banks such as investment companies 
increased from €28 bn in 1995 to €102 bn in 2008, although the offices of such banks 
were only 107 out of 5727 at the end of 2008. This is an interesting point, because 
2% of Austrian banks have a volume of total assets of 10%, which is quite high.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 See Schnabler (2007), p. 4f 
116 See Schnabler (2007), p. 6. 
117 See OeNB (2010b), URL: http://www.oenb.at/isaweb/report.do?report=3.1.1#optionen, retrieved            
 March 25th, 2010. 
118 See OeNB (2010c), URL: http://www.oenb.at/isaweb/report.do?lang=EN&report=3.1.2, retrieved          
 March 25th, 2010. 
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Total assets (in € bn) 1995 2008 
Joint stock banks 111 308 
Savings banks 121 177 
State mortgage banks 21 96 
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives 78 265 
Volksbank credit cooperatives 17 79 
Building and loan associations 14 20 
Special Purpose banks 28 102 
 390 1047 
 Table 5: Total Assets (in € bn) of 1995 and 2008 
 Source: OeNB 
 
Figure 3 shows the changes of total assets of the Austrian Banks and the number of 
banks between 1995 and 2008. While the total assets increased by 168%, the 
number of banks declined by 12%, from 5727 (1041 head offices) in 1995 to 5027 
(855 head offices) in 2008. Joint stock banks had the largest total asset growth of 
roughly 22% or €65 bn compared to 2007. According to 1995, Volksbank credit 
cooperatives and state mortgage banks had the largest asset growth of 365% and 
357%. The total asset growth of joint stock banks between 1995 and 2008 was 
178%.  
 
 
 Figure 3: Total Assets versus Number of banks (incl. branch offices) between 1995 and 2008 
 Source: OeNB 
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The total number of monetary financial institutions as head offices (MFIs) in the Euro 
Area stood at 8,076 in December 2009. In comparison with January 1999, this is a 
decrease of 1,726. In the European Union, there were 10,192 MFis in December 
2009, a decrease of only 717 from 10,919, compared to January 1999. The vast 
majority of credit institutions are commercial banks, savings banks, postal banks, 
credit unions, while money market funds are the minority. In Austria, 820 banks are 
included (791 credit institutions, 28 money market funds, 1 central bank)119 with an 
aggregated balance sheet total of €830 bn.120 The top 6 of Austrian banks by total 
assets (UniCredit Bank Austria, Erste Group, RZB Group, ÖVAG, Hypo Group, 
BAWAG P.S.K. Group) had an aggregate amount of €700 bn, which is roughly 84%, 
by the end of 2008. 
 
                                                 
119 See ECB (2010), URL: http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100120.en.html, retrieved March 25th, 
 2010. 
120 See ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse 
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3. Commercial Banking 
In this chapter I present a short revision of the development of investment banking 
and the separation to commercial banking, if there is a separation. Further the 
leverage and derivatives in financial institutions will be discussed in general. 
Moreover liquidity and leverage will be illustrated as well as the role of sovereigns, 
which are also called government bonds. 
 
3.1. Investment versus commercial banking 
As we heard, the Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial from investment banking 
in the US after the Great Depression in 1933. In 1999 the US Congress repealed the 
Glass-Steagall Act and replaced it by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In 2008, after a 
lot of criticism and at the beginning of the financial crisis, the investment banks were 
forced to change their status into commercial banks for tighter regulation 
purposes.121 After the Glass-Steagall Act, the investment bank Morgan Stanley for 
example was formed by Henry S. Morgan and Harold Stanley. In Europe the two 
activities can be combined in one single firm. Originally investment banks acted as  
brokers and helped customers raise funds or give advice on mergers and 
acquisitions, while commercial banks offer traditional services like taking deposits. 
The separation is controversial. Commercial banks are financial intermediaries with 
high leverage i.e. a large proportion of short-term debt such as deposits. The 
commercial banks’ funds are moreover used to offer loans to firms and individuals. 
Investment banks also offer activities like trading and brokerage, asset management, 
and underwriting and advisory services as mentioned. Such banks therefore use their 
assets to issue debt. One of the possibilities is called asset backed securitization.122 
It is clear that commercial banks exist because firms and individuals do not always 
have access to financial markets issuing bonds and stocks. The reason for the 
existence of the role of investment and commercial banks is always the same: 
information asymmetry. The traditional banking, which is borrowing short and lending 
                                                 
121 See Wiebe, (2010), URL: http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/obamas-vorbild-glass-steagall-
 act-von-1933;2516803, retrieved January, 21st, 2010. 
122 See Iannotta (2010), p. 2ff. 
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long is no more valid. Mishkin (2007) outlined, that in the US, the importance of 
commercial banks as a source of funds to non-financial borrowers shrunk from 40% 
in 1974 to 30% in 2005123 which is quite enough including the fact that the number of 
banks also decreased.  
 
By the end of 2009, in the US the number of commercial banks which had Total 
Assets above $1 bn was 514 out of 6839 total national banks. The largest 514 
commercial banks had a total share of total assets of 90%124, which is an impressive 
figure and shows the problematic of the size and their allocation in terms of total 
assets, as we will see later. Figure 4 shows the number of US Commercial Banks 
and their Total Assets in History between 1896 and 2009. The number of commercial 
banks decreased by 69%, from 23,098 to 6,839, in the 100 years from 1909 to 2009. 
The total assets skyrocketed in the same period from $18,145 bn to $11,846,114 bn. 
Especially the First and Second World Wars influenced the picture. In 1945 at the 
end of the Second World War, the number of commercial banks in the US stood at 
13,302 while the total assets stood at $157,582 bn. 
 
 
 Figure 4: Number of US Commercial Banks (FDIC-Insured) 1896-2009 
 Source: FDIC, FRASER Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
By the end of 2009, there were 6,458 credit institutions in the Euro Area registered by 
the European Central Bank, which is slightly below the number of the US 
                                                 
123 See Mishkin (2007), p. 257. 
124 See FDIC (2009), URL: http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main4.asp, retrieved May 16th 2010. 
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Commercial Banks. Compared to overall monetary financial institutions in the Euro 
Area this is a market share of 80% (6458 out of 8076). In Austria and Germany there 
is an integrated provision of financial services (‘universal banking system’), which 
means that there is no clear distinction between commercial and investment banks. 
Some banks, like the Deutsche Bank AG, also operate in niche products like 
brokerage and other special investment services.  
 
3.2. Leverage and derivatives in financial institutions 
The bank balance sheet is a list of banks’ assets and liabilities. The total assets are 
the sum of total liabilities plus capital. The liabilities are the sources of a bank for 
example checkable deposits, non-transaction deposits and borrowings. The assets 
illustrate the use of funds. Examples are reserves, loans and securities. Banks with 
deposits need reserves to fill the reserve requirements and to have excess reserves 
to meet their obligations when funds are withdrawn.125 Excess reserves are also an 
insurance against costs with deposit outflows.126 Important factors that could 
increase the risk of banks, but is not considered on the balance sheet, are off-
balance-sheet instruments and activities.127 
 
Commercial banks normally have a leverage ratio between 10 and 12. Lehmann 
Brothers had a ratio of 30 with only 3% equity of total assets at the end of 2007.128 At 
the end of 2007 the UBS and Credit Suisse were highly levered, UBS with a simple 
leverage ratio of 53.129 Normally investment banks have leverage ratios between 20 
and 25.130 
 
                                                 
125 See Mishkin (2007), p. 222. 
126 Mishkin (2007), p. 229. 
127 See Mishkin (2007), p. 241f. 
128 See Morris/Shin (2008), p. 14. 
129 See Morris/Shin (2008), p. 23. 
130 See Greenlaw et al. (2008), p. 37. 
  46 
 
 Figure 5: Total Financial Assets of Financial Intermediaries as % of commercial banks Total Assets 
 Source: Adrian/Shin (2008a), p. 10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and HFR. 
 
Figure 5 shows Security Brokers and Dealers and Hedge Funds total financial assets 
on the balance sheet relative to commercial banks. For the Hedge Funds, the total 
assets under management (with reference to total shareholder equity) are used. This 
value is multiplied by a leverage of 2 as a proxy. The combined balance sheet 
Security Brokers and hedge funds therefore is over 50% of commercial banks 
balance sheet. A problem might be that the balance sheet is marked to market, so 
reactions could be proportionally large. The balance sheet as a decoupled figure is 
not a good indicator, because in the past Long Term Capital Management’s (LTCM) 
balance sheet was relatively small to the total financial sector and the impact was a 
dramatic one.131  
 
A combination of leverage and total assets could be a better indicator. Adrian and 
Shin (2008) found out that leverage is procyclical because, even when leverage is 
large, total assets are large. They show a positive relationship between the change in 
leverage and the change in total assets. On the other side, leverage is positively 
related to short-term debt, repos and other collateralised borrowings. Especially the 
balance sheet increases through repos and reverse repos, which is a contract when 
an institution sells a security and simultaneously agrees to buy it back at a fixed price 
on a fixed future date. Therefore investment banks use repos for financing 
                                                 
131 See Adrian/Shin (2008a), p. 10.  
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activities.132 The balance sheet of investment banks has often shown a lot of short-
term claims i.e. repos and reverse repos which are marked-to-market.133 
 
The current credit crisis was enhanced by two mechanisms. The first one has been 
constituted by problems in the interbank funding market, especially collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) and asset-backed commercial papers (ABCPs). These 
assets are held by leveraged institutions like Security brokers, off-balance-sheet 
vehicles or hedge funds specializing in mortgage securities.134 More than half of the 
ABCP daily issuance has maturities of 1 to 4 days. The average maturity of 
outstanding paper is about 30 days.135 ABCP are often held by money market mutual 
funds. The most traditional ABCP program is the multi-seller program, in which a 
bankruptcy-remote conduit purchases receivables and loans from multiple firms. The 
sponsor is typically a financial institution that provides the conduit (Special Purpose 
Vehicle) with a committed liquidity line.136 In the end of July 2007, there were 98 
multi-seller programs with $525 bn ABCP outstanding, which was 45% of the total 
ABCP outstanding. Other ABCPs are issued by collateralized debt obligations in the 
form of structured investment vehicles. Structured investment vehicles (SIVs) are 
highly-rated securities which do not have explicit agreements with their sponsoring 
banks for committed back-stop liquidity lines to cover short-term liabilities. The 
difference to structured investment vehicles (SIVs) is that CDOs are not actively 
managed and tend to rely on explicit, but only partial liquidity support.137 Sovereign 
debt and high-grade corporate bonds remain stable in the early times of crisis.138 
This situation for sovereigns changed in the later stage of the crisis as we will see 
later. The second problem arose from the subprime mortgages. The credit quality of 
mortgages began to fall in the early 2007.139 
 
In the summer of 2007, the US Asset-Backed Commercial paper market erupted. 
Due to decline in confidence in mortgage financial intermediaries and rating 
downgrades of structured mortgage securities, investors got reluctant to roll over 
                                                 
132 See Adrian/Shin (2008a), p.11f. 
133 See Greenlaw et al. (2008), p. 37. 
134 See Greenlaw et al. (2008), p. 41. 
135 See Covitz/Liang/Suarez (2009), p. 7. 
136 Covitz/Liang/Suarez (2009), p. 8ff. 
137 See Covitz/Liang/Suarez (2009), p. 8. 
138 See Greenlaw et al. (2008), p. 41. 
139 See Greenlaw et al. (2008), p. 41. 
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ABCPs and the outstanding ABCP amount plummeted by $190 bn, roughly 20% in 
August and additional $160 to $830 bn by the end of 2007140, as Figure 6 exhibits. 
The total value of asset-backed commercial paper outstanding fell by 37% from 
August 2007 to August 2008.141  
 
In chapter Basel II weaknesses I mentioned the example Northern Rock. Northern 
Rock, which was the fifth largest UK mortgage bank, sorted by mortgage assets, 
began to get into trouble during the early time of the financial crisis, in mid-2007. On 
the 14th of September 2007, the Bank of England announced a liquidity support for 
Northern Rock. Some days before, on the 9th of August, short-term borrowing 
through securitized notes ran dry. The British mortgage lenders had many off-
balance sheet investment vehicles in their portfolio, for example Asset-backed 
commercial papers with high exposures in the US subprime market. Their business 
focus was focused on non-retail funding such as interbank deposits and covered 
bonds and only 23% of its liabilities were retail deposits. The total assets of Northern 
Rock grew from £17.4 bn in June 1998 to £113.5 bn in June 2007. Between 8th and 
15th of August, the amount of outstanding Asset-backed commercial papers dropped 
sharply by 4%, as stated in Figure 6. The problem therefore was not only the off-
balance sheet investments, but also that they used short-term funding from the same 
Special Purpose Vehicle Pool.142 
 
                                                 
140 See Covitz/Liang/Suarez (2009), p. 1. 
141 See Kacperczyk/Schnabl (2009), p. 1. 
142 See Shin (2008), p. 2ff. 
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 Figure 6: Asset-Backed Commercial Papers outstanding 
 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
Figure 7 shows the composition of liabilities of Northern Rock before and after the 
run and the liquidity support from the Bank of England. While covered bonds and 
securitized notes stood relatively constant, there were significant changes in retail 
deposits and wholesale funding i.e. non-retail funding (without covered bonds and 
securitized notes). Wholesales liabilities drop from £26.7 bn to £11.5 bn between 
June and December 2007. The wholesales liabilities were mostly short-term or 
medium-term and the maturing loans and deposits were not renewed by the 
investors. Furthermore the pool of the special investment vehicles was the same as 
the short-term wholesale funding i.e. short-term creditors.143 
 
The retail deposits plummeted from £24.4 bn to £10.5 bn by more than 50%. These 
deposits show a large reduction in postal account deposits and offshore deposits 
while the typical customer deposits fall less.144 
 
                                                 
143 Shin (2008), p. 10ff. 
144 Shin (2008), p. 12. 
US Asset-Backed Commercial Papers outstanding in 2007
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
01/2007 02/2007 03/2007 04/2007 05/2007 06/2007 07/2007 08/2007 09/2007 10/2007 11/2007 12/2007
in USD bn
8th Aug 2007
15th Aug 2007
  50 
 
 Figure 7: Aftermath of Run: Composition of Liabilites (in million £) 
 Source: Shin (2008), p. 10. 
 
Banking institutions began to hoard their cash positions in order to meet their ABCP 
obligations and became hesitant in interbank lending markets. Therefore the risk 
spreads for overnight interbank funding widened sharply, while the outstanding 
amount decreased. Figure 8 shows that the daily spreads of the AA-rated Asset-
Backed Commercial Papers over the target federal funds rate in the US Market 
widened from 0.1 to roughly 1.1 by 1 percentage points in July and August 2007.  
 
 
 Figure 8: Spreads (Overnight AA Asset-backed Commercial Paper Interest Rate to Effective Federal 
 Funds Rate) of Overnight Asset-Backed Commercial Papers 
 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Liquidity injections of national and central banks enabled opportunities for financial 
intermediaries to expand their balance sheets by borrowing from the central bank 
and forward lending to other parties.  
 
Figure 9 summarizes the notional amount outstanding (gross nominal of all deals 
concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date) of interest rate and currency 
swaps, equity derivatives and credit default swaps from 1995 to 2008. The data is 
collected by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) which 
conducted detailed surveys of overall over-the-counter derivatives activities and has 
collected data since 1987 of transactions or reporting institutions worldwide. The 
notional amount outstanding of overall derivatives dramatically skyrocketed from   
$17 trn in 1995 to $441 trn by the end of 2008. The notional amount of interest rate 
derivatives outstanding, for example interest rate swaps, interest rate options, 
forward rate agreements and foreign exchange contracts such as currency swaps, by 
the end of 2008 was roughly $403 trn which is roughly 90% of the overall outstanding 
amount. The most important OTC derivatives are interest rate contracts, especially 
interest rate swaps with a 77% market share of roughly $309 trn out of $403 trn 
overall interest rate and currency contracts. The rapid growth of derivatives was 
mostly due to the growth in interest rate contracts. The total credit default swaps 
outstanding was roughly $38 trn by the end of 2008 and fell by 38% compared to 
2007 due to the financial crisis, while the other derivatives outstanding increased. 
The notional amount of equity derivatives, which are especially options and futures, 
had been roughly $8.7 trn with a market share of only 2% by the end of 2008. 
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 Figure 9: Total derivatives outstanding 1995-2008 (in USD bn) 
 Source: ISDA Market Survey (annual data) 
 
3.3. Liquidity, Leverage and the role of Sovereigns 
The importance of liquidity was emphasized by a lot of economists. Goldstein (2008) 
argued that much of the crisis was due to liquidity. Especially large banks in the G-7 
countries have reduced the share of liquid assets before the crisis such as treasuries 
and got their liquidity by short-term borrowing.145 In response to increase in prices, 
financial market liquidity can be seen as a rate of growth of aggregate balance 
sheets.146 On a theoretical basis, if it is assumed that a financial institution holds 100 
worth of securities, with debt worth 90 and the price of debt is assumed to be 
constant for small changes in total assets. If the price of securities increases by 1% 
to 101, the Leverage will fall from 10 to 9.18 (securities worth 101 divided by equity 
worth 11). When the bank has a target leverage of 10, then it must take additional 
debt and purchase securities. On the other side, if Leverage is too high, the bank 
could sell their securities and paying down debt. When the leverage of banks is pro-
cyclical, then leverage is high during booms and low during busts.147 
 
If financial markets are not liquid, i.e. a greater supply of assets, which are marked-
to-market, tends to put downward pressure on its price. Therefore weaker balance 
                                                 
145 See Goldstein (2008), p. 6. 
146 See Adrian/Shin (2008a), p. 4. 
147 See Adrian/Shin (2008a), p. 10f. 
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sheets lead to greater sales of the assets, which put the asset’s price down. When 
asset prices decrease, banks leverage tends to be higher. When asset prices 
increase, financial intermediaries’ balance sheets become stronger and their 
leverage tends to be low and financials tend to hold surplus capital.148 Adrian and 
Shin (2008) show that key balance sheet forecast changes in the Volatility Index of 
implied volatility in the stock market.149  
 
Figure 10 shows the development of the liquidity index on a monthly basis between 
the 1st of January 1997 and to 30th June of 2009. The Liquidity Index, which is 
published by the Bank of England, shows the number of standard deviations from the 
mean. It is a simple unweighted average of nine liquidity measures, normalised on 
the period 1999-2004. The series shown is an exponentially weighted moving 
average. After 1997 the indicator is more reliable as it is based on a greater number 
of underlying measures. Liquidity measures incorporate the gaps between bid and 
offer prices on bonds, currencies and stocks, the ratio of market returns to trading 
volumes and spreads in the credit market.150 The decline which started in August 
2007 is mostly due to the sharp decline in the interbank market liquidity and a 
response to US sub-prime market downturn. Bank’s funding became vulnerable to a 
sudden shift in financial market conditions and worsened the credit conditions. The 
sharp decline of liquidity was across the global market. Especially the dramatic fall in 
the Liquidity Index was due to negative effects on prices of securitised assets which 
are globally linked to each other. Such a fall was exacerbated by the high leverage of 
financial institutions. A number of institutions needed financial support from the public 
sector including Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. 
                                                 
148 See Adrian/Shin (2008a), p. 37. 
149 See Adrian/Shin (2008a), p. 12. 
150 See Bloomberg definitions 
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 Figure 10: The liquidity index from 01-01-1997 to 30-06-2009 (monthly basis) 
 Source: Bank of England, Bloomberg, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Debt Management Office, 
  London Stock Exchange, Merrill Lynch, Thomson Datastream & Bank calculations 
 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), which was introduced in 
1993, equals the implied volatility (estimation of future volatility) on the S&P 500 
Index. The S&P 500 index publishes prices of the 500 large-cap stocks traded in the 
US. The VIX reflects aggregate financial market volatility and the price of risk. The 
VIX is used as a benchmark for US stock market volatility, is often used for financial 
market conditions as measure of ‘fear’. The index estimates expected volatility by 
averaging the weighted prices of the S&P 500 put and call options over a wide range 
of strike prices.151 
 
In history, the VIX reflects investor fear regarding a potential drop in the US stock 
market. The S&P 500 and the VIX Index are normalized on January 1997. Recent 
crises are plotted in Figure 11. Every few years an event shocked financial markets. 
Previous crises are the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the Russian Crisis including 
Long-Term-Capital-Management (1998), 9/11 (2001), the DotCom bubble (2000-
2002) and the recent problems with Bear Stearns collapse (2007) and Lehman filing 
for Chapter 11 (2008). The dramatic downturn in the market in late 2008 can also be 
seen in the VIX graph. On a normalized basis (starting point 01-01-1997) the VIX 
                                                 
151 See CBOE (2009), p. 1. 
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rose by almost 80% during the Asian Financial Crisis from the beginning of 1997 to 
November 1997. The 100% upward slope was reached during the Russian Financial 
crisis in 1998 and again on 9/11 and the DotCom Bubble. The years between 2003 
and 2007 were years of steady growth. While the collapse of Bear Stearns had less 
impact on the VIX index, the Lehman failure had the historical highest impact on the 
VIX Index, which rose by 4x times higher than the levels bevor. Due to the turmoil, 
the S&P 500 fell off to the levels of 1997. During these years, the VIX flutuated 
between 10 and 35 and dropped sharply to 89 at the end of 2008. The Lehman 
bankrupcty triggered a very high volatility “regime”. 
 
 
 Figure 11: Development of the S&P 500 and the VIX Index normalized from Jan 1997 to Jan 2009 
 Source: Bloomberg 
 
Historically it is known that sovereigns have always be seen as a safe investment 
which can not default. A lot of scientists had build models, for example the CAPM of 
Treynor, Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin in the 1960s, and took the yield for long-term 
government bonds as a risk-free rate. The current situation is different and 
sovereigns play a role in the development of the crisis. The Argentina’s debt crisis, 
starting in 2001, has been the biggest default ever in terms of                      
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monetary amounts ($ 90 bn).152 Greece is the latest addition, which peaked at 115% 
debt/GDP ratio by 2009, and according to IMF estimations could again increase to 
150% by the end of 2011. The highest US debt-to-GDP ratio was 109% at the end of 
World War II.153 As we heard recent crisis had signifcant impacts on global equity 
markets. The domestic impact on crisis depends on perceived global systemic risk 
and contagion effects on financial institutions. We are now in the fourth stage of the 
cycle, the sovereign risk phase. In the first stage, the financial crisis was in the built-
up period, where sovereigns were almost stable and volatility markets largely ignored 
the problems. It started with the US housing price bubble in the subprime mortgage 
market in 2007. Afterwards other commercial and investment banks were affected by 
the mortgage meltdown and the market for asset-backed commercial papers. In the 
first time only highly leveraged banks were largerly affected and defaulted. The 
second stage was the systemic outbreak as Figure 12 summaries. This chart shows 
the 10-year german government bond yield compared to the 10-year government 
bond yield to PIIGS (Portgual, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) which is simply 
called the yields spread between 10-year Greek government bonds and their 
benchmark 10-year German Bunds. Through the massive liquidity shortages of 
banks, some financial institutions ran into problems i.e. Northern Rock, Bear Stearns 
and later Lehman. 
 
In the third stage the central banks intervened in October 2008 to lower interest rates 
to provide liquidity and foreign currency. During this phase, national governments 
wanted to stabilize the domestic market by expanding insurance on guarantees for 
depositors and guarantees for banks. The IMF, for example, issued loans to Hungary 
($15.7 bn) and the Ukraine ($16.4 bn) and granted loans to Belarus, Bosnia & 
Herzigovina, Iceland, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania and Serbia. Banks in the EU 
have already nearly $1.5 trn assets invested in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
crisis has underscored the interdepence between financial markets in the US and 
European economies.154 Central banks engaged in direct injections of capital to 
support banks balance sheets which were also necessary in the case of Austria. Due 
to the Lehman bankruptcy, credit markets were frozen up and the CDS contracts that 
                                                 
152 See Olivares-Caminal (2010), p. 91. 
153 See Dickson, (2010), URL: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/26/cbos-2020-vision-debt-will-
 rise-to-90-of-gdp/, retrieved August, 17th, 2010. 
154 See Jackson (2009), p. 2f. 
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referenced Lehman led to high counterparty risks. The crisis demonstrated that 
financial markets are interdependent across national borders. As we have seen, a lot 
of financial institutions are “too big to fail” and covered by the central bank which is 
banking system without an explicit Lender of Last Resort. This could explain why low 
interest rates did not work successfully. Furthermore, the monetary policy of central 
banks by narrowing interest rates to zero and injecting capital didn’t work because 
banks didn’t channel the capital into the real economy.  
 
In the old Keynesian view, a liquidity trap is defined as a situation in which short-term 
nominal interest rate is zero. Increasing money supply has no effect in a liquidity trap 
and monetary policy is ineffetive because short-term nominal interest rate can not be 
less than zero as long as as commercial banks hold excess reserves at zero interest 
with the central bank.155 The liquidity preference theory suggested that holding long-
term securities, for example bonds, will yield a premium to investors rather than 
short-term securities due to greater uncertainty about the liquidity. In practice this is 
dependent on the term structure of interest rates. According to Keynes, liquid assets 
are bills and call loans because they are realisable at short notice without loss and 
therefore investments are more liquid than advances. Hicks (1962) explained that the 
term “without loss” should be used in a comparative manner, for example the book 
value to the current market value.156 Hicks defines the term ‘Liqudity’ itself as the 
judgment of the adequacy of liquid assets that are comprised in it to meet the claims 
which are made upon them.157 Furthermore for judging liquidity, someone should use 
conventional rules such as ratios.158 In general, the judging of liquidity is not easy 
and short-term liquidity problems forces banks into bankrupcy.  
 
 
                                                 
155 See Keynes (1936), p. 37f. 
156 See Hicks (1962), p. 789ff. 
157 Hicks (1962), p. 794. 
158 See Hicks (1962), p. 794. 
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Figure 12: 10-year sovereign spreads (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal to Germany as a 
 benchmark) (01-01-2008 to 21-04-2010) 
 Source: Bloomberg, IMF, Ithuba Capital Research 
 
In the fourth stage financial markets, on bank balance sheets or sovereign balance 
sheets, do not support leverage and liquidity will be withdrawn as a part of policy 
exits. Therefore sovereign credit risk premiums increased substantially in some of the 
major economies which are most hit by the crisis. By the 21st of April the Irish and 
Portuguese yield spreads were by 142 bp and 134 bp, while Spainish and Italian 
yield spreads were below 80 bp, but also rose in the first quarter 2010. In the fourth 
stage the Greek yield spread over German bunds rose by 73% to a new high of 413 
basis points from the 1 st January to 21 st April 2010, as investors demanded a yield of 
7.23% for a 10-year Greek bond, compared with a 3.10% yield on German bunds. 
Therefore there is a contagion of spreads for PIIGS sovereign spreads, because 
spreads are increasing due to increasing sovereign default risk of Greece. After April, 
the Greek spreads increased again. This was mainly due to private investors, who 
withdrew money from their deposits in the fear of taxes on deposits and the 
uncertainty of the banking system. The transmission of sovereign risks to the banking 
system could subvert financial stability as a whole. The effects of the de-leveraging 
process of banks are most challenging because banks have to write down loan 
losses. Poorly capitalized banks furthermore have to file for bankrupcty or need 
support from the government. Further stages are currently uncertain, but it might be 
possible that sovereign problems spill back to the banking sector.  
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 Figure 13: 5y CDS Spreads Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal (01-01-2008 to 23-04-2010) 
 Source: Bloomberg 
 
Figure 13 gives an overview of the development over 5-year CDS spreads of Austria 
compared to Greece, Ireland and Portgual. The spreads for five-year Greece CDS 
increased to almost 600 basis points in 2010. This means that the costs of protecting 
government debt for five years against default in Greece is still rising. The influence 
of Greece on other countries is illustratet in the chart because also spreads of CDS 
of Portgual and Ireland widened. By the end of 23th of April 2010 the Austrian 
spreads were at around 67 basis points which is a dramatic difference to Greece. 
The Figure also provides the last chart of the evolution of the financial crisis and the 
contagion of spreads. It is not surprising that rating agencies firstly cut the banks 
credit rating of the four largest Banks in Greece and secondly downgraded Greek 
bonds to junk status.  
 
Figure 14 plots the percentage of countries in default or restructuring historically 
during any given year for the years 1800 to 2006. The dataset obtains more than 
90% of global GDP and shows sovereign default on external debt which is 
government default on its own external debt or private sector debts that were publicly 
guaranteed. The sovereign default is defined as the failure to meet a principal or 
interest payment on the due date. The periods also include instances where 
rescheduled debt is extinguished in terms less favorable than the original obligation. 
The Figure shows that long periods with a high percentage of all countries were in a 
state of default or restructuring. There were five peaks or default cycles. The first one 
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was during the Napoleonic War. The second runs, between 1820 and 1840 when 
nearly 50% of the countries in the world were in default. The third episode started in 
the early 1870s. The fourth episode started with the Great Depression of the 1930s in 
which also nearly half of the countries were in default. The most recent default cycle 
was between 1980s and 1990s, which was the emerging market debt crisis.159 
 
 
 Figure 14: Sovereign External Debt 1800-2006 (includes 60 countries) 
 Source: Reinhart/Rogoff (2008), p. 4. 
 
3.4. Are banks too big to fail?  
Analysts of J.P. Morgan (2010) see a problem due to the size of banks even when 
banks’ total assets are relatively high compared to national GDP. They found out that 
banks in Europe have usually higher percentages of total assets to GDP ratios than 
banks in the US, Japan and China.160 
 
The size of the banks could be measured by the reported total assets, the adjusted 
assets (estimation of the US GAAP for non US banks), the risk-weighted assets (as 
                                                 
159 See Reinhart/Rogoff (2008), p. 3f. 
160 See J.P. Morgan (2010), p. 1. 
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defined by the BIS) or total assets less insured deposits and less Tier 1 capital. The 
equity research report of J.P. Morgan ranked the 25 largest banks in Europe, the US 
and APAC (Asia-Pacific) by total assets in 1990. A not surprising point is that large 
banks operate in multiple jurisdictions, which means for example UBS has 11% 
assets domiciled in the home country, i.e. Switzerland and 89% of assets domiciled 
in other countries. This is a clear fact of the interconnectedness of global banks. 
Especially non-US banks have low proportions of their assets in the home country.161 
 
Table 6 and 7 show the 25 largest global banks sorted by total assets in the years 
2008 and 1990. The assets are compared with their national (nominal) GDP. The 
tables attribute the significant increase of the balance sheets in the last two decades. 
The sum of the assets of the top 25 banks was $6.8 trn in 1990, and quadruplicated 
to almost $43.7 trn in 2008. In 1990 many the leading global banks, in terms of total 
assets, were located in Asia, whereas in 2008 European Banks are top-ranked. The 
Asian banks were on top also due to mergers, for example Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, 
Fuji Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan merged to Mizuho Holdings Inc in October 
2000.162 Regarding, European banks, most European countries rely heavily on bank 
finance in contrast to the US. 
 
In 1990, none of the banks had a balance sheet which was greater than their national 
GDP. Compared to 2008 six of the 25 banks had greater assets than the ‘home’ 
GDP. Noticeable is also that the percentages of assets to national GDP increased 
sharply over time. One reason of that is the increase in the derivatives market and 
Leverage, although there is a reporting difference in European and American banks 
because US banks permit greater netting of exposures relating to derivatives.163 The 
globalization and internationalization of banks is again pointed out in the tables.  
 
                                                 
161 See J.P. Morgan (2010), p. 5f. 
162 See Mizuho Holdings (2000), URL: http://www.mizuho-
 fg.co.jp/english/company/info/html/20000929release_eng.html, retrieved January 25th, 2010. 
163 See J.P. Morgan (2010), p. 7. 
  62 
 
 Table 6: Global Banks, sorted by Total Assets year 2008 
 Source: Bloomberg, IMF 
 
Furthermore total assets are an indicator for potential losses of a banking system. A 
high percentage of assets to national GDP could enable large losses in the whole 
banking systems of a country. The tables also show that America has a less 
concentrated banking system compared to Europe. The ratios of the largest banks 
are signifcant lower than in Europe. The largest two banks in the US, J.P. Morgan 
Chase and Citigroup had a ratio of roughly 15%, while the largest European Banks 
had ratios above or slightly below 100%.  
 
Rank Company Country Region Assets ($bn) % 'home' GDP
1 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom Europe 3.500 131%
2 Deutsche Bank AG Germany Europe 3.073 84%
3 Barclays PLC United Kingdom Europe 2.992 112%
4 BNP Paribas France Europe 2.896 101%
5 HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Europe 2.527 95%
6 Credit Agricole France Europe 2.307 80%
7 J.P. Morgan Chase United States US 2.175 15%
8 Citigroup Inc. United States US 1.938 14%
9 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Japan APAC 1.933 39%
10 UBS AG Switzerland Europe 1.885 383%
11 Bank of America Corp. United States US 1.818 13%
12 Societe Generale Group France Europe 1.577 55%
13 Mizuho Financial Group Inc. Japan APAC 1.546 31%
14 Banco Sandander Spain Europe 1.464 91%
15 Unicredit Group Italy Europe 1.459 63%
16 Industrial & Commcerial Bank of China China APAC 1.430 33%
17 Wells Fargo & Co United States US 1.310 9%
18 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Japan APAC 1.121 23%
19 China Construction Bank China APAC 1.107 26%
20 Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland Europe 1.095 222%
21 Bank of China China APAC 1.018 24%
22 Dexia Belgium Europe 922 182%
23 Intesa Sanapaolo Italy Europe 888 38%
24 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. United States US 885 6%
25 Commerzbank AG Germany Europe 872 24%
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 Table 7: Global Banks, sorted by Total Assets year 1990 
 Source: J.P. Morgan (2010), p. 7. 
 
Figure 15 supports the difference of the banking system in Europe and US. The 
Figure shows the sum of the total assets of the Top 25 European and US/Canadian 
banks. While the GDP of the Top 25 European Banks doubled from $7.3 trn in 2001 
to $15 trn in 2008, the total assets of the balance sheets tripled from $ 9 trn to $33.7 
trn. In America the situation is different. The GDP was higher than the total assets, 
despite the fact that the gap between the two figures tightened. In 2001 GDP was 
around $10.9 trn with total assets of $4.7 trn, while the numbers increased to $15.8 
trn and $11.2 trn. This is an indicater that the balance sheets rose disproportionally to 
national GDP. 
Rank Company Country Region Assets ($bn) % 'home' GDP
1 Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank Japan APAC 428 13%
2 Sumitomo Bank Japan APAC 409 13%
3 Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank Japan APAC 409 13%
4 Sanwa Bank Japan APAC 403 12%
5 Fuji Bank Japan APAC 400 12%
6 Mitsubishi Bank Japan APAC 392 12%
7 Credit Agricole France Europe 305 20%
8 BNP Paribas France Europe 292 20%
9 Credit Lyonnais France Europe 287 6%
10 Deutsche Bank AG Germany Europe 266 19%
11 Barclays PLC United Kingdom Europe 259 14%
12 Tokai Bank Japan APAC 250 23%
13 Norinchukin Bank Japan APAC 250 8%
14 Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Japan APAC 238 8%
15 NatWest United Kingdom Europe 233 7%
16 Bank of Tokyo Japan APAC 223 21%
17 Societe Generale Group France Europe 220 7%
18 Sumitomo Trust & Banking Japan APAC 219 15%
19 Mitsui Trust & Banking Japan APAC 211 7%
20 Industrial Bank of Japan Japan APC 209 6%
21 Long-Term Credit Bank Japan APAC 201 6%
22 Dresdner Bank AG Germany Europe 187 10%
23 UBS AG Switzerland Europe 183 71%
24 Yasuda Trust & Banking Japan APAC 176 5%
25 Daiwa Bank Japan APAC 171 5%
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 Figure 15: Total Assets for Top 25 Banks in US/Canada and Europe164 versus GDP in 2001 and 2008 
 Source: Bloomberg, IMF  
 
Table 8 shows that the situation in Austria is almost the same as in most European 
countries, a concentration of assets of only some banks. The top 6 Austrian banks, 
ranked by total assets held in sum €694 bn at the end of 2009. In Austria, the six 
banks UniCredit Bank Austria, Erste Group, RZB Group, ÖVAG, Hypo Group and 
Bawag P.S.K. Group were called ‘systemic relevant banks’. The biggest two banks 
UniCredit Bank Austria and Erste Group had roughly a 75% ratio of Total Assets to 
national GDP.  
 
The cross-border financial assets and liabilties in Austria (including Direct 
Investment, portfolio investment, loans, deposits, derivatives and reserve assets), i.e. 
the rate of internationalization, was 582% of GDP at the end of 2008. In 1999 the rate 
of internationalization was only around 280% of GDP. The highest figures are 
displayed by debt securities. Austrian’s external financial assets were around       
€767 bn.165 
 
 
 Table 8: Top 6 Austrian banks, sorted by Total Assets in the year 2009 
 Source: Annual Reports Companies, IMF 
 
  
                                                 
164 Europe including UK, Germany, France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden  
165 See Fuchs (2009), p. 6ff. 
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Rank Company Country Region Assets (€bn) % 'home' GDP
1 UniCredit Bank Austria Austria Europe 204 74%
2 Erste Group Austria Europe 202 73%
3 RZB Group Austria Europe 151 55%
4 Österreichische Volksbanken AG Austria Europe 54 20%
5 Hypo Group Austria Europe 42 15%
6 BAWAG P.S.K. Group Austria Europe 41 15%
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4. Leverage in commercial banks 
When the financial system as a whole holds long-term illiquid assets financed by 
short-term liabilites, any bank could cause stress to another one in the system, even 
if some banks are resistant against greater stress to the assets due to maturity 
mismatch.166 Adrian/Shin (2006) exhibited that many of bank’s liabilities are not 
counted as money and not all items of them qualify as money. Especially the first 
point is more relevant in a financial system that relies on capital markets more than 
on the banking system. As stated above, capital markets play a much bigger role in 
the past. Other items of liabilites such as repurchase agreements or certificates of 
deposits are under the control of the banks and tend to be most volatile over time. 
For a bank-dominated financial system, where liabilities of the banking sector can be 
identified with various components of money, excess liquidity means excessive 
growth of the money stock. To measure the growth of the Leverage, in a financial 
system, off-balance sheet items suchs as OTC derivatives are also important, even 
more important for a valid size.167  
 
In the following chapters 4.1 and 4.2 I present the methodology, the results of the 
regression analysis and the calculated leverage ratios in comparison to the Basel II 
regulation standards. Furthermore in the chapter 4.3 I discuss further possibilities of 
an implementation. 
 
4.1. Methodology 
The primary sources of the data for the analysis are the reported annual reports and 
half-year interim reports. To complete these tables, Bloomberg data was also used. 
The analysis is based on a time series data of individual banks’ balance sheets from 
global player in Europe and America over a five year period on a half-year basis from 
Q4/2005 to Q4/2009. Furthermore the Top 5 Austrian Banks are used to compare the 
results with the biggest banks globally.  
 
                                                 
166 See Adrian/Shin (2008b), p. 1. 
167 See Adrian/Shin (2006), p. 15ff. 
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For European Banks I used Royal Bank of Scotland (GB), Credit Agricole (FR), 
Barclays PLC (GB), Deutsche Bank (GE) and UBS (SZ) rather than BNP Paribas or 
HSBC Holdings PLC because data sources are better usable. The American banks 
used for the analysis are Bank of America (formerly Merrill Lynch), JP Morgan Chase 
& Co, Citigroup Inc, Wells Fargo & Co and US Bancorp with are the Top 5 US banks 
according the Total Assets by the end of 2009. The Austrian banks used are the 
Volksbanks AG (ÖVAG), the Erste Group, the Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG, 
the UniCredit subsidiary Bank Austria and the Hypo Group rather than the BAWAG. 
The reason is, as mentioned above, the Hypo Group had a lot of troubles in the past 
and this might be a good comparison with other banks. Furthermore the period 
between 2005 and 2009 covers the situation before the financial crisis, during the 
crisis and the situation in the current development. Additionally, the change between 
Basel I and Basel II (2008) is also included, which is relevant for the Bankscope 
database.  
 
Using the Top 5 banks, regarding the balance sheet, for analysis is also better than 
using smaller ones, because as also mentioned above, the biggest banks have many 
total assets and cover more than ten smaller banks and can therefore affect the 
stability of the banking system as a whole. The global Canadian und Japanese banks 
are excluded from the sample.  
 
On the Basis of Basel, the following ratios are being calculated for the 15 banks 
between Q4/2005 and Q4/2009: 
• Tier 1 Ratio 
• Capital Adequacy Ratio (Total Capital Ratio) 
• Core Tier 1 Ratio (which is Tier 1 capital minus Minority interests, hybrid Tier 1 
capital such as trust preferred securities), preference shares and other 
innovative Tier 1 capital) 
• Shareholders Equity to Risk-Weighted Assets 
• Leverage Ratio 1 (Shareholders Equity to Total Assets) 
• Leverage Ratio 2 (Tier 1 Capital to Total Assets) 
• Tier 1 Capital (excluding Minority Interests) to Total Capital 
• Core Tier 1 Capital to Total Assets 
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• Leverage Ratio 3 (Total Capital to Total Assets) 
• Reported Tier 1 Ratio of US Banks  
 
For the analysis I took the simple mean of the ratios for the banks. For European and 
US Banks the share prices, the Return on Equity (Profit after Tax divided by 
Shareholders Equity) and the Return on Capital are also calculated.  
 
Moreover, in order to find out whether the relationship between Leverage and the 
bank’s balance sheet dependency still holds, some bank’s return measures are 
calculated. Therefore the linear regression is used to determine whether there is a 
significant linear relationship between the independent variable x (Leverage growth) 
and the dependent variable y (Asset growth) at a significance level of 0.01. The null 
hypothesis states that the slope is equal to zero, while the alternative hypothesis 
states that the slope is not equal to zero, which means that there is a significant 
linear relationship between the Leverage growth and the Asset growth.  
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4.2. Results 
Figure 16 shows a scatter plot. The horizontal axis measures the change in the 
Leverage growth (Total Asset to Shareholders Equity), while the vertical axis 
measures the change of the Total Assets on a half-year basis between Q4/2005 and 
Q4/2009 of the above mentioned five European Banks. The Figure points out the 
positive relationship between Leverage Growth and Asset growth. The regression 
statistics is included in the Appendix 11. 
 
 
 Figure 16: Linear Regression of Asset to Leverage Growth of Top 5 European Banks  
  (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Annual Reports, Bloomberg, Own calculations 
 
Testing the time series for the European Banks between Q4/2005 to Q4/2009 on a 
half-year basis, the p-value for the intercept is 0.0115 and therefore more than the 
significance level of 0.01, which means that the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Therefore there is a significant relationship for European Banks between the 
Leverage growth and the Asset growth with a coefficient of determination (R²) of 
0.60. This means that R² is near 1 and therefore 60% of the total variance in Y is 
explained by the linear regression model which is quite good.  
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 Figure 17: Linear Regression of Leverage to Asset Growth of all Top 5 Banks (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Annual and Interim Reports, Bloomberg, Own calculations 
 
In Figure 17, again the scatter plot shows the relationship of Asset growth to 
Leverage growth. This scatter plot shows again a positive relation, which means 
Leverage grew, when Total Assets rose. 
 
For the regression test of all 15 banks between Q4/2005 and Q4/2009, p-value is 
less than 0.01, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected and there is no 
significant relationship including the data of all banks. The coefficient of 
determination is 0.17. 
 
All in all, this means that the top European banks are targeting Leverage and will 
adjust their balance sheets to hit the ratio, while the evidence including all banks is 
mixed across countries.  
 
Figure 18 shows the comparison of the mean of the Tier 1 ratios and the Total Tier 
Ratios (Capital Adequacy Ratios) for European, US and Austrian Banks between 
Q4/2005 and Q4/2009. The calculated ratios are attached in Appendix 16. The chart 
illustrates that the two measures simultaneously change up and down. After 
introduction and the use of Basel II regulation in Q1/2008, the ratios rose in all cases 
on average, in spite of the financial crisis and liquidity shortages of global banks. 
Furthermore the Tier 1 ratios and the Total Tier ratios of all banks were significant 
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over the minimum, defined by the BIS, of 4% and 8%. The difference to the BIS 
definitions was around 2%, although UBS had the highest average ratios of 12.13% 
and 15.43%.  
 
 
 Figure 18: Reported Tier 1 Ratio & Capital Adequacy Ratio (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations 
 
In order to compare the core Tier 1 capital to the Tier 1 capital I calculated the 
difference. The core Tier 1 capital is made up of the regulatory Tier 1 capital net of 
Minority interests, hybrid Tier 1 capital such as trust preferred securities, preference 
shares and other innovative Tier 1 capital. The reason is that some changes could be 
implemented by the Basel III application. Figure 19 shows the spreads between the 
two ratios in percentage points. The results show that such hybrid Tier 1 capital is 
more important for the European and Austrian banks than the US banks. 
Furthermore European banks significantly increased their hybrid capital after the 
implementation of Basel II. After deduction of the mentioned hybrid capital and 
minority interests the mean of the Tier 1 ratios for European and Austrian banks only 
ranged between 4% and 6% between Q4/2005 and Q2/2009, which is slightly over 
the defined BIS minimum. Therefore hybrid capital and Minorities are an important 
part of the Tier 1 capital in Europe and especially in Austria.  
 
In detail, Minority interests are rougly 40% of Tier 1 capital for the top 5 European 
Banks and 16% of the Tier 1 capital for the Austrian Banks in Q4/2009. The 
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interesting point is also that the importance for Minorities for European Banks 
increased from 17% to the mentioned figure of 38% in Q4/2005 while Austrian Banks 
showed the reverse development. For the US Banks Minority interests stood 
constant on a 5% level of overall Tier 1 capital of the analysed banks. The analysis is 
shown in Figure 20. The fraction of the Minority interests changes over the time on a 
constant basis calculating the leverage ratio 1 (Shareholders Equity to Total Assets). 
This indicates that Minority interests, in some cases reduce the Tier 1 capital but do 
not influence the leverage ratio 1, although there is a significant difference of 
Shareholders Equity excluding Minorities, especially for Austrian Banks. 
 
Preference shares are not relevant for Austrian banks, but are still essential for 
European banks with a portion of 17% of total Tier 1 capital in Q4/2009. For the US 
banks, the importance of including preference shares in the total Tier 1 capital 
increased over time from 1% in Q4/2005 to 7% in Q4/2009 as a fraction of Tier 1 
capital.  
 
 
 Figure 19: Spread between Tier 1 Ratio and Core Tier 1 Ratio (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations 
 
For comparison reasons, I calculated the relevance of goodwill in the Tier 1 capital, 
which is actually included in the Tier 1 calculations under Basel II. The calculations 
are documented in USD with the relevant exchange rates in Appendix 15. In detail, 
30% of the Tier 1 capital is attributable to goodwill and other intangibles for the 
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European Banks in Q4/2009. Goodwill in the United States is most relevant with a 
fraction of 47% of total Tier 1 capital. In Austria goodwill and other intangibles did not 
play an important role in the past. 
 
 
 Figure 20: Leverage Ratio 1 including and excluding Minority Interests (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 21 illustrates the comparison the calculated Leverage Ratio 2 to the Leverage 
Ratio 3. The results could be compared to the CAR and Tier 1 ratio. Again the results 
show that the two measures correspond to each other and change simultaneously.  
 
 
 Figure 21: Leverage Ratio 2 versus Leverage Ratio 3 (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations 
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The compare the calculated Leverage Ratio 2 (Tier 1 capital to total assets) with the 
reported Tier 1 Ratio (Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets) the calculations show 
complete different findings for the European, US and Austrian Banks. The difference 
between the reported Tier 1 ratio and the Leverage Ratio 2 is the hightest for 
European banks by roughly more than 6%, while the difference of Austrian Banks is 
slightly more than 2% and for US Banks around 2%. This is again an interesting point 
because the difference between the total assets and the risk-weighted Assets of the 
analysed European Banks were significantly higher than for US banks. The graph 
also shows that the calculated leverage ratios were less volatile than the reported 
Tier 1 ratios and increased less over time. As Appendix 15 states, the risk-weighted 
Assets for European Banks are around 25% of total assets, while the number was 
66% for US Banks and 55% for Austrian Banks in Q4/2009. Compared to Q4/2005 
these fractions did not change moderately.  
 
 
 Figure 22: Reported Tier 1 Ratio versus Leverage Ratio 2 (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations 
 
The above figures show a comparison of the Total Capital ratios. Figure 23 states the 
difference between the reported CAR (Total Capital to risk-weighted assets) and the 
Leverage Ratio 3 (Total Capital to Total Assets). The results indicate that the 
difference of the two ratios rose on average by roughly 3% and show the relevance 
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of the calculation method. Especially European Banks are, according to the US view, 
of a Leverage ratio undercapitalized with a mean Leverage Ratio under 4%.  
 
 
 Figure 23: Reported CAR versus Leverage Ratio 3 (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations  
 
Figure 24 shows the considerable difference of the return situation of the global 
banks to the calculated ratio of Shareholders Equity to Total Assets. While the 
leverage ratio 1 (left scale) stood relatively constant for US and European Banks, the 
return on equity dramatically declined during the financial crisis.  
 
 
 Figure 24: Leverage Ratio 1 versus Return on Equity (Q4/2005-Q4/2009) 
 Source: Own calculations 
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The overall results exhibit that the leverage ratio is not a good indicator for the profit 
and the liquidity of a commercial bank. The results show that hybrid and innovative 
capital, goodwill and other intangibles play an important role in the banking system. 
Furthermore, the reported Tier 1 and Total Capital ratios as well as the leverage 
ratios increased during the financial crisis. On the one hand, this could be a result of 
Basel II regulation, but on the other hand could also be due to capital injections 
during the crisis. The return measures such as return on equity and return on capital 
decreased after Q4/2007, while the capital ratios increased. The current approach 
that higher riskiness of bank’s assets requires more capital does have some 
drawbacks. 
 
4.3. Further discussions of a new Leverage ratio 
Hildebrand (2008) pointed out that the leverage ratio should be implemented as a 
independent measure of capital adequacy and banks should meet a minimum 
requirement for both measures.168  
 
The problem of this approach is that the independence, as documented above, is not 
as much as it should be for a second backstop measure of a Basel III regulation. The 
second problem of setting minimum requirements for a leverage ratio is that the 
differences among the global banks are much higher than for the current ratios. Such 
a minimum level of a leverage ratio could be changed by the national supervisor, but 
the differences of the European Banks to the US Banks are enormous.  
 
Furthermore Hildebrand argued that two capital ratios are much more difficult to 
arbitrage.169 When both measures are pro-cyclical and change in the same direction 
over time, i.e. are highly correlated, this is not true.  
 
Hildebrand added that leverage ratios help the banking system in greater stress 
scenarios due to a smaller buffer to absorb negative stress tests in a financial 
                                                 
168 See Hildebrand (2008), p. 8. 
169 See Hildebrand (2008), p. 10. 
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crisis.170 This is consistent with my analysis as shown above. The difference between 
the leverage ratios and the reported ratios is large and some banks are significant 
under the minimum buffer levels. The minimum Canadian Leverage Ratio (Total 
Capital to Total Assets) must be at least 5%. In my analysis the average of the 
Leverage Ratio for four out of five European Banks was below 5%, while all US 
Banks are above this level. 
 
In the Turner Review (2009), named after the chairman of the Financial Services 
Authority Adair Turner, the arguments for using a leverage ratio are mainly based on 
experiences of the financial crisis. In a systemic crisis, when low-risk assets of all 
banks become high-risky and illiquid in short-term, a back-stop control measure 
related to the gross scale of the balance sheet positon could be used. This would be 
a constraint on excessive balance sheet growth. The second argument used is to 
implement a leverage ratio beside the risk-based system on internal models. Local 
Supervisory Authorities have to judge the internal models used by banks and have to 
balance pros and cons of the usage, but a backstop measure is simply the same in 
all banks.171  
 
As decribed above, a leverage ratio could reduce regulatory arbitrage by using 
structured products to upgrade the credit rating and lower capital requirements. The 
problem might be that such a ratio could also be mitigated in other ways, for example 
shorten the balance sheet assets through selling off. 
 
Some negative aspects are also discussed by Hildebrand:172 
• There are incentives to increase off-balance-sheet exposures and raise the 
bank’s risk. 
• As mentioned above, a leverage ratio could strenghten a financial cycle. In a 
downturn cycle, banks could cut down the lending to meet the requirements 
for a leverage ratio. This problem could become even greater if all financial 
institutions cut down the lending and the financial market is highly dependent 
on the banking system. 
                                                 
170 See Hildebrand (2008), p. 10. 
171 See Financial Services Authority (2009), p. 67. 
172 See Hildebrand (2008), p. 10f. 
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• The third disadvantage is associated with the banks’ profitability. Due to higher 
capital requirements, the costs for bearing a larger share of their potential 
losses are higher and could be transferred to the customers in a way. 
Furthermore higher capital holdings reduce their tax shield and diminish a 
bank’s market value because the advantage of debt over equity could be less 
useful.  
 
Moreover a leverage ratio does not distiniguish between the riskiness of the bank’s 
assets and reduce the incentives of growth through decrease of lending activities. 
Other problems are associated with the definition of the calculation and accounting 
adjustments. 
 
  
  78 
5. Conclusio 
The results of the analysis between Q4/2005 and Q4/2009 show that among the Top 
European, US and Austrian Banks the reported Tier 1 ratios were relatively stable 
and above 6% but increased after Basel II implementation and after the crisis. The 
reason for this could be, on the one hand, the more stringent capital requirements of 
Basel II and, on the other hand, capital injections of the national government, by 
issuing new shares during the crisis or by selling assets and reducing the total assets 
and consequently risk-weighted assets. Furthermore the reported Total Capital ratios 
changed, in comparison to the Tier 1 ratios on a parallel level, which was on average 
2% higher than the Tier 1 ratios. The findings indicated that Total Capital ratios 
(Capital Adequacy Ratios) rose during the financial crisis, which is consistent with the 
analysis of Goodhart (2005). Goodhart (2005) found out that the CAR for the Internal 
Rating Based Approach is higher during a recession.  
 
The globalization of banks made it necessary to implement global homogeneous 
regulatory standards. Especially in the last few years, the banks’ balance sheets 
skyrocketed and the total assets exceeded the national GDP of most of global banks. 
Austria is an example for a ‘bank-driven’ economy, in which only six banks play a 
central role. Compared to the Switzerland, which has two systemic banks, this is 
quite a high number. The first consideration is that a leverage ratio is easy to 
implement on an international basis because the risk-weights disappear. This could 
reduce incentives for excess leverage if negative aspects are neglected. The second 
consideration is a more difficult one. Many limitations and regulatory questions are 
related to the introduction of a new leverage ratio. Some of the problems are the 
effectiveness of that ratio on a cross-border basis and regulatory arbitrage. The other 
problems are linked to the calculation method. There are some open questions 
regarding off-balance sheet exposures in the trading book and the definition of the 
capital. For the calibration of the leverage ratio it is important to constrain banks 
during the economic cycle. Some of the ideas are mentioned above. For calculation it 
is important to implement derivatives netting and off-balance-sheet exposures in a 
way. Emphasis of the analysis should be given to the interest rate and currency 
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swaps, which are, according to ISDA Market Survey, the most important derivatives 
outstanding.  
 
Especially the definition of capital is tricky and hard to implement consistently. The 
best example of how important the definition is for calculation, is given by Shin 
(2008). Shin took Northern Rock as an example and computed the leverage ratio 
based on common equity, total equity and shareholders’ equity. He showed that the 
common equity plus preferred shares is the best way to calculate the leverage ratio. 
In my analysis I took the common equity plus reserves as Core Tier 1 capital. The 
differences between the Core Tier 1 capital (excluding Minority Interests, Goodwill, 
hybrid Tier 1 capital, preference shares and innovative Tier 1 capital) and the 
reported Tier 1 capital varied considerably for the analyzed banks among the 
countries and among the time series. The spreads fluctuated between 1% and 6% 
and were highly volatile. For European Banks, Minorities and preference shares play 
an important role whereas for US Banks the most important indicator for Tier 1 
capital is goodwill and other intangibles. Comparing to the top Austrian Banks, 
Minority interests play a major role for the calculations of Tier 1 capital.  
 
The differences between the ratios Shareholders Equity to Total assets (Leverage 
Ratio 1) and Tier 1 capital to Total assets (Leverage Ratio 2) were also various 
among the countries. While the gap for US Banks was roughly 2% on average 
between Q4/2005 and Q4/2009, for European Banks the difference was less than 
1%. Austrian Banks were in between of these analyzed banks. This means that the 
differences between Shareholders Equity and Tier 1 capital were the highest in the 
US.  
 
The findings were almost the same for the differences between the Tier 1 to Total 
assets ratio (Leverage Ratio 2) and Total Capital to Total assets ratio (Leverage 
Ratio 3). The gap between the two ratios was around 2% for US and Austrian Banks, 
whereas the differences for European Banks displayed a maximum of 1%. This 
indicates that the Tier 2 capital plays a higher role for the US banks than for the 
European Banks, except for Austrian Banks. The Tier 2 capital, relatively to Total 
assets, was higher in the US among the time series, which might emphasize the 
importance of the Tier 2 capital. 
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The analysis of a comparison between the Leverage Ratios 2 and 3 to the risk-
weighted back-stops reported Tier 1 ratio and Total Capital ratio indicated an 
opposing image. The gap between the reported ratios to the leverage ratios was 
significantly higher for the European Banks than for Austrian and US Banks. The 
differences were on average at around 8-9% in Europe and only around 3-4% in the 
US and Austria. This indicates that, on the basis of a leverage ratio, European Banks 
are quite undercapitalized (the capital is too low relatively to Assets) and the 
calculated leverage ratios are below 4% on average. The reason for that is mainly 
due to lower risk-weighted assets, relatively to Total assets, in European Banks in 
comparison to US and Austrian Banks. This is consistent with the results of the 
regression analysis. I analyzed the asset growth relative to leverage growth and 
found out that there is a significant relationship in European Banks. This means that, 
in case of European Banks, an increase of the balance sheet indicates a rise in 
Leverage. Another indication is that European Banks are targeting leverage. 
Therefore for European Banks such a leverage back-stop might be a better indicator 
than for US banks because the analyzed banks display low risk-weighted assets, but 
report increasing Capital ratios, despite of the financial crisis. Another interesting 
point is that the leverage ratios vary less volatile than the reported capital ratios and 
have not significantly increased after Basel II implementation, which is not surprising 
in the manner that the focus of Basel II has been on the risk-weights of the assets. 
Furthermore this is an indication that the total capital of the banks does not change 
quickly, relatively to total assets but changes more considerable relatively to risk-
weighted assets. This is a plausible argument for the usage of a leverage ratio.  
 
Generally, for most of the banks, the Total assets rose from Q4/2007 but decreased 
at the end of 2008 due to the financial crisis. 
 
A comparison between the return on equity and return on capital relatively to 
Leverage Ratio 1 and 3 showed that the leverage ratios are no valid indicators of the 
return on the ownership interest of a stock. Although the ratios changed relatively 
little during the period, the return measures for US and European Banks fell 
dramatically. Further analysis is needed what was the reason for the changes. It 
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could also be due to ‘expensive’ leverage. The negative return figures indicated a net 
loss.  
 
Further work needs to be done on liquidity, especially regarding the interbank funding 
market. Short-term liquidity is very important and structured short-term vehicles, 
which are globally linked to each other, could force the market as a whole into 
troubles. As mentioned the spreads of overnight Asset-Backed Commercial Papers 
rose dramatically during the financial crisis and furthermore the spreads for credit 
default swaps of government bonds. Especially the situation for government bonds 
changed quickly in a negative way so that some countries might not be able to repay 
their coupons, which used to be regarded as the safest investment in business 
sciences.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Basel II Development in Detail 
 
Month Year Item 
December 1987 Consultative Document  
(Proposals for International Convergence of capital measurement and standards) 
July 1988 Basel I – Basel Capital Accord  
November 1991 Amendment of the Basel capital accord 
(Inclusion of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves in capital) 
End 1992 Entry into force of Basel I
April 1993 Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks 
July 1994 Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord of July 1988 
(Redefinition for the risk-weighting applicable to banks’ claims) 
December 1994 Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord of July 1988  
(Recognition of Collateral) 
April 1998 Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord of July 1988 
(Reduction of risk-weight for claims on regulated securities firms) 
April 1999a BCBS Working Paper No 1 
(Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord) 
June 1999b BCBS Working Paper No 2 
(Supervisory Lessons to be drawn from the Asian Crisis) 
June 1999b First consultative paper on revising the Capital Accord (Basel II) 
January 2001 Second consultative paper on revising the Capital Accord (Basel II) 
April 2003 Third consultative paper on revising the Capital Accord (Basel II) 
August 2003 BCBS Working Paper No 12  
(Markets for Bank Subordinated Debt and Equity in Member Countries) 
April 2004 BCBS Working Paper No 13  
(Bank Failures in Mature Economies) 
November 2005 Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord of July 1988 
(Incorporation of market risk) (as of January 1996 and September 1997) 
June 2006 Basel II – International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework – Comprehensive Version  
(incl. Basel I Accord of July 1988, Amendment of November 2005 and 
Application of Basel II Trading Activities & Double Default Effect of April 2005) 
End 2006 Entry into force of Basel II
Source: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
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Appendix 2: Austrian Banking Sector 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: US Commercial Banks in History 
 
US Commercial Banks  
 # of banks Total Assets in $bn 
1896 11.474 6.167
1897 11.438 6.475
1898 11.530 7.170
1899 11.835 8.489
1900 12.427 9.059
1901 13.424 10.572
1902 14.488 11.427
1903 15.814 12.190
1904 17.037 13.035
1905 18.152 14.542
1906 19.786 15.601
1907 21.361 16.862
1908 22.531 16.664
1909 23.098 18.145
1910 24.514 19.324
1911 25.183 20.320
1912 25.844 21.495
1913 26.664 22.056
1914 25.510 23.155
1915 25.875 24.106
1916 26.217 28.217
1917 26.831 32.802
1918 27.457 36.352
1919 27.859 42.462
1920 29.087 47.509
1921 29.788 43.669
1922 29.458 44.106
1923 28.877 47.332
1924 28.185 50.136
1925 27.638 54.401
1926 26.751 56.781
1927 25.800 58.973
1928 24.968 61.563
1929 24.026 62.442
1930 22.172 64.125 1983 14.469 2.342.101 
1931 19.375 59.017 1984 14.496 2.508.871 
1932 17.802 46.304 1985 14.417 2.730.672 
1933 14.440 40.511 1986 14.210 2.940.699 
1934 14.146 46.448 1987 13.723 2.999.949 
1935 14.125 50.926 1988 13.137 3.130.796 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number of banks 5727 5713 5686 5547 5527 5479 5453
Total Assets in € bn 391 412 434 479 523 562 583
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of banks 5368 5297 5242 5197 5150 5156 5118
Total Assets in € bn 572 603 649 718 787 886 1.047
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1936 13.973 56.210 1989 12.715 3.299.362 
1937 13.797 54.212 1990 12.347 3.389.490 
1938 13.661 56.800 1991 11.927 3.430.682 
1939 13.538 63.147 1992 11.467 3.506.171 
1940 13.442 70.720 1993 10.961 3.707.088 
1941 13.431 76.827 1994 10.453 4.012.107 
1942 13.347 95.459 1995 9.943 4.315.175 
1943 13.274 112.246 1996 9.530 4.582.165 
1944 13.268 134.613 1997 9.144 5.018.532 
1945 13.302 157.582 1998 8.777 5.442.604 
1946 13.359 147.365 1999 8.582 5.735.135 
1947 13.403 152.773 2000 8.315 6.245.560 
1948 13.419 152.163 2001 8.082 6.552.294 
1949 13.436 155.319 2002 7.888 7.076.912 
1950 13.446 166.792 2003 7.770 7.601.545 
1951 13.455 177.449 2004 7.631 8.415.615 
1952 13.439 186.682 2005 7.526 9.040.294 
1953 13.432 191.062 2006 7.401 10.091.541 
1954 13.323 200.589 2007 7.283 11.176.051 
1955 13.237 209.145 2008 7.086 12.308.857 
1956 13.218 216.146 2009 6.839 11.846.114 
1957 13.165 221.534
1958 13.124 237.474
1959 13.114 243.422
1960 13.126 256.322
1961 13.115 277.374
1962 13.124 295.983
1963 13.291 311.790
1964 13.493 345.130
1965 13.544 375.394
1966 13.538 402.899
1967 13.514 450.647
1968 13.487 500.160
1969 13.473 524.645
1970 13.511 570.158
1971 13.612 633.573
1972 13.733 730.902
1973 13.976 824.960
1974 14.230 1.037.197
1975 14.384 1.086.674
1976 14.410 1.182.412
1977 14.411 1.339.376
1978 14.391 1.507.936
1979 14.364 1.691.789
1980 14.434 1.855.687
1981 14.414 2.028.982
1982 14.451 2.193.339
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Appendix 4: US Asset-backed Commercial Paper Outstanding 
 
 Asset-backed Commercial 
Paper Outstanding 
  
Unit: Currency 
Multiplier: 1000000
Currency: USD 
Unique Identifier: CP/OUTST/ 
DTBSPCKA_N.WW 
Time Period NSA 
2007-01-01 1.122.309
2007-01-10 1.119.006
2007-01-17 1.102.012
2007-01-24 1.097.524
2007-01-31 1.088.758
2007-02-07 1.095.575
2007-02-14 1.107.033
2007-02-21 1.100.377
2007-02-28 1.094.437
2007-03-07 1.099.810
2007-03-14 1.105.178
2007-03-21 1.097.843
2007-03-28 1.102.374
2007-04-04 1.103.111
2007-04-11 1.113.277
2007-04-18 1.097.692
2007-04-25 1.108.422
2007-05-02 1.128.105
2007-05-09 1.143.204
2007-05-16 1.150.712
2007-05-23 1.142.159
2007-05-30 1.144.758
2007-06-06 1.164.958
2007-06-13 1.167.613
2007-06-20 1.166.009
2007-06-27 1.173.194
2007-07-04 1.178.807
2007-07-11 1.188.699
2007-07-18 1.180.510
2007-07-25 1.190.747
2007-08-01 1.201.396
2007-08-08 1.213.717
2007-08-15 1.163.827
2007-08-22 1.091.767
2007-08-29 1.013.950
2007-09-05 988.215
2007-09-12 974.042
2007-09-19 958.340
2007-09-26 953.990
2007-10-03 956.765
2007-10-10 951.455
2007-10-17 929.795
2007-10-24 928.900
2007-10-31 920.905
  97 
2007-11-07 904.798
2007-11-14 899.630
2007-11-21 874.294
2007-11-28 866.176
2007-12-05 857.361
2007-12-12 855.481
2007-12-31 832.916
2007-12-26 831.770
 
Appendix 6: Spreads of Overnight Asset-Backed Commercial Papers (AA rated) 
 
date Spreads 
2007-01-01 0,17 
2007-01-02 0,04 
2007-01-03 0,00 
2007-01-04 0,03 
2007-01-05 0,05 
2007-01-08 0,04 
2007-01-09 0,01 
2007-01-10 -0,01 
2007-01-11 -0,02 
2007-01-12 0,04 
2007-01-15 0,04 
2007-01-16 -0,02 
2007-01-17 -0,01 
2007-01-18 0,02 
2007-01-19 0,00 
2007-01-22 -0,01 
2007-01-23 -0,01 
2007-01-24 -0,01 2007-04-12 0,05 2007-06-29 -0,01 
2007-01-25 -0,05 2007-04-13 0,07 2007-07-02 -0,01 
2007-01-26 -0,01 2007-04-16 -0,03 2007-07-03 0,05 
2007-01-29 0,03 2007-04-17 0,04 2007-07-04 0,04 
2007-01-30 0,03 2007-04-18 0,05 2007-07-05 0,03 
2007-01-31 -0,07 2007-04-19 0,03 2007-07-06 0,04 
2007-02-01 -0,03 2007-04-20 0,00 2007-07-09 0,04 
2007-02-02 0,02 2007-04-23 0,03 2007-07-10 0,03 
2007-02-05 -0,01 2007-04-24 0,06 2007-07-11 0,03 
2007-02-06 0,02 2007-04-25 0,08 2007-07-12 0,07 
2007-02-07 0,03 2007-04-26 0,08 2007-07-13 0,02 
2007-02-08 0,01 2007-04-27 0,07 2007-07-16 -0,05 
2007-02-09 0,01 2007-04-30 -0,03 2007-07-17 -0,01 
2007-02-12 -0,01 2007-05-01 0,00 2007-07-18 0,01 
2007-02-13 0,06 2007-05-02 0,05 2007-07-19 0,03 
2007-02-14 0,00 2007-05-03 0,03 2007-07-20 0,03 
2007-02-15 -0,02 2007-05-04 0,02 2007-07-23 0,02 
2007-02-16 0,06 2007-05-07 0,02 2007-07-24 0,08 
2007-02-19 0,04 2007-05-08 0,04 2007-07-25 0,02 
2007-02-20 -0,02 2007-05-09 0,04 2007-07-26 0,10 
2007-02-21 0,02 2007-05-10 0,02 2007-07-27 0,14 
2007-02-22 0,01 2007-05-11 0,05 2007-07-30 0,07 
2007-02-23 0,05 2007-05-14 0,01 2007-07-31 0,08 
2007-02-26 0,03 2007-05-15 -0,02 2007-08-01 0,04 
2007-02-27 0,07 2007-05-16 0,02 2007-08-02 0,12 
2007-02-28 -0,11 2007-05-17 0,02 2007-08-03 0,13 
2007-03-01 -0,03 2007-05-18 0,02 2007-08-06 0,13 
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2007-03-02 0,07 2007-05-21 0,02 2007-08-07 0,49 
2007-03-05 0,00 2007-05-22 0,03 2007-08-08 0,87 
2007-03-06 0,05 2007-05-23 0,02 2007-08-09 0,09 
2007-03-07 0,03 2007-05-24 0,03 2007-08-10 0,78 
2007-03-08 0,03 2007-05-25 0,01 2007-08-13 0,70 
2007-03-09 0,03 2007-05-28 0,01 2007-08-14 1,26 
2007-03-12 0,05 2007-05-29 0,04 2007-08-15 1,21 
2007-03-13 0,11 2007-05-30 0,07 2007-08-16 0,99 
2007-03-14 0,00 2007-05-31 0,00 2007-08-17 1,06 
2007-03-15 -0,02 2007-06-01 0,04 2007-08-20 0,92 
2007-03-16 0,02 2007-06-04 0,03 2007-08-21 1,00 
2007-03-19 0,01 2007-06-05 0,09 2007-08-22 0,98 
2007-03-20 0,01 2007-06-06 0,03 2007-08-23 0,82 
2007-03-21 0,00 2007-06-07 0,03 2007-08-24 0,61 
2007-03-22 0,00 2007-06-08 0,02 2007-08-27 0,64 
2007-03-23 0,03 2007-06-11 0,03 2007-08-28 0,64 
2007-03-26 0,02 2007-06-12 0,06 2007-08-29 0,98 
2007-03-27 0,07 2007-06-13 0,08 2007-08-30 0,98 
2007-03-28 0,16 2007-06-14 0,00 2007-08-31 0,94 
2007-03-29 0,05 2007-06-15 0,01 2007-09-03 0,92 
2007-03-30 -0,02 2007-06-18 0,03 2007-09-04 0,61 
2007-04-02 0,04 2007-06-19 0,07 2007-09-05 0,53 
2007-04-03 0,09 2007-06-20 0,00 2007-09-06 0,69 
2007-04-04 0,17 2007-06-21 0,03 2007-09-07 0,74 
2007-04-05 0,03 2007-06-22 0,08 2007-09-10 0,47 
2007-04-06 0,02 2007-06-25 0,05 2007-09-11 0,41 
2007-04-09 0,03 2007-06-26 0,12 2007-09-12 0,27 
2007-04-10 0,04 2007-06-27 0,15 2007-09-13 0,59 
2007-04-11 0,05 2007-06-28 0,09 2007-09-14 0,22 
2007-09-17 -0,22 2007-12-04 0,51
2007-09-18 0,16 2007-12-05 0,62
2007-09-19 0,33 2007-12-06 0,46
2007-09-20 0,29 2007-12-07 0,41
2007-09-21 0,32 2007-12-10 0,28
2007-09-24 0,38 2007-12-11 0,41
2007-09-25 0,50 2007-12-12 0,46
2007-09-26 0,69 2007-12-13 0,51
2007-09-27 0,30 2007-12-14 0,54
2007-09-28 0,61 2007-12-17 0,44
2007-10-01 0,22 2007-12-18 0,55
2007-10-02 0,34 2007-12-19 0,78
2007-10-03 0,42 2007-12-20 0,39
2007-10-04 0,36 2007-12-21 0,48
2007-10-05 0,36 2007-12-24 0,71
2007-10-08 0,38 2007-12-25 0,87
2007-10-09 0,20 2007-12-26 0,53
2007-10-10 0,57 2007-12-27 0,69
2007-10-11 0,39 
2007-10-12 0,33 
2007-10-15 0,24 
2007-10-16 0,31 
2007-10-17 0,26 
2007-10-18 0,26 
2007-10-19 0,18 
2007-10-22 0,22 
2007-10-23 0,24 
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2007-10-24 0,19 
2007-10-25 0,09 
2007-10-26 0,23 
2007-10-29 0,19 
2007-10-30 -0,02 
2007-10-31 0,17 
2007-11-01 0,23 
2007-11-02 0,50 
2007-11-05 0,50 
2007-11-06 0,57 
2007-11-07 0,39 
2007-11-08 0,20 
2007-11-09 0,36 
2007-11-12 0,50 
2007-11-13 0,49 
2007-11-14 0,32 
2007-11-15 0,40 
2007-11-16 0,45 
2007-11-19 0,45 
2007-11-20 0,45 
2007-11-21 0,50 
2007-11-22 0,52 
2007-11-23 0,46 
2007-11-26 0,41 
2007-11-27 0,62 
2007-11-28 0,53 
2007-11-29 0,45 
2007-11-30 0,33 
2007-12-03 0,48 
 
Appendix 7: ISDA Market Survey, Notional amounts outstanding at year-end, all surveyed 
contracts, 1987-present 
 
  
Total IR and 
currency 
outstandings 
Total credit 
default swap 
outstandings
Total equity 
derivative 
outstandings
1987  $              865,60      
1988               1.654,30      
1989               2.474,70      
1990               3.450,30      
1991               4.449,50      
1992               5.345,70      
1993               8.474,50      
1994             11.303,20      
1995             17.712,60      
1996             25.453,10      
1997             29.035,00      
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1998             50.997,00      
1999             58.265,00      
2000             63.009,00      
2001             69.207,30            918,87   
2002           101.318,49         2.191,57        2.455,29 
2003           142.306,92         3.779,40        3.444,08 
2004           183.583,27         8.422,26        4.151,29 
2005           213.194,58       17.096,14        5.553,97 
2006 285.728,14      34.422,80        7.178,48 
2007           382.302,71       62.173,20        9.995,71 
2008           403.072,81       38.563,82        8.733,03 
 
Appendix 8: The liquidity index from 01-01-1997 to 30-06-2009 (monthly basis) 
(This data is released in April and October in the Bank of England's Financial Stability Report. Simple, unweighted mean of the 
liquidity measures, normalised on the period 1999-2004. Data shown are an exponentially weighted moving average. The 
indicator is more reliable after 1997 as it is based on a greater number of underlying measures. Liquidity measures incorporate 
bis-ask spreads, return to volume ratio, and the Liquidity premia. This single index summarises all these measures. The index 
combines three key market measures -- the gaps between bid and offer prices on bonds, currencies and stocks, the ratio of 
market returns to trading volumes, and spreads in the credit market.) 
 
UKBOEFML 
Index   
Period PX_LAST 
01.01.1997 -0,411 
31.01.1997 -0,015 
28.02.1997 0,081 
31.03.1997 0,093 
30.04.1997 0,152 
30.05.1997 0,117 
30.06.1997 0,103 
31.07.1997 0,102 
29.08.1997 0,042 
30.09.1997 -0,067 
31.10.1997 -0,255 
28.11.1997 -0,365 
31.12.1997 -0,488 
30.01.1998 -0,082 
27.02.1998 0,061 
31.03.1998 0,085 
30.04.1998 -0,025 
29.05.1998 0,025 
30.06.1998 -0,151 
31.07.1998 -0,158 
31.08.1998 -0,303 
30.09.1998 -0,557 
30.10.1998 -0,916 
30.11.1998 -0,845 
31.12.1998 -0,957 
29.01.1999 -0,584 
26.02.1999 -0,428 
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31.03.1999 -0,308 
30.04.1999 -0,263 
31.05.1999 -0,276 
30.06.1999 -0,426 
30.07.1999 -0,36 
31.08.1999 -0,373 
30.09.1999 -0,491 
29.10.1999 -0,912 
30.11.1999 -0,778 
31.12.1999 -0,749 
31.01.2000 -0,456 
29.02.2000 -0,307 
31.03.2000 -0,22 
28.04.2000 -0,325 
31.05.2000 -0,555 
30.06.2000 -0,609 
31.07.2000 -0,569 
31.08.2000 -0,528 
29.09.2000 -0,568 
31.10.2000 -0,537 
30.11.2000 -0,547 
29.12.2000 -0,705 
31.01.2001 -0,367 
28.02.2001 -0,243 
30.03.2001 -0,255 
30.04.2001 -0,266 
31.05.2001 -0,212 
29.06.2001 -0,336 
31.07.2001 -0,166 
31.08.2001 -0,056 
28.09.2001 -0,115 
31.10.2001 -0,112 
30.11.2001 -0,143 
31.12.2001 -0,328 
31.01.2002 -0,149 
28.02.2002 -0,088 
29.03.2002 -0,063 
30.04.2002 0,059 
31.05.2002 0,096 
28.06.2002 0,234 
31.07.2002 0,338 
30.08.2002 0,259 
30.09.2002 0,277 
31.10.2002 0,252 
29.11.2002 0,14 
31.12.2002 0,127 
31.01.2003 0,233 
28.02.2003 0,279 
31.03.2003 0,291 
30.04.2003 0,283 
30.05.2003 0,311 
30.06.2003 0,213 
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31.07.2003 0,358 
29.08.2003 0,471 
30.09.2003 0,486 
31.10.2003 0,524 
28.11.2003 0,58 
31.12.2003 0,518 
30.01.2004 0,582 
27.02.2004 0,645 
31.03.2004 0,619 
30.04.2004 0,629 
31.05.2004 0,65 
30.06.2004 0,616 
30.07.2004 0,598 
31.08.2004 0,551 
30.09.2004 0,634 
29.10.2004 0,702 
30.11.2004 0,718 
31.12.2004 0,668 
31.01.2005 0,759 
28.02.2005 0,8 
31.03.2005 0,816 
29.04.2005 0,688 
31.05.2005 0,619 
30.06.2005 0,589 
29.07.2005 0,629 
31.08.2005 0,69 
30.09.2005 0,657 
31.10.2005 0,689 
30.11.2005 0,646 
30.12.2005 0,604 
31.01.2006 0,755 
28.02.2006 0,821 
31.03.2006 0,769 
28.04.2006 0,75 
31.05.2006 0,666 
30.06.2006 0,661 
31.07.2006 0,623 
31.08.2006 0,7 
29.09.2006 0,693 
31.10.2006 0,773 
30.11.2006 0,742 
29.12.2006 0,717 
31.01.2007 0,861 
28.02.2007 0,86 
30.03.2007 0,888 
30.04.2007 0,822 
31.05.2007 0,803 
29.06.2007 0,724 
31.07.2007 0,701 
31.08.2007 -0,027 
28.09.2007 -0,248 
31.10.2007 -0,006 
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30.11.2007 -0,256 
31.12.2007 -0,609 
31.01.2008 -0,188 
29.02.2008 -0,253 
31.03.2008 -0,886 
30.04.2008 -1,101 
30.05.2008 -0,91 
30.06.2008 -0,67 
31.07.2008 -0,598 
29.08.2008 -0,748 
30.09.2008 -1,295 
31.10.2008 -2,962 
28.11.2008 -3,638 
31.12.2008 -3,905 
30.01.2009 -3,538 
27.02.2009 -3,511 
31.03.2009 -4,02 
30.04.2009 -4,198 
29.05.2009 -3,549 
30.06.2009 -3,219 
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Appendix 9: Development of the S&P 500 and the VIX Index (normalized) from Jan 1997 to 
Jan 2009 
 
 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange 
SPX Volatility Index
UKBOEFML Index
Period PX_LAST PX_LAST
31.01.1996 -0,174 31.10.2002 0,252
29.02.1996 -0,123 29.11.2002 0,14
29.03.1996 -0,157 31.12.2002 0,127
30.04.1996 -0,132 31.01.2003 0,233
31.05.1996 -0,206 28.02.2003 0,279
28.06.1996 -0,203 31.03.2003 0,291
31.07.1996 -0,223 30.04.2003 0,283
30.08.1996 -0,316 30.05.2003 0,311
30.09.1996 -0,347 30.06.2003 0,213
31.10.1996 -0,211 31.07.2003 0,358
29.11.1996 -0,271 29.08.2003 0,471
01.01.1997 -0,411 30.09.2003 0,486
31.01.1997 -0,015 31.10.2003 0,524
28.02.1997 0,081 28.11.2003 0,58
31.03.1997 0,093 31.12.2003 0,518
30.04.1997 0,152 30.01.2004 0,582
30.05.1997 0,117 27.02.2004 0,645
30.06.1997 0,103 31.03.2004 0,619
31.07.1997 0,102 30.04.2004 0,629
29.08.1997 0,042 31.05.2004 0,65
30.09.1997 -0,067 30.06.2004 0,616
31.10.1997 -0,255 30.07.2004 0,598
28.11.1997 -0,365 31.08.2004 0,551
31.12.1997 -0,488 30.09.2004 0,634
30.01.1998 -0,082 29.10.2004 0,702
27.02.1998 0,061 30.11.2004 0,718
31.03.1998 0,085 31.12.2004 0,668
30.04.1998 -0,025 31.01.2005 0,759
29.05.1998 0,025 28.02.2005 0,8
30.06.1998 -0,151 31.03.2005 0,816
31.07.1998 -0,158 29.04.2005 0,688
31.08.1998 -0,303 31.05.2005 0,619
30.09.1998 -0,557 30.06.2005 0,589
30.10.1998 -0,916 29.07.2005 0,629
30.11.1998 -0,845 31.08.2005 0,69
31.12.1998 -0,957 30.09.2005 0,657
29.01.1999 -0,584 31.10.2005 0,689
26.02.1999 -0,428 30.11.2005 0,646
31.03.1999 -0,308 30.12.2005 0,604
30.04.1999 -0,263 31.01.2006 0,755
31.05.1999 -0,276 28.02.2006 0,821
30.06.1999 -0,426 31.03.2006 0,769
30.07.1999 -0,36 28.04.2006 0,75
31.08.1999 -0,373 31.05.2006 0,666
30.09.1999 -0,491 30.06.2006 0,661
29.10.1999 -0,912 31.07.2006 0,623
30.11.1999 -0,778 31.08.2006 0,7
31.12.1999 -0,749 29.09.2006 0,693
31.01.2000 -0,456 31.10.2006 0,773
29.02.2000 -0,307 30.11.2006 0,742
31.03.2000 -0,22 29.12.2006 0,717
28.04.2000 -0,325 31.01.2007 0,861
31.05.2000 -0,555 28.02.2007 0,86
30.06.2000 -0,609 30.03.2007 0,888
31.07.2000 -0,569 30.04.2007 0,822
31.08.2000 -0,528 31.05.2007 0,803
29.09.2000 -0,568 29.06.2007 0,724
31.10.2000 -0,537 31.07.2007 0,701
30.11.2000 -0,547 31.08.2007 -0,027
29.12.2000 -0,705 28.09.2007 -0,248
31.01.2001 -0,367 31.10.2007 -0,006
28.02.2001 -0,243 30.11.2007 -0,256
30.03.2001 -0,255 31.12.2007 -0,609
30.04.2001 -0,266 31.01.2008 -0,188
31.05.2001 -0,212 29.02.2008 -0,253
29.06.2001 -0,336 31.03.2008 -0,886
31.07.2001 -0,166 30.04.2008 -1,101
31.08.2001 -0,056 30.05.2008 -0,91
28.09.2001 -0,115 30.06.2008 -0,67
31.10.2001 -0,112 31.07.2008 -0,598
30.11.2001 -0,143 29.08.2008 -0,748
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VIX Index
Date PX_LAST disc. Return normalized
01.01.1997 20,92 0,01051625 100
02.01.1997 21,14 -0,09508042 90,4919584
03.01.1997 19,13 0 90,4919584
04.01.1997 19,13 0 90,4919584
05.01.1997 19,13 0,03972818 94,0870388
06.01.1997 19,89 -0,02714932 91,5326395
07.01.1997 19,35 0,04599483 95,7426679
08.01.1997 20,24 0,03310277 98,9120151
09.01.1997 20,91 -0,06121473 92,8571429
10.01.1997 19,63 0 92,8571429
11.01.1997 19,63 0 92,8571429
12.01.1997 19,63 0,01069791 93,8505203
13.01.1997 19,84 -0,02872984 91,15421
14.01.1997 19,27 0,00674624 91,769158
15.01.1997 19,4 0,01082474 92,7625355
16.01.1997 19,61 -0,0499745 88,1267739
17.01.1997 18,63 0 88,1267739
18.01.1997 18,63 0 88,1267739
19.01.1997 18,63 -0,00161031 87,9848628
20.01.1997 18,6 -0,04247312 84,2478713
21.01.1997 17,81 -0,04042673 80,8420057
22.01.1997 17,09 0,08074898 87,3699149
23.01.1997 18,47 0,04656199 91,4380322
24.01.1997 19,33 0 91,4380322
25.01.1997 19,33 0 91,4380322
26.01.1997 19,33 0,04293844 95,3642384
27.01.1997 20,16 0,02876984 98,1078524
28.01.1997 20,74 -0,02459016 95,6953642
29.01.1997 20,23 -0,03756797 92,1002838
30.01.1997 19,47 0,06933744 98,4862819
31.01.1997 20,82 0 98,4862819
01.02.1997 20,82 0 98,4862819
02.02.1997 20,82 -0,05955812 92,6206244
03.02.1997 19,58 -0,00766088 91,9110691
04.02.1997 19,43 0,08389089 99,6215705
05.02.1997 21,06 -0,04273504 95,3642384
06.02.1997 20,16 -0,0625 89,4039735
07.02.1997 18,9 0 89,4039735
08.02.1997 18,9 0 89,4039735
09.02.1997 18,9 0,09259259 97,6821192
10.02.1997 20,65 -0,03292978 94,4654683
11.02.1997 19,97 -0,02453681 92,1475875
12.02.1997 19,48 -0,01283368 90,9649953
13.02.1997 19,23 -0,0026001 90,7284768
14.02.1997 19,18 0 90,7284768
15.02.1997 19,18 0 90,7284768
16.02.1997 19,18 0 90,7284768
17.02.1997 19,18 0,02711157 93,1882687
18.02.1997 19,7 0,04619289 97,4929044
19.02.1997 20,61 0,03881611 101,2772
20.02.1997 21,41 -0,04016815 97,2090823
21.02.1997 20,55 0 97,2090823
22.02.1997 20,55 0 97,2090823
23.02.1997 20,55 -0,03454988 93,8505203
24.02.1997 19,84 0,00705645 94,512772
25.02.1997 19,98 0,03803804 98,1078524
26.02.1997 20,74 0,01639344 99,7161779
27.02.1997 21,08 0,00094877 99,8107852
28.02.1997 21,1 0 99,8107852
01.03.1997 21,1 0 99,8107852
02.03.1997 21,1 -0,00995261 98,8174078
03.03.1997 20,89 -0,01292484 97,5402081
04.03.1997 20,62 -0,05480116 92,1948912
05.03.1997 19,49 0,05079528 96,8779565
06.03.1997 20,48 -0,05664063 91,3907285
07.03.1997 19,32 0 91,3907285
08.03.1997 19,32 0 91,3907285
09.03.1997 19,32 -0,01656315 89,8770104
10.03.1997 19 0,01315789 91,0596026
11.03.1997 19,25 0,0187013 92,7625355
12.03.1997 19,61 0,00917899 93,6140019
13.03.1997 19,79 0,00101061 93,7086093
14.03.1997 19,81 0 93,7086093
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Appendix 10: 5y CDS Spreads Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal (01-01-2008 to 23-04-
2010) 
 
 
C91010Y Index C90410Y Index C90210Y Index C91810Y Index C90510Y Index C91710Y Index
Date PX_LAST PX_LAST PX_LAST PX_LAST PX_LAST PX_LAST
31.12.2007 4,3317 4,6662 4,4434 4,4277 4,5829 4,5555
01.01.2008 4,3309 4,6656 4,4431 4,4284 4,58 4,5557
02.01.2008 4,2021 4,5257 4,3093 4,3165 4,4604 4,4347
03.01.2008 4,1857 4,5192 4,319 4,3187 4,4432 4,4367
04.01.2008 4,1273 4,4613 4,2794 4,2399 4,3947 4,3966
07.01.2008 4,1196 4,4541 4,2834 4,326 4,4028 4,3954
08.01.2008 4,1477 4,4999 4,3166 4,3521 4,4256 4,4238
09.01.2008 4,0838 4,4559 4,2805 4,2859 4,375 4,3752
10.01.2008 4,084 4,4652 4,2936 4,2381 4,3977 4,3875
11.01.2008 4,0821 4,4568 4,2915 4,2444 4,3933 4,3798
14.01.2008 4,0496 4,4196 4,2523 4,1984 4,3447 4,3331
15.01.2008 4,0197 4,3886 4,2277 4,1875 4,3178 4,3085
16.01.2008 3,9739 4,3435 4,1935 4,149 4,2766 4,2674
17.01.2008 3,9671 4,3264 4,182 4,1523 4,2602 4,2516
18.01.2008 3,9682 4,3243 4,1774 4,1427 4,2599 4,2507
21.01.2008 3,9128 4,2706 4,1359 4,08 4,2121 4,2034
22.01.2008 3,989 4,3926 4,2225 4,2058 4,3063 4,2907
23.01.2008 3,8864 4,3113 4,1284 4,0946 4,2201 4,1969
24.01.2008 3,9954 4,416 4,2351 4,2441 4,3369 4,3111
25.01.2008 3,975 4,4233 4,2179 4,2161 4,3184 4,3031
28.01.2008 3,9461 4,378 4,1885 4,1671 4,2671 4,2621
29.01.2008 3,9927 4,4154 4,2379 4,2128 4,3127 4,3032
30.01.2008 4,0163 4,44 4,2625 4,2336 4,3324 4,3269
31.01.2008 3,929 4,3544 4,1779 4,1301 4,2401 4,2375
01.02.2008 3,918 4,315 4,1565 4,1066 4,2146 4,2152
04.02.2008 3,932 4,3315 4,1668 4,1224 4,2308 4,2209
05.02.2008 3,8464 4,256 4,0838 4,0271 4,1572 4,1464
06.02.2008 3,8954 4,2986 4,1368 4,0709 4,2093 4,199
07.02.2008 3,8778 4,2798 4,1152 4,0357 4,2111 4,1864
08.02.2008 3,8648 4,2674 4,0944 4,0355 4,1879 4,1638
11.02.2008 3,8606 4,2806 4,0966 4,0451 4,1979 4,1704
12.02.2008 3,9466 4,3802 4,1865 4,1671 4,2804 4,2591
13.02.2008 3,9584 4,3939 4,19 4,1522 4,2854 4,2641
14.02.2008 4,0099 4,4311 4,2243 4,202 4,3285 4,3121
15.02.2008 3,9609 4,4018 4,1752 4,2659 4,2988 4,2802
18.02.2008 4,1034 4,4577 4,2285 4,2144 4,3468 4,3325
19.02.2008 4,0425 4,4353 4,209 4,209 4,3311 4,3209
20.02.2008 4,0535 4,4728 4,2511 4,2427 4,3692 4,3602
21.02.2008 4,0434 4,4694 4,2464 4,2563 4,3644 4,3573
22.02.2008 4,0319 4,4712 4,2447 4,2457 4,3638 4,3569
25.02.2008 4,0656 4,5242 4,2881 4,2658 4,4156 4,3983
26.02.2008 4,1038 4,5595 4,3214 4,2958 4,4449 4,44
27.02.2008 4,0886 4,5708 4,3329 4,3125 4,4572 4,4519
28.02.2008 4,0011 4,4785 4,227 4,2179 4,3711 4,3652
29.02.2008 3,8918 4,3992 4,1251 4,1165 4,2719 4,272
03.03.2008 3,862 4,3763 4,1139 4,1057 4,2697 4,2587
04.03.2008 3,8089 4,3671 4,1055 4,1039 4,2658 4,2529
05.03.2008 3,8647 4,4713 4,1965 4,2289 4,3775 4,3539
06.03.2008 3,8138 4,454 4,15 4,1622 4,3504 4,3431
07.03.2008 3,793 4,5043 4,1815 4,1606 4,3709 4,361
10.03.2008 3,737 4,4389 4,1258 4,1188 4,3233 4,3111
11.03.2008 3,7938 4,4778 4,1681 4,1341 4,3357 4,3298
12.03.2008 3,7751 4,4631 4,1465 4,1224 4,3078 4,3023
13.03.2008 3,7662 4,4893 4,1494 4,1356 4,3288 4,3059
14.03.2008 3,7419 4,4182 4,1215 4,1427 4,301 4,2824
17.03.2008 3,7028 4,4232 4,1021 4,1028 4,2875 4,2785
18.03.2008 3,7748 4,4635 4,166 4,1628 4,3208 4,327
19.03.2008 3,7189 4,3745 4,0829 4,1024 4,2733 4,2578
20.03.2008 3,7527 4,3975 4,1197 4,1654 4,2567 4,2672
21.03.2008 3,7628 4,4022 4,1258 4,179 4,2551 4,2792
24.03.2008 3,7625 4,4079 4,1263 4,1876 4,2505 4,2867
25.03.2008 3,8873 4,5349 4,2356 4,2547 4,3637 4,3784
26.03.2008 3,882 4,5003 4,2533 4,263 4,3717 4,3892
27.03.2008 3,9353 4,5437 4,2914 4,2833 4,4079 4,4224
28.03.2008 3,9532 4,5327 4,2847 4,2898 4,4075 4,4256
31.03.2008 3,9086 4,4952 4,2501 4,2564 4,3686 4,3818
01.04.2008 3,973 4,536 4,2909 4,3149 4,388 4,4148
02.04.2008 3,9914 4,5407 4,2886 4,3179 4,3861 4,4054
03.04.2008 3,9888 4,5474 4,3029 4,3464 4,404 4,4218
04.04.2008 3,9357 4,5076 4,2667 4,3184 4,3652 4,3815
07.04.2008 3,9681 4,5054 4,2754 4,2829 4,4253 4,3815
BFV EUR Italy 
Sovereign 10 Year
BFV EUR Portugal 
Sovereign 10 Year
BFV EUR Germany 
Sovereign 10 Year
BFV EUR Greece 
Sovereign 10 Year
BFV EUR Spain 
Sovereign 10 Year
BFV EUR Ireland 
Sovereign 10 Year
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08.04.2008 3,9677 4,5202 4,2856 4,3081 4,4559 4,4041
09.04.2008 3,9553 4,5166 4,273 4,2908 4,4406 4,3958
10.04.2008 3,9327 4,5027 4,2543 4,276 4,4329 4,3919
11.04.2008 3,8668 4,4295 4,1772 4,2102 4,3528 4,3205
14.04.2008 3,8674 4,4352 4,1782 4,1066 4,3784 4,3294
15.04.2008 3,9235 4,5004 4,2359 4,1656 4,4394 4,3909
16.04.2008 4,0003 4,5754 4,3116 4,3096 4,5139 4,4596
17.04.2008 4,0311 4,6002 4,3544 4,3738 4,5387 4,5015
18.04.2008 4,0808 4,6266 4,4054 4,4213 4,5551 4,5399
21.04.2008 4,0654 4,539 4,3745 4,3612 4,5393 4,5155
22.04.2008 4,1387 4,6144 4,443 4,4158 4,5792 4,5895
23.04.2008 4,1393 4,6904 4,437 4,4908 4,5766 4,5899
24.04.2008 4,1711 4,7256 4,4744 4,5263 4,6062 4,6315
25.04.2008 4,1642 4,7098 4,4551 4,4802 4,5804 4,614
28.04.2008 4,19 4,7242 4,4714 4,4963 4,5977 4,6278
29.04.2008 4,1343 4,701 4,4141 4,454 4,5424 4,5693
30.04.2008 4,1212 4,6684 4,4039 4,4366 4,5111 4,5447
01.05.2008 4,1158 4,6534 4,3947 4,4379 4,5118 4,5397
02.05.2008 4,1562 4,6719 4,4301 4,4555 4,5652 4,5541
05.05.2008 4,1187 4,6381 4,3919 4,416 4,5266 4,5175
06.05.2008 4,0996 4,5287 4,3648 4,3545 4,5134 4,4886
07.05.2008 4,1352 4,5559 4,396 4,3948 4,5343 4,5143
08.05.2008 4,027 4,4689 4,3026 4,3144 4,4717 4,4199
09.05.2008 3,9492 4,4292 4,2579 4,2591 4,4337 4,3816
12.05.2008 3,9656 4,5053 4,2802 4,268 4,4835 4,4511
13.05.2008 4,1194 4,5871 4,3674 4,3445 4,5325 4,5134
14.05.2008 4,1889 4,6526 4,4138 4,4224 4,5896 4,5691
15.05.2008 4,2331 4,7088 4,4366 4,4341 4,6164 4,5859
16.05.2008 4,1947 4,6534 4,396 4,3865 4,571 4,5294
19.05.2008 4,2339 4,6979 4,4438 4,4535 4,6136 4,5748
20.05.2008 4,203 4,6763 4,4167 4,4177 4,5967 4,545
21.05.2008 4,2753 4,7351 4,4781 4,486 4,6604 4,6007
22.05.2008 4,3084 4,7555 4,509 4,5183 4,6402 4,6246
23.05.2008 4,275 4,7403 4,4829 4,4935 4,6285 4,6222
26.05.2008 4,2685 4,7761 4,4912 4,5065 4,6485 4,6392
27.05.2008 4,2901 4,7973 4,5098 4,534 4,6744 4,6494
28.05.2008 4,3358 4,8341 4,5319 4,5787 4,7383 4,6704
29.05.2008 4,4169 4,9082 4,6128 4,6595 4,8256 4,7579
30.05.2008 4,3927 4,8876 4,5841 4,6267 4,7981 4,7331
02.06.2008 4,3343 4,8417 4,5359 4,5765 4,7575 4,6931
03.06.2008 4,4133 4,9112 4,6204 4,6488 4,8259 4,765
04.06.2008 4,3704 4,8792 4,5794 4,6125 4,7868 4,7262
05.06.2008 4,4525 4,9549 4,6627 4,6954 4,861 4,7994
06.06.2008 4,3874 4,9239 4,6276 4,6509 4,8538 4,7713
09.06.2008 4,4479 5,0292 4,7271 4,7451 4,961 4,8631
10.06.2008 4,4787 5,0759 4,7496 4,7822 5,0004 4,8958
11.06.2008 4,5106 5,0906 4,7809 4,8146 5,0067 4,9201
12.06.2008 4,5517 5,1425 4,8275 4,8624 5,0508 4,9664
13.06.2008 4,596 5,189 4,8689 4,9116 5,1067 5,0052
16.06.2008 4,5894 5,1884 4,854 4,9113 5,1044 4,9975
17.06.2008 4,5662 5,1665 4,8387 4,887 5,0747 4,9754
18.06.2008 4,5692 5,1507 4,8283 4,8848 5,0563 4,9646
19.06.2008 4,6286 5,2108 4,8773 4,9223 5,1045 5,0159
20.06.2008 4,5778 5,1659 4,8295 4,8496 5,069 4,9727
23.06.2008 4,549 5,152 4,8158 4,8279 5,0626 4,9526
24.06.2008 4,5529 5,1851 4,8143 4,8413 5,0798 4,9611
25.06.2008 4,5648 5,1957 4,8255 4,891 5,0801 4,9706
26.06.2008 4,479 5,1248 4,7365 4,8051 5,0102 4,8867
27.06.2008 4,4787 5,1341 4,7503 4,8178 5,0361 4,9162
30.06.2008 4,5717 5,2251 4,8417 4,9269 5,1138 5,0119
01.07.2008 4,56 5,2159 4,834 4,9115 5,0926 5,0004
02.07.2008 4,6047 5,2525 4,8655 4,9465 5,1133 5,0244
03.07.2008 4,5121 5,161 4,784 4,8374 5,017 4,9391
04.07.2008 4,4586 5,1078 4,7255 4,7788 4,9614 4,8803
07.07.2008 4,3918 5,0625 4,6655 4,7194 4,9019 4,824
08.07.2008 4,3794 4,9854 4,6597 4,7148 4,8954 4,8404
09.07.2008 4,3799 4,9852 4,6523 4,7063 4,8807 4,8318
10.07.2008 4,3642 4,9742 4,6406 4,6905 4,8733 4,8103
11.07.2008 4,3888 4,9923 4,6761 4,7164 4,8943 4,8153
14.07.2008 4,3641 4,963 4,6477 4,6957 4,8758 4,7918
15.07.2008 4,3511 4,9625 4,6511 4,6912 4,8879 4,7777
16.07.2008 4,3619 4,9761 4,6649 4,7032 4,8894 4,8023
17.07.2008 4,413 5,025 4,7212 4,752 4,9316 4,8557
18.07.2008 4,5367 5,1415 4,8423 4,8771 5,0413 4,9712
21.07.2008 4,5874 5,1975 4,8986 4,9267 5,0776 5,0133
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22.07.2008 4,593 5,2039 4,8868 4,9201 5,0725 5,0179
23.07.2008 4,6181 5,2202 4,8945 4,9296 5,0801 5,0243
24.07.2008 4,5273 5,1394 4,8093 4,8293 5,0016 4,9417
25.07.2008 4,5616 5,1695 4,8486 4,8691 5,0447 4,9784
28.07.2008 4,4877 5,0919 4,7698 4,7961 4,9662 4,9029
29.07.2008 4,4375 5,0492 4,7218 4,7527 4,942 4,8588
30.07.2008 4,3909 4,9935 4,6714 4,699 4,8846 4,8091
31.07.2008 4,33 4,933 4,6165 4,648 4,824 4,7475
01.08.2008 4,3147 4,9298 4,6138 4,6449 4,8188 4,7385
04.08.2008 4,2967 4,9421 4,6032 4,6263 4,8061 4,7246
05.08.2008 4,2754 4,918 4,5807 4,607 4,7757 4,7014
06.08.2008 4,3015 4,9329 4,6063 4,6265 4,7874 4,7263
07.08.2008 4,2217 4,8562 4,525 4,5591 4,7085 4,6491
08.08.2008 4,219 4,856 4,5198 4,55 4,6996 4,6545
11.08.2008 4,2315 4,8683 4,5311 4,5619 4,7152 4,6711
12.08.2008 4,1942 4,832 4,4924 4,5213 4,6931 4,635
13.08.2008 4,1748 4,8181 4,4751 4,506 4,6866 4,6235
14.08.2008 4,1767 4,8037 4,4748 4,5076 4,6831 4,6174
15.08.2008 4,15 4,7738 4,442 4,4713 4,655 4,5838
18.08.2008 4,1265 4,7558 4,4248 4,4538 4,6414 4,569
19.08.2008 4,1466 4,7724 4,4554 4,4786 4,6719 4,5891
20.08.2008 4,1026 4,7438 4,4452 4,4379 4,6291 4,5557
21.08.2008 4,1538 4,7897 4,4946 4,4887 4,6691 4,6015
22.08.2008 4,1969 4,8386 4,5383 4,532 4,7104 4,6419
25.08.2008 4,1044 4,7836 4,4479 4,4419 4,7425 4,5576
26.08.2008 4,0935 4,7809 4,4428 4,4348 4,6758 4,5529
27.08.2008 4,1565 4,8379 4,5042 4,5005 4,7411 4,6151
28.08.2008 4,1416 4,8406 4,5062 4,5082 4,7366 4,6188
29.08.2008 4,1396 4,8421 4,5071 4,5079 4,7337 4,6143
01.09.2008 4,0911 4,784 4,4595 4,4594 4,6839 4,5636
02.09.2008 4,1088 4,7792 4,4773 4,4799 4,6891 4,5835
03.09.2008 4,1111 4,7829 4,478 4,4752 4,6893 4,576
04.09.2008 4,045 4,7294 4,4142 4,4179 4,6313 4,5293
05.09.2008 3,9788 4,6883 4,3803 4,3646 4,6025 4,4932
08.09.2008 4,0427 4,7548 4,4496 4,4248 4,6624 4,5539
09.09.2008 4,0214 4,7545 4,4301 4,4082 4,6506 4,5434
10.09.2008 4,0421 4,777 4,441 4,4299 4,6606 4,5459
11.09.2008 4,0611 4,7789 4,4653 4,4558 4,6788 4,5724
12.09.2008 4,1724 4,8633 4,5568 4,5475 4,76 4,6427
15.09.2008 4,0368 4,7974 4,4667 4,4354 4,6892 4,5569
16.09.2008 3,9828 4,7718 4,4469 4,4133 4,6658 4,5261
17.09.2008 4,0122 4,7909 4,4857 4,4419 4,6974 4,5437
18.09.2008 4,0325 4,8526 4,5455 4,4797 4,7745 4,6341
19.09.2008 4,1995 4,9699 4,6629 4,6321 4,852 4,7433
22.09.2008 4,2526 4,9534 4,6989 4,6814 4,8617 4,7635
23.09.2008 4,2324 4,947 4,6791 4,6554 4,8504 4,7392
24.09.2008 4,16 4,8863 4,6009 4,5792 4,7754 4,664
25.09.2008 4,2223 4,9474 4,6552 4,6284 4,8297 4,7161
26.09.2008 4,1598 4,8995 4,5954 4,5802 4,8004 4,6626
29.09.2008 3,9748 4,828 4,4966 4,4592 4,7824 4,6027
30.09.2008 4,0065 4,8756 4,5424 4,5525 4,8173 4,6498
01.10.2008 3,9854 4,8453 4,5002 4,5475 4,7508 4,6121
02.10.2008 3,9299 4,7708 4,4444 4,4784 4,6783 4,5389
03.10.2008 3,917 4,7369 4,4297 4,4663 4,6526 4,5105
06.10.2008 3,752 4,6012 4,2694 4,3054 4,5124 4,3551
07.10.2008 3,7439 4,609 4,2712 4,3062 4,5141 4,3535
08.10.2008 3,7993 4,6878 4,3513 4,3543 4,5888 4,4364
09.10.2008 3,8777 4,7776 4,4314 4,4487 4,6644 4,5185
10.10.2008 3,9906 4,9266 4,5689 4,5856 4,8018 4,6421
13.10.2008 4,0698 4,9542 4,6428 4,6929 4,804 4,6797
14.10.2008 4,1215 4,9236 4,6255 4,6831 4,7675 4,6324
15.10.2008 4,1342 4,8998 4,583 4,6754 4,7328 4,5727
16.10.2008 4,0847 4,8541 4,5372 4,6304 4,6986 4,5318
17.10.2008 4,0328 4,7864 4,4917 4,5701 4,6702 4,4964
20.10.2008 4,0295 4,7786 4,4843 4,5741 4,6527 4,4867
21.10.2008 3,9633 4,7326 4,399 4,5108 4,6204 4,4372
22.10.2008 3,8322 4,6654 4,2985 4,4346 4,5399 4,3504
23.10.2008 3,802 4,7465 4,3023 4,4539 4,5553 4,373
24.10.2008 3,7777 4,767 4,3295 4,4755 4,5725 4,3986
27.10.2008 3,7904 4,7889 4,3554 4,5404 4,6204 4,4387
28.10.2008 3,787 4,8461 4,3425 4,5722 4,659 4,4337
29.10.2008 3,8279 5,0605 4,3998 4,6182 4,8035 4,5554
30.10.2008 3,8149 5,1422 4,408 4,6611 4,8875 4,6007
31.10.2008 3,9459 5,37 4,5708 4,8364 5,0452 4,7708
03.11.2008 3,8908 5,3853 4,5047 4,8276 4,9266 4,7104
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04.11.2008 3,864 5,2003 4,4827 4,8119 4,7697 4,6858
05.11.2008 3,8257 5,2279 4,4192 4,7397 4,6797 4,6118
06.11.2008 3,7606 5,0827 4,2854 4,6581 4,5772 4,5315
07.11.2008 3,7355 5,1223 4,1922 4,6016 4,5165 4,4023
10.11.2008 3,7393 5,0238 4,1744 4,5129 4,5043 4,3879
11.11.2008 3,7294 5,03 4,1516 4,5135 4,5312 4,376
12.11.2008 3,6848 5,03 4,1101 4,4957 4,566 4,3723
13.11.2008 3,6974 5,0876 4,12 4,4977 4,6023 4,3802
14.11.2008 3,6592 5,0282 4,0702 4,4584 4,5322 4,331
17.11.2008 3,6492 4,9365 4,0668 4,4633 4,5928 4,3424
18.11.2008 3,6406 4,9536 4,0441 4,4652 4,5578 4,3147
19.11.2008 3,5463 4,8704 3,9485 4,355 4,4546 4,2229
20.11.2008 3,4067 4,7455 3,8336 4,2529 4,3493 4,083
21.11.2008 3,4025 4,7649 3,8525 4,2558 4,3583 4,0985
24.11.2008 3,4411 4,7979 3,9329 4,3042 4,3888 4,141
25.11.2008 3,3688 4,7209 3,8867 4,2524 4,3381 4,0701
26.11.2008 3,3049 4,6717 3,8406 4,1999 4,2926 4,0058
27.11.2008 3,3169 4,7251 3,8722 4,1959 4,3488 4,0216
28.11.2008 3,2761 4,6965 3,8558 4,1875 4,3668 3,992
01.12.2008 3,1832 4,6097 3,814 4,1649 4,3376 3,9426
02.12.2008 3,0661 4,4957 3,702 4,1088 4,2221 3,82
03.12.2008 3,055 4,4682 3,6722 4,1194 4,2073 3,7956
04.12.2008 3,1211 4,6087 3,7941 4,2074 4,3538 3,9324
05.12.2008 3,0666 4,5564 3,7695 4,1464 4,3614 3,9145
08.12.2008 3,1608 4,6519 3,8672 4,3657 4,4478 4,0471
09.12.2008 3,2844 4,7388 3,9738 4,491 4,4989 4,1533
10.12.2008 3,2427 4,7302 3,9409 4,4616 4,4111 4,1096
11.12.2008 3,2459 4,8716 3,9253 4,4453 4,4212 4,0905
12.12.2008 3,3261 5,1353 4,0005 4,5151 4,538 4,163
15.12.2008 3,2256 5,2008 3,9317 4,5445 4,5034 4,1234
16.12.2008 3,1626 5,147 3,8894 4,4062 4,4121 4,0512
17.12.2008 3,0173 5,1073 3,7457 4,3067 4,2936 3,9032
18.12.2008 3,0119 5,1139 3,7337 4,3145 4,2831 3,8904
19.12.2008 3,0492 5,1545 3,7636 4,344 4,3247 3,9327
22.12.2008 2,9962 5,1201 3,7319 4,3161 4,2904 3,9246
23.12.2008 3,0112 5,1103 3,7603 4,3327 4,2823 3,9435
24.12.2008 2,9993 5,1103 3,7482 4,3142 4,2741 3,9358
25.12.2008 2,9984 5,1094 3,7398 4,3188 4,2759 3,931
26.12.2008 2,9985 5,1095 3,8395 4,3195 4,2757 3,9311
29.12.2008 2,9846 5,0878 3,81 4,3014 4,302 3,9034
30.12.2008 3,0134 5,0969 3,8591 4,3423 4,3445 4,007
31.12.2008 3,0187 5,0951 3,846 4,3497 4,3433 4,01
01.01.2009 3,0178 5,0941 3,8461 4,3504 4,343 4,0185
02.01.2009 3,0311 5,0914 3,8297 4,3179 4,2895 4,0071
05.01.2009 3,0946 5,0808 3,8864 4,3376 4,2816 3,9664
06.01.2009 3,2183 5,223 4,0149 4,55 4,4115 4,1045
07.01.2009 3,2448 5,1655 4,0165 4,6199 4,377 4,1507
08.01.2009 3,2015 5,1064 3,9646 4,6115 4,3205 4,1525
09.01.2009 3,0957 5,117 3,8936 4,5424 4,2934 4,1142
12.01.2009 3,0662 5,2695 3,9546 4,5203 4,3535 4,0464
13.01.2009 3,0657 5,3485 4,0408 4,5871 4,3906 4,1456
14.01.2009 3,0053 5,3194 4,0067 4,6556 4,38 4,1366
15.01.2009 2,9609 5,3288 4,0931 4,6312 4,3885 4,2233
16.01.2009 3,02 5,4764 4,2048 4,8065 4,4238 4,2369
19.01.2009 3,09 5,5658 4,2373 5,0623 4,4379 4,2825
20.01.2009 3,1277 5,7693 4,289 5,3103 4,5222 4,272
21.01.2009 3,0478 5,7898 4,2781 5,5236 4,5302 4,389
22.01.2009 3,1631 5,9415 4,3398 5,678 4,5937 4,5579
23.01.2009 3,2953 6,0886 4,4389 5,8165 4,7479 4,6719
26.01.2009 3,4155 6,0222 4,5463 5,9878 4,8493 4,7266
27.01.2009 3,3354 5,8411 4,4515 5,8444 4,7127 4,6684
28.01.2009 3,3089 5,8114 4,4171 5,707 4,6288 4,569
29.01.2009 3,304 5,4561 4,3866 5,4925 4,513 4,4831
30.01.2009 3,3316 5,5343 4,4217 5,4251 4,5559 4,5504
02.02.2009 3,331 5,5795 4,4154 5,4973 4,4915 4,5462
03.02.2009 3,3712 5,5181 4,4011 5,4365 4,4651 4,5306
04.02.2009 3,4269 5,3905 4,3602 5,3715 4,3978 4,5186
05.02.2009 3,4063 5,4212 4,3128 5,369 4,4333 4,4971
06.02.2009 3,4262 5,4815 4,3177 5,3716 4,4315 4,575
09.02.2009 3,4653 5,472 4,285 5,3908 4,4403 4,5169
10.02.2009 3,4252 5,471 4,2465 5,3834 4,4376 4,4879
11.02.2009 3,2504 5,3912 4,1362 5,2734 4,403 4,4484
12.02.2009 3,1531 5,5213 4,1112 5,304 4,3856 4,4407
13.02.2009 3,1855 5,6406 4,1535 5,4631 4,46 4,5106
16.02.2009 3,1143 5,7479 4,1628 5,5746 4,4869 4,6333
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17.02.2009 3,0516 5,743 4,1264 5,5585 4,4506 4,6143
18.02.2009 3,0544 5,6751 4,0735 5,5315 4,4101 4,5894
19.02.2009 3,1433 5,617 4,1629 5,5322 4,3975 4,57
20.02.2009 3,0945 5,5237 4,0918 5,4787 4,3674 4,5084
23.02.2009 3,0722 5,4245 4,0419 5,3497 4,323 4,4522
24.02.2009 3,0612 5,4629 4,0612 5,4139 4,3982 4,5278
25.02.2009 3,0599 5,4684 4,0526 5,4514 4,433 4,5133
26.02.2009 3,2037 5,5769 4,1743 5,5133 4,5541 4,5779
27.02.2009 3,1534 5,5769 4,1357 5,519 4,5224 4,5725
02.03.2009 3,1036 5,5419 4,0992 5,4938 4,4936 4,5252
03.03.2009 3,1291 5,6902 4,1174 5,5221 4,4995 4,5641
04.03.2009 3,1827 5,7598 4,1175 5,6335 4,5259 4,5571
05.03.2009 3,0783 5,6678 3,9782 5,5955 4,4233 4,4892
06.03.2009 2,9624 5,6224 3,9069 5,5724 4,3809 4,4325
09.03.2009 2,9884 5,6584 3,9031 5,6144 4,3775 4,4622
10.03.2009 3,0549 5,6963 3,9533 5,6605 4,4144 4,5202
11.03.2009 3,1221 5,7117 3,9709 5,6201 4,4465 4,5289
12.03.2009 3,0561 5,6776 3,9347 5,6833 4,4365 4,4724
13.03.2009 3,1065 5,7079 3,9788 5,7334 4,4395 4,5068
16.03.2009 3,1974 5,7732 4,0457 5,8166 4,4515 4,4902
17.03.2009 3,2317 5,7202 4,0885 5,83 4,4459 4,4763
18.03.2009 3,2606 5,7191 4,1207 5,8787 4,4563 4,6856
19.03.2009 3,0883 5,5284 4,0027 5,8775 4,3115 4,5689
20.03.2009 3,0433 5,2743 3,939 5,8639 4,2281 4,5091
23.03.2009 3,086 5,2875 3,9614 5,6526 4,293 4,5325
24.03.2009 3,2163 5,3895 4,0749 5,684 4,3989 4,5738
25.03.2009 3,194 5,3814 4,0261 5,4359 4,329 4,5271
26.03.2009 3,1944 5,281 3,9859 5,3909 4,3254 4,5754
27.03.2009 3,1215 5,2703 3,9428 5,2529 4,3112 4,5043
30.03.2009 3,0703 5,355 3,9642 5,3595 4,3928 4,5503
31.03.2009 3,0334 5,3509 3,9657 5,4225 4,3804 4,5551
01.04.2009 3,0146 5,3038 3,9548 5,429 4,3246 4,5563
02.04.2009 3,1477 5,3544 4,0263 5,3295 4,391 4,6129
03.04.2009 3,2174 5,3325 4,0356 5,3046 4,3891 4,6285
06.04.2009 3,2213 5,2948 3,9857 5,1696 4,3995 4,5979
07.04.2009 3,2419 5,3258 4,0529 5,2221 4,4547 4,5941
08.04.2009 3,2292 5,2949 4,0558 5,2806 4,4435 4,6014
09.04.2009 3,2985 5,333 4,1039 5,3514 4,4598 4,6566
10.04.2009 3,2919 5,3237 4,086 5,3478 4,4367 4,6566
13.04.2009 3,2952 5,3349 4,086 5,3469 4,4306 4,6629
14.04.2009 3,2475 5,2754 4,0324 5,307 4,4042 4,6069
15.04.2009 3,1868 5,245 3,984 5,272 4,3449 4,571
16.04.2009 3,2134 5,2426 3,9965 5,3151 4,3302 4,5874
17.04.2009 3,3133 5,3218 4,076 5,3151 4,3767 4,5524
20.04.2009 3,1906 5,1702 3,9454 5,2845 4,3127 4,5852
21.04.2009 3,1682 5,1764 3,9329 5,2552 4,3363 4,4554
22.04.2009 3,2432 5,1916 3,9634 5,2587 4,3358 4,5682
23.04.2009 3,2979 5,1313 3,9815 5,2716 4,3194 4,5427
24.04.2009 3,2415 5,1059 3,9524 5,1491 4,3016 4,4657
27.04.2009 3,2099 5,0854 3,9139 5,1316 4,2767 4,4217
28.04.2009 3,208 5,1169 3,9275 5,1383 4,2975 4,4301
29.04.2009 3,1988 5,1065 3,881 5,15 4,2869 4,4043
30.04.2009 3,244 5,1067 3,9013 5,1004 4,2961 4,4021
01.05.2009 3,2369 5,1027 3,8955 5,1041 4,2928 4,39
04.05.2009 3,2968 5,1355 3,93 5,1273 4,2887 4,3243
05.05.2009 3,2496 5,0221 3,8741 5,0914 4,2048 4,2505
06.05.2009 3,2725 4,9615 3,8988 5,0512 4,2237 4,2326
07.05.2009 3,4224 4,8937 3,9963 5,0387 4,2619 4,2872
08.05.2009 3,4669 4,8065 3,9912 5,0266 4,2608 4,2928
11.05.2009 3,4123 4,7571 3,9554 5,0543 4,2347 4,1737
12.05.2009 3,4519 4,8437 3,9925 5,086 4,3161 4,2014
13.05.2009 3,3742 4,8399 3,9382 5,0741 4,2957 4,1788
14.05.2009 3,3554 4,8801 3,9682 5,0788 4,2904 4,215
15.05.2009 3,4224 4,8643 4,0208 5,1139 4,2813 4,2124
18.05.2009 3,3967 4,8316 3,9871 5,099 4,2583 4,1647
19.05.2009 3,4917 4,8692 4,0878 5,1505 4,2947 4,217
20.05.2009 3,4703 4,8209 4,0595 5,1861 4,2635 4,2001
21.05.2009 3,3891 4,8043 4,0498 5,1408 4,2702 4,2277
22.05.2009 3,5189 4,7379 4,1571 5,2097 4,3315 4,2763
25.05.2009 3,5946 4,7979 4,2374 5,3049 4,3937 4,2836
26.05.2009 3,589 4,8118 4,2348 5,3121 4,3956 4,3284
27.05.2009 3,6113 4,8267 4,2452 5,372 4,4165 4,4287
28.05.2009 3,6249 4,8676 4,2772 5,364 4,4801 4,392
29.05.2009 3,5978 4,8615 4,2701 5,4207 4,4332 4,3905
01.06.2009 3,6431 4,8943 4,3084 5,4581 4,4637 4,3914
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02.06.2009 3,6423 4,9859 4,2884 5,4063 4,488 4,4363
03.06.2009 3,571 4,9402 4,2423 5,4099 4,4433 4,4201
04.06.2009 3,6406 5,0467 4,3418 5,603 4,561 4,528
05.06.2009 3,7304 5,1482 4,3721 5,6795 4,601 4,5857
08.06.2009 3,6625 5,1099 4,2806 5,6373 4,5785 4,5251
09.06.2009 3,6225 5,2176 4,252 5,625 4,5814 4,5405
10.06.2009 3,6592 5,3281 4,2783 5,6386 4,6117 4,5268
11.06.2009 3,7028 5,3114 4,3171 5,6635 4,6398 4,5541
12.06.2009 3,6242 5,262 4,2772 5,6013 4,5846 4,538
15.06.2009 3,5279 5,1622 4,1799 5,5676 4,506 4,5078
16.06.2009 3,5374 5,2044 4,2159 5,4786 4,5421 4,4868
17.06.2009 3,4931 5,1755 4,1948 5,4642 4,5091 4,4424
18.06.2009 3,5434 5,2222 4,2144 5,4775 4,5302 4,4907
19.06.2009 3,514 5,1689 4,1847 5,6239 4,5043 4,4669
22.06.2009 3,4644 5,1219 4,1446 5,649 4,4937 4,4622
23.06.2009 3,4788 5,1342 4,1427 5,7252 4,5269 4,5093
24.06.2009 3,4759 5,1092 4,1101 5,6905 4,4904 4,4829
25.06.2009 3,4495 5,0439 4,0861 5,6858 4,4606 4,4539
26.06.2009 3,4174 5,0069 4,0616 5,6292 4,4286 4,4327
29.06.2009 3,3874 4,9369 4,0328 5,5875 4,3494 4,4068
30.06.2009 3,4023 4,9405 4,0437 5,5758 4,3567 4,4153
01.07.2009 3,4367 4,9551 4,0692 5,6212 4,3665 4,4314
02.07.2009 3,3545 4,8866 3,9769 5,7605 4,3059 4,3654
03.07.2009 3,3554 4,8807 3,9901 5,6897 4,3036 4,3718
06.07.2009 3,3172 4,8349 3,9618 5,6721 4,3087 4,3422
07.07.2009 3,3383 4,8707 3,9832 5,4285 4,3499 4,3381
08.07.2009 3,3151 4,9218 4,0085 5,467 4,374 4,364
09.07.2009 3,3107 4,9178 4,0034 5,4813 4,3868 4,331
10.07.2009 3,2804 4,8975 3,9643 5,4426 4,3786 4,2783
13.07.2009 3,2767 4,9326 3,9834 5,3661 4,3616 4,3023
14.07.2009 3,3168 4,9589 4,0223 5,3349 4,3755 4,3306
15.07.2009 3,3815 5,0241 4,0419 5,32 4,3769 4,3468
16.07.2009 3,3523 4,9353 4,0037 5,3567 4,321 4,3098
17.07.2009 3,4155 4,9698 4,0583 5,4144 4,3177 4,3318
20.07.2009 3,433 4,9297 3,9904 5,3401 4,2499 4,2675
21.07.2009 3,3859 4,8054 3,9317 5,3416 4,2065 4,2114
22.07.2009 3,3984 4,8228 3,9355 5,2814 4,202 4,1925
23.07.2009 3,477 4,9097 3,9735 5,2739 4,2498 4,2351
24.07.2009 3,5113 4,9222 3,9713 5,2041 4,2623 4,2079
27.07.2009 3,5242 4,9202 3,9929 5,1972 4,2471 4,1908
28.07.2009 3,4728 4,7807 3,9452 5,1314 4,1839 4,1357
29.07.2009 3,454 4,7245 3,9313 5,0643 4,1503 4,0761
30.07.2009 3,4812 4,7098 3,9297 5,0512 4,1515 4,066
31.07.2009 3,3463 4,5855 3,8031 4,9322 4,0555 3,9636
03.08.2009 3,3909 4,6255 3,8504 4,97 4,0695 4,0048
04.08.2009 3,3909 4,6199 3,8598 4,9413 4,0562 3,9962
05.08.2009 3,3866 4,5029 3,8576 4,9132 4,0429 3,9783
06.08.2009 3,3909 4,5017 3,8629 4,9243 4,0444 3,9998
07.08.2009 3,5253 4,5873 3,943 5,0012 4,1037 4,0811
10.08.2009 3,512 4,5495 3,8872 4,8937 4,046 4,0311
11.08.2009 3,5037 4,5259 3,8778 4,8854 4,0789 4,0407
12.08.2009 3,497 4,5565 3,8957 4,9648 4,0981 4,059
13.08.2009 3,4681 4,536 3,8658 4,9161 4,1023 4,0443
14.08.2009 3,3608 4,4616 3,7864 4,8289 4,0407 3,968
17.08.2009 3,3227 4,4483 3,779 4,8138 4,0153 3,9443
18.08.2009 3,3373 4,4441 3,7761 4,8156 4,0105 3,9362
19.08.2009 3,2804 4,4372 3,7415 4,7752 3,9993 3,9117
20.08.2009 3,3037 4,4389 3,7497 4,7874 3,9941 3,9267
21.08.2009 3,3545 4,466 3,7865 4,8057 3,9918 3,9326
24.08.2009 3,3486 4,4999 3,8219 4,8158 4,0234 3,9605
25.08.2009 3,3137 4,4377 3,7815 4,7272 3,9595 3,9012
26.08.2009 3,3005 4,4328 3,7596 4,7933 3,953 3,9053
27.08.2009 3,2993 4,4179 3,7479 4,7693 3,9434 3,892
28.08.2009 3,3188 4,4627 3,7809 4,7926 3,9722 3,9221
31.08.2009 3,3369 4,4855 3,799 4,8446 3,9978 3,9412
01.09.2009 3,3362 4,5796 3,8661 4,9282 4,0269 3,9993
02.09.2009 3,3054 4,5639 3,8571 4,9248 4,0277 4,0228
03.09.2009 3,3179 4,6323 3,9108 4,9636 4,0602 4,0493
04.09.2009 3,3091 4,611 3,8866 4,9322 4,0528 4,0246
07.09.2009 3,2966 4,6356 3,9205 4,9622 4,0564 4,0257
08.09.2009 3,3424 4,6405 3,9497 5,0026 4,0751 4,0328
09.09.2009 3,4276 4,6295 3,9699 5,0565 4,0789 4,0322
10.09.2009 3,3761 4,5719 3,8731 4,9787 4,0322 3,9684
11.09.2009 3,313 4,4841 3,8038 4,8887 3,9605 3,909
14.09.2009 3,3338 4,5061 3,8528 4,9423 3,9805 3,9273
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15.09.2009 3,371 4,4988 3,8698 4,9393 3,983 3,9421
16.09.2009 3,4205 4,5324 3,8828 4,9359 3,9923 3,9684
17.09.2009 3,4366 4,522 3,8871 4,9129 3,9982 3,9801
18.09.2009 3,4511 4,5381 3,8957 4,8941 3,998 3,9771
21.09.2009 3,4542 4,5583 3,9095 4,9205 4,0099 4,0005
22.09.2009 3,468 4,5633 3,8989 4,8907 4,0186 3,9985
23.09.2009 3,4431 4,502 3,8606 4,8119 4,0135 3,9755
24.09.2009 3,3783 4,4685 3,7961 4,7739 3,9624 3,9166
25.09.2009 3,3436 4,4624 3,7933 4,7446 3,9396 3,8944
28.09.2009 3,3295 4,4572 3,7854 4,7422 3,9321 3,8844
29.09.2009 3,3183 4,4547 3,7959 4,7226 3,932 3,8769
30.09.2009 3,2963 4,4904 3,8041 4,726 3,9387 3,8874
01.10.2009 3,2588 4,5589 3,8128 4,8429 3,9615 3,9343
02.10.2009 3,2188 4,5132 3,7848 4,8438 3,9032 3,8811
05.10.2009 3,2141 4,4692 3,7643 4,874 3,8875 3,8503
06.10.2009 3,248 4,4931 3,7932 4,8552 3,9021 3,8535
07.10.2009 3,2138 4,4659 3,7618 4,779 3,8614 3,8252
08.10.2009 3,2066 4,4651 3,7472 4,7454 3,846 3,8186
09.10.2009 3,3109 4,5437 3,8243 4,8168 3,9168 3,8996
12.10.2009 3,2677 4,5155 3,7917 4,7998 3,8967 3,8724
13.10.2009 3,2415 4,5299 3,8011 4,7967 3,9122 3,8753
14.10.2009 3,2931 4,5827 3,8393 4,8373 3,9648 3,9094
15.10.2009 3,3471 4,6413 3,8853 4,8869 4,0225 3,9565
16.10.2009 3,3423 4,6394 3,8671 4,8597 3,9992 3,9326
19.10.2009 3,3771 4,6551 3,8815 4,8979 4,0011 3,9373
20.10.2009 3,3278 4,6014 3,8372 4,8225 3,95 3,8828
21.10.2009 3,4049 4,705 3,8857 4,8481 3,9995 3,9165
22.10.2009 3,3788 4,6643 3,8518 4,8355 3,9734 3,8913
23.10.2009 3,4161 4,7237 3,8776 4,8739 4,0077 3,94
26.10.2009 3,4234 4,734 3,8758 4,8567 4,0204 3,9452
27.10.2009 3,3424 4,6749 3,8155 4,793 3,9436 3,8773
28.10.2009 3,3424 4,6632 3,8151 4,79 3,9387 3,8615
29.10.2009 3,4014 4,7517 3,8786 4,8447 3,9993 3,9265
30.10.2009 3,3066 4,6817 3,8072 4,7665 3,93 3,8557
02.11.2009 3,3029 4,7097 3,8018 4,7649 3,9094 3,8233
03.11.2009 3,3325 4,7695 3,8316 4,757 3,9326 3,841
04.11.2009 3,3889 4,8032 3,8725 4,824 3,9623 3,8753
05.11.2009 3,435 4,8506 3,9009 4,8323 3,9888 3,9042
06.11.2009 3,4375 4,8601 3,9036 4,8346 3,9871 3,9177
09.11.2009 3,3943 4,7993 3,8564 4,789 3,9376 3,8668
10.11.2009 3,3581 4,7635 3,8278 4,7721 3,9036 3,8292
11.11.2009 3,3415 4,6648 3,8266 4,7592 3,9035 3,8198
12.11.2009 3,3616 4,69 3,8517 4,7532 3,9225 3,84
13.11.2009 3,393 4,7703 3,9031 4,8301 3,9757 3,8847
16.11.2009 3,3254 4,8182 3,8621 4,8474 3,9384 3,8661
17.11.2009 3,2779 4,7192 3,8006 4,6917 3,8816 3,8072
18.11.2009 3,3003 4,7734 3,8285 4,735 3,9153 3,8293
19.11.2009 3,284 4,8782 3,837 4,798 3,9306 3,8556
20.11.2009 3,2781 4,9041 3,8522 4,7748 3,9386 3,8774
23.11.2009 3,2958 4,9244 3,8624 4,762 3,935 3,8834
24.11.2009 3,2764 4,9682 3,8365 4,7864 3,921 3,8614
25.11.2009 3,272 5,0193 3,837 4,8768 3,9312 3,8771
26.11.2009 3,1735 4,9208 3,7775 4,916 3,9244 3,8525
27.11.2009 3,198 5,1955 3,8133 4,9495 3,9298 3,8791
30.11.2009 3,175 5,1811 3,7834 4,8982 3,8988 3,8335
01.12.2009 3,1582 5,0744 3,7578 4,8345 3,859 3,7903
02.12.2009 3,1858 5,0859 3,7903 4,8454 3,8744 3,813
03.12.2009 3,1914 5,1099 3,7822 4,8401 3,8767 3,8053
04.12.2009 3,2545 5,2185 3,8121 4,885 3,8862 3,8357
07.12.2009 3,2101 5,3305 3,7918 4,8776 3,842 3,8387
08.12.2009 3,1582 5,637 3,7937 4,9029 3,8532 3,8624
09.12.2009 3,1546 5,8113 3,8647 5,0913 3,898 3,9828
10.12.2009 3,1937 5,8104 3,9003 5,0212 3,9163 4
11.12.2009 3,2402 5,682 3,89 4,9465 3,9224 3,993
14.12.2009 3,2095 5,7381 3,8468 4,8755 3,8914 3,9432
15.12.2009 3,2553 6,0152 3,8853 4,9338 3,9174 3,9921
16.12.2009 3,2207 5,7255 3,8424 4,8188 3,877 3,9481
17.12.2009 3,1732 5,8544 3,8485 4,8143 3,855 3,9509
18.12.2009 3,1592 5,9158 3,8887 4,8149 3,8516 4,0019
21.12.2009 3,21 6,1399 3,979 4,8691 3,8959 4,091
22.12.2009 3,2868 5,9673 3,9858 4,8601 3,8978 4,0843
23.12.2009 3,3065 5,9704 3,9771 4,8618 3,9045 4,0915
24.12.2009 3,3217 6,0044 4,0052 4,8927 3,9388 4,1124
25.12.2009 3,3153 5,998 4,0035 4,8907 3,9381 4,1136
28.12.2009 3,3517 5,9946 3,9978 4,9211 3,962 4,1246
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29.12.2009 3,3722 5,974 4,0082 4,913 4,0053 4,1268
30.12.2009 3,3908 5,8355 4,0303 4,9072 4,0397 4,173
31.12.2009 3,3758 5,7623 4,0222 4,916 4,0211 4,1701
01.01.2010 3,3761 5,7626 4,0226 4,911 4,0224 4,1772
04.01.2010 3,382 5,6442 4,01 4,8278 3,9789 4,1626
05.01.2010 3,3856 5,5685 4,024 4,859 3,9865 4,1462
06.01.2010 3,3963 5,549 4,0511 4,9596 3,9958 4,1618
07.01.2010 3,3871 5,5567 4,038 4,8918 3,9765 4,1394
08.01.2010 3,4037 5,4498 4,0144 4,8429 3,9699 4,1115
11.01.2010 3,3663 5,3786 4,0141 4,7875 3,945 4,1172
12.01.2010 3,3298 5,5022 4,0016 4,7741 3,9417 4,1046
13.01.2010 3,3342 5,7558 4,0153 4,8639 3,9756 4,1741
14.01.2010 3,3281 5,9959 4,054 4,9205 3,9815 4,2812
15.01.2010 3,307 5,9798 4,0402 4,8906 3,9693 4,3101
18.01.2010 3,2824 5,9667 4,0424 4,8891 3,9671 4,3128
19.01.2010 3,3178 6,0613 4,0888 4,8298 3,9725 4,3247
20.01.2010 3,2658 6,11 4,0739 4,8171 3,9896 4,3804
21.01.2010 3,2726 6,3645 4,1006 4,7796 4,012 4,3765
22.01.2010 3,2529 6,4727 4,1059 4,7954 4,0026 4,409
25.01.2010 3,2582 6,6117 4,0385 4,7136 3,9749 4,3137
26.01.2010 3,2462 6,6288 4,0113 4,6977 3,948 4,2488
27.01.2010 3,2404 6,6226 4,0699 4,7284 4,0056 4,3628
28.01.2010 3,2368 6,874 4,1528 4,8424 4,0741 4,5144
29.01.2010 3,2328 7,069 4,1028 4,8468 4,0517 4,541
01.02.2010 3,2179 6,9153 4,0154 4,807 3,9835 4,512
02.02.2010 3,2071 6,8561 4,0337 4,8009 3,9852 4,5976
03.02.2010 3,235 6,9434 4,0853 4,8307 4,0067 4,7934
04.02.2010 3,1782 6,8726 4,1042 4,8266 3,9918 4,8402
05.02.2010 3,1389 6,8407 4,1119 4,8651 3,9907 4,82
08.02.2010 3,1527 6,9889 4,1185 4,9213 4,0284 4,8856
09.02.2010 3,1618 6,8171 4,0571 4,8421 3,9794 4,7133
10.02.2010 3,1959 6,1137 3,9782 4,721 3,9637 4,6542
11.02.2010 3,2354 6,1088 3,9888 4,6608 3,9802 4,5574
12.02.2010 3,1946 6,0818 3,9779 4,6638 3,9941 4,5441
15.02.2010 3,2273 6,1463 4,0243 4,7136 4,0082 4,5615
16.02.2010 3,2299 6,4344 4,0104 4,7551 4,0059 4,5826
17.02.2010 3,2234 6,3689 3,9945 4,7454 3,9959 4,5165
18.02.2010 3,2687 6,5792 4,0161 4,7793 4,0099 4,5418
19.02.2010 3,2988 6,5041 4,0106 4,7889 4,0301 4,5425
22.02.2010 3,2916 6,3747 3,9894 4,7364 4,0301 4,5123
23.02.2010 3,1938 6,3517 3,9107 4,6139 3,9731 4,4318
24.02.2010 3,1629 6,4308 3,892 4,6586 3,9557 4,4191
25.02.2010 3,1378 6,5569 3,8974 4,6827 3,977 4,4196
26.02.2010 3,1299 6,6587 3,8538 4,6318 3,9265 4,3505
01.03.2010 3,1356 6,5668 3,8173 4,5587 3,906 4,2273
02.03.2010 3,1569 6,3903 3,8605 4,5498 3,9062 4,2002
03.03.2010 3,1718 6,2629 3,8689 4,5558 3,9046 4,2004
04.03.2010 3,1469 6,1786 3,8678 4,536 3,8963 4,2024
05.03.2010 3,18 6,2116 3,8591 4,5393 3,8958 4,2151
08.03.2010 3,1928 6,2214 3,8463 4,5296 3,8863 4,2087
09.03.2010 3,1545 6,1075 3,831 4,5066 3,8552 4,2066
10.03.2010 3,1836 5,9926 3,8446 4,4785 3,8585 4,1969
11.03.2010 3,1966 6,1762 3,8672 4,4918 3,8796 4,2459
12.03.2010 3,1986 6,0752 3,867 4,4563 3,8861 4,2364
15.03.2010 3,1852 6,0411 3,8701 4,4588 3,8784 4,2594
16.03.2010 3,1682 5,9045 3,8535 4,433 3,863 4,2408
17.03.2010 3,1452 5,8474 3,844 4,4626 3,8461 4,2438
18.03.2010 3,1565 6,0493 3,8633 4,4936 3,8762 4,2676
19.03.2010 3,1418 6,2098 3,8766 4,5233 3,8915 4,2993
22.03.2010 3,1043 6,3421 3,847 4,5141 3,8728 4,3091
23.03.2010 3,092 6,1991 3,8204 4,4798 3,8484 4,286
24.03.2010 3,1142 6,2208 3,8252 4,5588 3,8589 4,3178
25.03.2010 3,1685 6,1005 3,852 4,5739 3,8665 4,3436
26.03.2010 3,1869 5,9408 3,8356 4,5492 3,8635 4,2743
29.03.2010 3,1746 6,0716 3,8224 4,5072 3,8622 4,2452
30.03.2010 3,1668 6,2678 3,8332 4,507 3,8599 4,2601
31.03.2010 3,1437 6,387 3,8211 4,4819 3,8375 4,2288
01.04.2010 3,1386 6,4625 3,8096 4,4544 3,8099 4,1827
02.04.2010 3,1387 6,4627 3,8073 4,4479 3,8067 4,1763
05.04.2010 3,1417 6,4662 3,8099 4,4472 3,8088 4,1786
06.04.2010 3,178 7,223 3,8799 4,5134 3,875 4,2617
07.04.2010 3,1622 7,3018 3,8844 4,5083 3,8678 4,2652
08.04.2010 3,1347 7,4377 3,8613 4,5203 3,856 4,3572
09.04.2010 3,1972 7,1035 3,8801 4,535 3,8673 4,3551
12.04.2010 3,2137 6,8151 3,8554 4,5091 3,8589 4,3409
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Appendix 11: Regression Statistics of Top 5 European Banks and all Banks  
 
 
 
 
 
  
13.04.2010 3,1641 6,7983 3,859 4,5228 3,8612 4,3459
14.04.2010 3,159 7,1088 3,8676 4,5379 3,8675 4,4152
15.04.2010 3,1529 7,105 3,8764 4,5554 3,8817 4,4036
16.04.2010 3,106 7,1302 3,868 4,5617 3,8822 4,3834
19.04.2010 3,1006 7,1631 3,8362 4,5652 3,8849 4,441
20.04.2010 3,1264 7,1585 3,8551 4,5431 3,8853 4,4653
21.04.2010 3,1087 7,2387 3,8637 4,5377 3,8839 4,4574
Multiple R 0,776974293
R Square 0,603689052
Adjusted R Square 0,592977945
Standard Error 0,121458481
Observations 39
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0,831447138 0,831447138 56,36103423 6,04123E-09
Residual 37 0,545830014 0,014752163
Total 38 1,377277151
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 99.0% Upper 99.0%
Intercept 0,051697646 0,019449082 2,658102158 0,011537519 0,012290064 0,091105228 -0,00111456 0,104509852
X 0,800774915 0,106664766 7,507398632 6,04123E-09 0,584651573 1,016898258 0,511136481 1,09041335
Regression Statistics (Top 5 European Banks)
Regression Statistics (Top 5 US, European and Austrian Banks)
Multiple R 0,410844312
R Square 0,168793049
Adjusted R Square 0,161688716
Standard Error 0,180950727
Observations 119
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0,777950411 0,777950411 23,7591693 3,46573E-06
Residual 117 3,830950357 0,032743165
Total 118 4,608900768
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 99.0% Upper 99.0%
Intercept 0,072213582 0,016626627 4,343248956 3,00382E-05 0,039285419 0,105141745 0,02867669 0,115750473
X 0,555874602 0,11404105 4,874337832 3,46573E-06 0,330022287 0,781726918 0,257257646 0,854491559
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Appendix 12: Overview over US Banks (currency in million) 
 
 
 
 
 
USD Bank of America Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 1.190.270 1.445.193 1.459.737 1.534.359 1.715.746 1.716.875 1.817.943 2.420.317 2.223.299
Risk-weighted assets 890.189 1.019.893 1.054.091 1.115.268 1.213.430 2.461.286 1.320.824 1.599.569 1.542.517
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities) 101.533 127.841 135.272 135.751 146.803 162.691 171.661 242.867 226.077
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 101.533 127.841 135.272 135.751 146.803 162.691 169.992 240.985 225.495
Common equity 101.262 127.570 132.421 132.900 142.394 138.540 139.351 196.492 194.236
Minority Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.669 1.882 582
Tier 1 capital 74.375 84.978 91.064 94.979 83.372 101.541 120.814 190.874 160.388
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. trust preferred securities) 12.446 12.446 15.942 16.884 16.863 16.873 18.105 19.947 17.964
Preference shares 271 271 2.851 2.851 4.409 24.151 37.701 58.660 21.448
Innovative Tier 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 61.658 72.261 72.271 75.244 62.100 60.517 63.339 110.385 120.394
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 74.375 84.978 91.064 94.979 83.372 101.541 119.145 188.992 159.806
Tier 2 capital 25.526 29.760 34.162 40.080 50.348 53.548 50.847 34.827 65.689
Total Capital (after supervisory deductions) 99.901 114.738 125.226 135.059 133.720 155.089 171.661 225.701 226.077
Goodwill & other intangibles 94.613
Tier 1 ratio 8,35% 8,33% 8,64% 8,52% 6,87% 4,13% 9,15% 11,93% 10,40%
CAR 11,22% 11,25% 11,88% 12,11% 11,02% 6,30% 13,00% 14,11% 14,66%
Core Tier 1 ratio 6,93% 7,09% 6,86% 6,75% 5,12% 2,46% 4,80% 6,90% 7,81%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 8,53% 8,85% 9,27% 8,85% 8,56% 9,48% 9,44% 10,03% 10,17%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 6,25% 5,88% 6,24% 6,19% 4,86% 5,91% 6,65% 7,89% 7,21%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total Assets 6,25% 5,88% 6,24% 6,19% 4,86% 5,91% 6,55% 7,81% 7,19%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 11,41% 12,53% 12,83% 12,17% 12,10% 6,61% 13,00% 15,18% 14,66%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 8,39% 7,94% 8,58% 8,80% 7,79% 9,03% 9,44% 9,33% 10,17%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 5,18% 5,00% 4,95% 4,90% 3,62% 3,52% 3,48% 4,56% 5,42%
Tier 1 Leverage ratio 5,91% 6,13% 6,36% 6,33% 5,04% 6,09% 6,44% 8,21% 6,91%
Return on Assets 1,37% 1,33% 1,54% 1,45% 0,94% 0,50% 0,14% 0,18% -0,11%
Return on Capital 3,16% 2,81% 3,21% 2,95% 1,94% 1,06% 0,47% 0,70% 0,65%
Return on Equity 16,35% 15,68% 18,08% 16,59% 10,81% 6,02% 1,81% 2,12% -1,32%
Share Price 46,15 48,1 53,39 48,89 41,26 23,87 14,08 13,2 15,06
USD JP Morgan Chase & Co Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 1.198.942 1.328.001 1.351.520 1.458.042 1.562.147 1.775.670 2.175.052 2.026.642 2.031.989
Risk-weighted assets 850.643 884.228 935.909 1.016.031 1.051.879 1.079.199 1.244.659 1.260.237 1.198.080
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities) 107.211 110.684 115.790 119.211 123.221 133.176 166.884 154.766 165.365
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 94.551 98.024 102.820 106.241 108.216 118.171 149.627 137.594 145.830
Common equity 107.072 110.684 115.790 119.211 123.221 127.176 134.945 146.614 157.213
Minority Interest 12.660 12.660 12.970 12.970 15.005 15.005 17.257 17.172 19.535
Tier 1 capital 72.474 74.983 81.055 85.096 88.746 98.775 136.104 122.174 132.971
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. trust preferred securities) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Preference shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 31.939 8.152 8.152
Innovative Tier 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 59.814 62.323 68.085 72.126 73.741 83.770 86.908 96.850 105.284
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 59.814 62.323 68.085 72.126 73.741 83.770 118.847 105.002 113.436
Tier 2 capital 29.963 31.300 34.210 37.180 43.496 46.237 48.616 45.593 44.103
Total Capital (after supervisory deductions) 102.437 106.283 115.265 122.276 132.242 145.012 184.720 167.767 177.074
Goodwill & other intangibles 68.509
Tier 1 ratio 8,52% 8,48% 8,66% 8,38% 8,44% 9,15% 10,94% 9,69% 11,10%
CAR 12,04% 12,02% 12,32% 12,03% 12,57% 13,44% 14,84% 13,31% 14,78%
Core Tier 1 ratio 7,03% 7,05% 7,27% 7,10% 7,01% 7,76% 6,98% 7,69% 8,79%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 8,94% 8,33% 8,57% 8,18% 7,89% 7,50% 7,67% 7,64% 8,14%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 6,04% 5,65% 6,00% 5,84% 5,68% 5,56% 6,26% 6,03% 6,54%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total Assets 4,99% 4,69% 5,04% 4,95% 4,72% 4,72% 5,46% 5,18% 5,58%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 12,60% 12,52% 12,37% 11,73% 11,71% 12,34% 13,41% 12,28% 13,80%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 8,54% 8,00% 8,53% 8,39% 8,47% 8,17% 8,49% 8,28% 8,71%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 4,99% 4,69% 5,04% 4,95% 4,72% 4,72% 4,00% 4,78% 5,18%
Tier 1 Leverage ratio 6,29% 5,85% 6,19% 6,18% 6,02% 6,43% 6,92% 6,20% 6,88%
Return on Assets 0,63% 0,72% 0,95% 1,13% 1,21% 1,05% 0,66% 0,26% 0,18%
Return on Capital 1,44% 1,68% 2,19% 2,67% 2,73% 2,51% 1,48% 0,74% 0,71%
Return on Equity 8,40% 7,98% 10,96% 12,96% 14,65% 12,86% 8,63% 3,82% 2,48%
Share Price 35,32 39,69 42 48,3 48,45 43,65 34,31 31,53 34,11
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USD Citigroup Inc Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 1.494.037 1.626.551 1.884.318 2.220.715 2.187.480 2.100.385 1.938.470 1.848.533 1.856.646
Risk-weighted assets 885.472 1.057.872 1.057.872 1.168.380 1.253.321 1.223.313 996.247 995.414 1.088.526
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities) 112.537 115.428 119.783 127.603 113.447 136.405 141.630 152.302 152.700
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 112.025 114.321 118.783 127.203 109.370 134.749 140.362 151.220 150.825
Common equity 111.412 114.428 118.783 127.154 113.447 108.981 70.966 78.001 152.388
Minority Interest 512 1.107 1.107 3.889 4.077 1.656 1.268 1.082 1.875
Tier 1 capital 77.824 90.899 90.899 92.435 89.226 106.915 118.758 126.778 127.034
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. trust preferred securities) 6.264 9.579 9.579 10.095 23.594 23.658 23.899 24.034 20.352
Preference shares 1.125 1.000 1.000 400 0 27.424 70.664 74.301 312
Innovative Tier 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 69.923 79.213 79.213 78.051 61.555 54.177 22.927 27.361 104.495
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 77.312 89.792 89.792 88.546 85.149 105.259 117.490 125.696 125.159
Tier 2 capital 28.578 32.361 32.361 38.815 44.895 43.426 37.640 38.646 38.949
Total Capital (after supervisory deductions) 106.402 123.260 123.260 131.250 134.121 150.341 156.398 165.424 165.983
Goodwill & other intangibles 40.636
Tier 1 ratio 8,79% 8,59% 8,59% 7,91% 7,12% 8,74% 11,92% 12,74% 11,67%
CAR 12,02% 11,65% 11,65% 11,23% 10,70% 12,29% 15,70% 16,62% 15,25%
Core Tier 1 ratio 7,90% 7,49% 7,49% 6,68% 4,91% 4,43% 2,30% 2,75% 9,60%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 7,53% 7,10% 6,36% 5,75% 5,19% 6,49% 7,31% 8,24% 8,22%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 5,21% 5,59% 4,82% 4,16% 4,08% 5,09% 6,13% 6,86% 6,84%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total Assets 5,17% 5,52% 4,77% 3,99% 3,89% 5,01% 6,06% 6,80% 6,74%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 12,71% 10,91% 11,32% 10,92% 9,05% 11,15% 14,22% 15,30% 14,03%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 7,12% 7,58% 6,54% 5,91% 6,13% 7,16% 8,07% 8,95% 8,94%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 4,68% 4,87% 4,20% 3,51% 2,81% 2,58% 1,18% 1,48% 5,63%
Tier 1 Leverage ratio 5,35% 5,19% 5,16% 4,37% 4,03% 5,04% 6,08% 6,92% 6,89%
Return on Assets 1,43% 1,57% 1,57% 1,27% 1,13% 0,18% -0,73% -1,43% -0,92%
Return on Capital 2,98% 3,09% 3,13% 2,45% 2,13% 0,36% -1,29% -2,65% -1,49%
Return on Equity 20,16% 21,52% 22,01% 18,66% 18,06% 3,08% -13,28% -31,90% -19,48%
Share Price 48,53 48,25 55,7 51,29 29,44 16,76 6,71 2,97 3,31
USD Wells Fargo & Co Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 468.481 491.456 482.585 539.865 575.442 609.074 1.309.639 1.284.176 1.243.646
Risk-weighted assets 384.021 399.340 411.200 448.097 483.146 1.031.326 1.101.437 1.047.700 1.013.600
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities) 40.660 41.894 45.876 47.239 47.628 47.964 99.084 121.382 114.400
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 40.660 41.894 45.876 46.602 47.178 47.241 95.884 114.623 111.800
Common equity 40.335 41.932 45.492 46.664 47.178 47.241 67.752 83.126 103.301
Minority Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.200 6.759 2.600
Tier 1 capital 31.724 33.344 36.808 38.325 39.211 42.471 86.397 102.721 93.795
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. trust preferred securities) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Preference shares 325 548 384 637 450 723 30.800 31.497 8.100
Innovative Tier 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 31.399 32.796 36.424 37.688 38.761 41.748 52.397 64.465 83.095
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 31.724 33.344 36.808 38.325 39.211 42.471 83.197 95.962 91.195
Tier 2 capital 13.143 13.858 14.619 14.130 15.311 15.438 43.921 42.263 40.602
Total Capital (after supervisory deductions) 44.867 47.202 51.427 52.455 54.522 57.909 130.318 144.984 134.397
Goodwill & other intangibles 37.700
Tier 1 ratio 8,26% 8,35% 8,95% 8,55% 8,12% 4,12% 7,84% 9,80% 9,25%
CAR 11,68% 11,82% 12,51% 11,71% 11,28% 5,62% 11,83% 13,84% 13,26%
Core Tier 1 ratio 8,18% 8,21% 8,86% 8,41% 8,02% 4,05% 4,76% 6,15% 8,20%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 8,68% 8,52% 9,51% 8,75% 8,28% 7,87% 7,57% 9,45% 9,20%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 6,77% 6,78% 7,63% 7,10% 6,81% 6,97% 6,60% 8,00% 7,54%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total Assets 6,77% 6,78% 7,63% 7,10% 6,81% 6,97% 6,35% 7,47% 7,33%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 10,59% 10,49% 11,16% 10,54% 9,86% 4,65% 9,00% 11,59% 11,29%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 9,58% 9,60% 10,66% 9,72% 9,47% 9,51% 9,95% 11,29% 10,81%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 6,70% 6,67% 7,55% 6,98% 6,74% 6,85% 4,00% 5,02% 6,68%
Tier 1 Leverage ratio 6,99% 6,99% 7,89% 7,89% 7,04% 7,35% 14,52% 8,32% 7,87%
Return on Assets 1,71% 1,69% 1,71% 1,76% 1,71% 1,52% 1,27% 0,30% 0,43%
Return on Capital 5,39% 5,53% 5,74% 5,85% 5,54% 4,66% 3,47% 0,84% 1,68%
Return on Equity 19,51% 19,61% 19,72% 19,77% 20,09% 17,39% 15,52% 4,95% 6,21%
Share Price 31,415 33,54 35,56 35,17 30,19 23,75 29,48 24,26 26,99
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USD US Bancorp Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 209.465 213.405 219.232 222.530 237.615 246.538 265.912 265.560 281.176
Risk-weighted assets 184.448 190.023 194.659 197.762 212.592 220.016 230.627 231.821 235.233
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities) 20.086 20.415 21.197 20.330 21.046 21.828 26.300 24.886 25.963
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 19.871 20.200 20.502 19.635 20.351 21.133 25.607 24.194 25.271
Common equity 20.086 19.415 20.197 19.330 20.046 20.328 18.369 22.671 24.463
Minority Interest 215 215 695 695 695 695 693 692 692
Tier 1 capital 15.145 16.841 17.036 16.876 17.539 18.624 24.426 21.710 22.610
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. trust preferred securities) 3.057 3.057 3.639 3.639 4.024 4.024 4.024 4.024 4.524
Preference shares 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.500 7.931 1.500 1.500
Innovative Tier 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 11.873 12.569 11.702 11.542 11.820 12.405 11.778 15.494 15.894
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 14.930 16.626 16.341 16.181 16.844 17.929 23.733 21.018 21.918
Tier 2 capital 7.911 8.055 7.459 8.833 8.386 8.878 8.471 8.329 7.848
Total Capital (after supervisory deductions) 23.056 24.896 24.495 25.709 25.925 27.502 32.897 30.039 30.458
Goodwill & other intangibles 10.139
Tier 1 ratio 8,21% 8,86% 8,75% 8,53% 8,25% 8,46% 10,59% 9,36% 9,61%
CAR 12,50% 13,10% 12,58% 13,00% 12,19% 12,50% 14,26% 12,96% 12,95%
Core Tier 1 ratio 6,44% 6,61% 6,01% 5,84% 5,56% 5,64% 5,11% 6,68% 6,76%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 9,59% 9,57% 9,67% 9,14% 8,86% 8,85% 9,89% 9,37% 9,23%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 7,23% 7,89% 7,77% 7,58% 7,38% 7,55% 9,19% 8,18% 8,04%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total Assets 7,13% 7,79% 7,45% 7,27% 7,09% 7,27% 8,93% 7,91% 7,80%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 10,89% 10,74% 10,89% 10,28% 9,90% 9,92% 11,40% 10,74% 11,04%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 11,01% 11,67% 11,17% 11,55% 10,91% 11,16% 12,37% 11,31% 10,83%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 5,67% 5,89% 5,34% 5,19% 4,97% 5,03% 4,43% 5,83% 5,65%
Tier 1 Leverage ratio 7,60% 8,20% 8,20% 8,20% 7,90% 7,90% 9,80% 8,40% 8,50%
Return on Assets 2,19% 2,22% 2,22% 2,19% 2,12% 1,87% 1,71% 1,11% 0,63%
Return on Capital 6,20% 6,20% 5,89% 5,83% 5,31% 4,74% 4,17% 3,04% 1,98%
Return on Equity 22,36% 22,66% 23,57% 23,35% 23,86% 21,19% 20,24% 14,60% 7,48%
Share Price 29,89 30,88 36,19 32,95 31,74 27,89 25,01 17,92 22,51
GBP Royal Bank of Scotland Group Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 776.827 839.339 871.432 1.011.266 1.655.130 1.730.705 2.218.693 1.644.400 1.522.481
Risk-weighted assets 371.000 385.500 400.300 419.700 609.000 643.700 695.800 655.200 541.000
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 35.435 37.375 40.227 41.544 53.038 61.637 58.879 55.666 77.736
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 33.326 33.189 34.964 36.630 14.650 19.581 37.260 39.240 60.841
Minority Interest 2.109 4.186 5.263 4.914 38.388 42.056 21.619 16.426 16.895
Tier 1 capital 28.218 29.124 30.041 31.151 44.367 58.495 69.847 60.887 76.421
Preference shares 10.022 9.892 9.760 10.166 14.704 16.200 16.655 11.207 11.265
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 5.746 5.148 4.900 4.264 6.919 6.814 7.383 3.586 5.213
Core Tier 1 capital 10.341 9.898 10.118 11.807 -15.644 -6.575 24.190 29.668 43.048
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 26.109 24.938 24.778 26.237 5.979 16.439 48.228 44.461 59.526
Tier 2 capital 22.437 26.674 27.491 26.955 33.693 30.335 32.223 21.078 15.389
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 43.373 45.687 46.949 52.303 67.974 84.888 98.175 77.661 87.245
Goodwill & other intangibles 17.847
Tier 1 ratio 7,61% 7,55% 7,50% 7,42% 7,29% 9,09% 10,04% 9,29% 14,13%
CAR 11,69% 11,85% 11,73% 12,46% 11,16% 13,19% 14,11% 11,85% 16,13%
Core Tier 1 ratio 2,79% 2,57% 2,53% 2,81% 0,00% 0,00% 3,48% 4,53% 7,96%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 4,56% 4,45% 4,62% 4,11% 3,20% 3,56% 2,65% 3,39% 5,11%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 3,63% 3,47% 3,45% 3,08% 2,68% 3,38% 3,15% 3,70% 5,02%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 3,36% 2,97% 2,84% 2,59% 0,36% 0,95% 2,17% 2,70% 3,91%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 9,55% 9,70% 10,05% 9,90% 8,71% 9,58% 8,46% 8,50% 14,37%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 5,58% 5,44% 5,39% 5,17% 4,11% 4,90% 4,42% 4,72% 5,73%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,33% 1,18% 1,16% 1,17% 0,00% 0,00% 1,09% 1,80% 2,83%
Return on Assets 0,77% 0,72% 0,73% 0,71% 0,54% 0,20% -1,15% -1,33% -0,18%
Return on Capital 1,92% 2,30% 1,93% 2,38% 1,46% 0,79% -4,92% -5,63% -0,38%
Return on Equity 15,24% 16,23% 15,89% 16,70% 15,66% 5,66% -43,44% -41,81% -5,28%
Share Price 4,899 4,963 5,563 5,301 3,718 2,098 0,494 0,386 0,292
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EUR Deutsche Bank AG Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 992.161 1.058.293 1.584.493 1.901.181 1.925.003 1.990.740 2.202.423 1.732.873 1.500.664
Risk-weighted assets 251.202 262.564 275.459 307.777 328.818 304.923 307.732 295.096 273.476
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 29.936 29.064 33.383 37.004 37.044 31.894 31.914 34.327 37.969
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 29.314 28.372 32.666 36.287 35.622 30.116 30.703 33.214 36.647
Minority Interest 622 692 717 717 1.422 1.778 1.211 1.113 1.322
Tier 1 capital 21.898 22.802 23.539 25.992 28.320 28.327 31.094 32.509 34.406
Preference shares 3.587 4.107 4.496 4.434 5.602 7.141 9.622 9.503 10.616
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 17.689 18.003 18.326 20.841 21.296 19.408 20.261 21.893 22.468
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 21.276 22.110 22.822 25.275 26.898 26.549 29.883 31.396 33.084
Tier 2 capital 11.988 10.951 10.770 10.366 9.729 8.669 6.302 4.243 3.523
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 33.886 33.753 34.309 36.358 38.049 36.996 37.396 36.752 37.929
Goodwill & other intangibles 10.169
Tier 1 ratio 8,72% 8,68% 8,55% 8,45% 8,61% 9,29% 10,10% 11,02% 12,58%
CAR 13,49% 12,86% 12,46% 11,81% 11,57% 12,13% 12,15% 12,45% 13,87%
Core Tier 1 ratio 7,04% 6,86% 6,65% 6,77% 6,48% 6,36% 6,58% 7,42% 8,22%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 3,02% 2,75% 2,11% 1,95% 1,92% 1,60% 1,45% 1,98% 2,53%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 2,21% 2,15% 1,49% 1,37% 1,47% 1,42% 1,41% 1,88% 2,29%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 2,14% 2,09% 1,44% 1,33% 1,40% 1,33% 1,36% 1,81% 2,20%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 11,92% 11,07% 12,12% 12,02% 11,27% 10,46% 10,37% 11,63% 13,88%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 3,42% 3,19% 2,17% 1,91% 1,98% 1,86% 1,70% 2,12% 2,53%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,78% 1,70% 1,16% 1,10% 1,11% 0,97% 0,92% 1,26% 1,50%
Return on Assets 0,39% 0,44% 0,57% 0,46% 0,41% 0,16% -0,18% -0,11% 0,27%
Return on Capital 1,17% 1,24% 1,65% 1,45% 1,61% 0,64% -1,09% -0,63% 1,71%
Return on Equity 12,64% 14,46% 19,08% 19,95% 18,54% 9,07% -11,32% -6,27% 14,77%
Share Price 81,9 87,97 101,72 107,09 89,47 54,43 27,83 43,19 49,42
EUR Credit Agricole Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 1.061.443 1.177.650 1.260.533 1.391.850 1.414.223 1.464.822 1.653.220 1.605.364 1.557.342
Risk-weighted assets 248.500 251.200 263.600 307.900 345.100 320.600 356.500 324.600 326.400
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 30.682 32.338 34.300 41.900 40.691 36.138 47.336 49.620 51.964
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 26.456 28.157 29.530 36.589 34.908 30.893 43.236 43.707 47.264
Minority Interest 4.226 4.181 4.770 5.311 5.783 5.245 4.100 5.913 4.700
Tier 1 capital 20.700 22.300 21.600 27.300 28.000 28.400 30.700 29.900 31.000
Preference shares 3.038 2.911 2.900 2.800 2.700 2.600 2.773 2.750 2.723
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.800 12.600 11.200
Core Tier 1 capital 13.436 15.208 13.930 19.189 19.517 20.555 12.027 8.637 12.377
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 16.474 18.119 16.830 21.989 22.217 23.155 26.600 23.987 26.300
Tier 2 capital 16.500 17.900 18.800 17.200 16.000 10.200 19.200 11.000 10.700
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 21.100 23.900 23.100 30.100 29.700 30.700 33.400 32.500 31.800
Goodwill & other intangibles 21.125
Tier 1 ratio 8,33% 8,88% 8,19% 8,87% 8,11% 8,86% 8,61% 9,21% 9,50%
CAR 8,49% 9,51% 8,76% 9,78% 8,61% 9,58% 9,37% 10,01% 9,74%
Core Tier 1 ratio 5,41% 6,05% 5,28% 6,23% 5,66% 6,41% 3,37% 2,66% 3,79%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 2,89% 2,75% 2,72% 3,01% 2,88% 2,47% 2,86% 3,09% 3,34%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 1,95% 1,89% 1,71% 1,96% 1,98% 1,94% 1,86% 1,86% 1,99%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 1,55% 1,54% 1,34% 1,58% 1,57% 1,58% 1,61% 1,49% 1,69%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 12,35% 12,87% 13,01% 13,61% 11,79% 11,27% 13,28% 15,29% 15,92%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 1,99% 2,03% 1,83% 2,16% 2,10% 2,10% 2,02% 2,02% 2,04%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,27% 1,29% 1,11% 1,38% 1,38% 1,40% 0,73% 0,54% 0,79%
Return on Assets 0,41% 0,42% 0,42% 0,48% 0,30% 0,07% 0,07% 0,03% 0,07%
Return on Capital 1,52% 1,79% 1,69% 1,77% 1,17% 0,36% 0,29% 0,14% 0,24%
Return on Equity 13,99% 15,63% 14,96% 16,70% 10,67% 2,73% 2,48% 1,15% 2,58%
Share Price 24,1583 27,009 28,9246 27,8579 21,2879 12,98 8 8,876 12,36
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GBP Barclays PLC Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 924.357 986.124 996.787 1.158.262 1.227.361 1.365.654 2.052.980 1.545.338 1.378.929
Risk-weighted assets 269.148 290.924 297.833 318.043 353.476 352.739 433.302 406.054 382.653
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 24.430 25.539 27.390 28.721 32.476 32.822 36.618 48.687 47.277
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 17.426 17.988 19.799 20.973 23.291 22.289 25.825 37.699 36.076
Minority Interest 7.004 7.551 7.591 7.748 9.185 10.533 10.793 10.988 11.201
Tier 1 capital 18.895 21.017 23.005 24.469 27.408 27.700 37.250 42.625 49.637
Preference shares 2.977 3.435 3.414 3.431 4.744 5.050 5.900 5.850 6.256
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 8.914 10.031 12.000 13.290 13.479 12.117 20.557 25.787 32.180
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 11.891 13.466 15.414 16.721 18.223 17.167 26.457 31.637 38.436
Tier 2 capital 13.350 14.642 14.036 15.206 17.123 17.469 22.333 17.897 14.703
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 30.502 33.715 34.711 37.452 42.642 44.452 58.727 58.720 63.460
Goodwill & other intangibles 8.795
Tier 1 ratio 7,02% 7,22% 7,72% 7,69% 7,75% 7,85% 8,60% 10,50% 12,97%
CAR 11,33% 11,59% 11,65% 11,78% 12,06% 12,60% 13,55% 14,46% 16,58%
Core Tier 1 ratio 3,31% 3,45% 4,03% 4,18% 3,81% 3,44% 4,74% 6,35% 8,41%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 2,64% 2,59% 2,75% 2,48% 2,65% 2,40% 1,78% 3,15% 3,43%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 2,04% 2,13% 2,31% 2,11% 2,23% 2,03% 1,81% 2,76% 3,60%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 1,29% 1,37% 1,55% 1,44% 1,48% 1,26% 1,29% 2,05% 2,79%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 9,08% 8,78% 9,20% 9,03% 9,19% 9,30% 8,45% 11,99% 12,36%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 3,30% 3,42% 3,48% 3,23% 3,47% 3,25% 2,86% 3,80% 4,60%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 0,96% 1,02% 1,20% 1,15% 1,10% 0,89% 1,00% 1,67% 2,33%
Return on Assets 0,47% 0,43% 0,48% 0,46% 0,40% 0,28% 0,23% 0,27% 0,55%
Return on Capital 1,25% 1,26% 1,47% 1,38% 1,27% 1,02% 0,98% 1,01% 2,02%
Return on Equity 20,71% 22,96% 24,56% 25,14% 20,50% 16,19% 12,61% 13,16% 22,39%
Share Price 42,08 45,78 58,14 55,79 40,37 23,15 9,8 18,44 17,6
CHF UBS Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 2.060.250 2.176.675 2.346.362 2.539.741 2.272.579 2.077.635 2.014.815 1.599.873 1.340.538
Risk-weighted assets 310.409 315.924 341.892 378.430 372.298 323.177 302.273 247.976 206.525
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 44.130 45.465 49.686 51.259 42.170 52.294 40.533 41.556 41.013
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 36.511 39.404 42.735 45.120 35.219 44.283 32.531 33.545 33.393
Minority Interest 7.619 6.061 6.951 6.139 6.951 8.011 8.002 8.011 7.620
Tier 1 capital 39.943 38.402 40.528 46.636 32.811 37.500 33.154 32.640 31.798
Preference shares 4.975 5.604 5.633 5.685 6.381 7.543 7.381 7.528 7.254
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 5.438 5.697 5.583 5.619 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 21.911 21.040 22.361 29.193 19.479 21.946 17.771 17.101 16.924
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 32.324 32.341 33.577 40.497 25.860 29.489 25.152 24.629 24.178
Tier 2 capital 3.974 6.928 9.836 12.059 11.696 13.170 12.213 11.231 9.143
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 43.917 45.330 50.364 58.695 44.507 50.670 45.367 43.871 40.941
Goodwill & other intangibles 11.008
Tier 1 ratio 12,87% 12,16% 11,85% 12,32% 8,81% 11,60% 10,97% 13,16% 15,40%
CAR 14,15% 14,35% 14,73% 15,51% 11,95% 15,68% 15,01% 17,69% 19,82%
Core Tier 1 ratio 7,06% 6,66% 6,54% 7,71% 5,23% 6,79% 5,88% 6,90% 8,19%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 2,14% 2,09% 2,12% 2,02% 1,86% 2,52% 2,01% 2,60% 3,06%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 1,94% 1,76% 1,73% 1,84% 1,44% 1,80% 1,65% 2,04% 2,37%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 1,57% 1,49% 1,43% 1,59% 1,14% 1,42% 1,25% 1,54% 1,80%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 14,22% 14,39% 14,53% 13,55% 11,33% 16,18% 13,41% 16,76% 19,86%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 2,13% 2,08% 2,15% 2,31% 1,96% 2,44% 2,25% 2,74% 3,05%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,06% 0,97% 0,95% 1,15% 0,86% 1,06% 0,88% 1,07% 1,26%
Return on Assets 0,74% 0,75% 0,55% 0,60% -0,22% -1,12% -0,99% -0,69% -0,16%
Return on Capital 1,61% 1,73% 1,16% 1,44% -0,44% -2,67% -2,72% -1,78% -0,42%
Return on Equity 35,99% 38,12% 26,16% 29,33% -12,12% -54,09% -61,35% -32,52% -7,44%
Share Price 55,63 59,59 65,86 65,46 46,6 21,44 14,84 13,29 16,05
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EUR ÖVAG Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 54.800 61.204 67.429 76.875 78.641 97.709 52.924 52.688 48.116
Risk-weighted assets 26.283 30.089 33.894 39.020 38.502 42.702 33.263 30.405 27.255
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 2.238 2.943 2.845 3.040 2.947 2.986 2.224 3.060 2.121
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 1.350 1.433 1.516 1.455 1.347 1.560 1.231 2.108 1.178
Minority Interest 888 1.128 1.329 1.455 1.600 1.425 993 952 943
Tier 1 capital 1.972 2.318 2.664 2.665 2.767 3.200 2.515 3.259 2.714
Preference shares 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 430 427 424 422 422 422 355 351 353
Core Tier 1 capital 635 744 892 769 725 1.333 1.147 1.936 1.399
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 1.084 1.190 1.335 1.210 1.167 1.775 1.522 2.307 1.771
Tier 2 capital 841 1.190 1.538 1.708 1.568 1.339 895 787 938
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 2.813 3.508 4.202 4.382 4.335 4.539 3.424 4.071 3.682
Goodwill & other intangibles 34
Tier 1 ratio 7,50% 7,70% 7,86% 6,83% 7,19% 7,49% 7,56% 10,72% 9,96%
CAR 10,70% 11,66% 12,40% 11,23% 11,26% 10,63% 10,29% 13,39% 13,51%
Core Tier 1 ratio 2,41% 2,47% 2,63% 1,97% 1,88% 3,12% 3,45% 6,37% 5,13%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 4,08% 4,81% 4,22% 3,95% 3,75% 3,06% 4,20% 5,81% 4,41%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 3,60% 3,79% 3,95% 3,47% 3,52% 3,28% 4,75% 6,19% 5,64%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 1,98% 1,94% 1,98% 1,57% 1,48% 1,82% 2,88% 4,38% 3,68%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 8,52% 9,78% 8,39% 7,79% 7,66% 6,99% 6,69% 10,07% 7,78%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 5,13% 5,73% 6,23% 5,70% 5,51% 4,65% 6,47% 7,73% 7,65%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,16% 1,22% 1,32% 1,00% 0,92% 1,36% 2,17% 3,68% 2,91%
EUR Hypo Group Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 24.230 27.412 30.595 37.756 37.939 41.212 43.336 41.712 41.079
Risk-weighted assets 17.760 19.885 22.010 25.534 28.247 32.678 32.832 31.279 27.908
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 983 1.115 1.247 1.302 1.659 1.748 2.530 2.406 1.990
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 660 755 850 709 1.155 1.016 2.021 1.891 1.466
Minority Interest 323 360 397 593 505 732 509 514 525
Tier 1 capital 914 1.046 1.178 1.514 1.769 1.898 2.747 2.550 2.018
Preference shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 227 226 224 204 206 201 117 119 130
Core Tier 1 capital 364 461 557 717 1.059 965 2.120 1.916 1.364
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 591 686 781 921 1.265 1.166 2.237 2.035 1.494
Tier 2 capital 557 684 812 993 1.107 1.415 1.430 1.427 996
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 1.471 1.731 1.990 2.507 2.876 3.313 4.176 3.977 3.014
Goodwill & other intangibles 45
Tier 1 ratio 5,15% 5,26% 5,35% 5,93% 6,26% 5,81% 8,37% 8,15% 7,23%
CAR 8,28% 8,70% 9,04% 9,82% 10,18% 10,14% 12,72% 12,72% 10,80%
Core Tier 1 ratio 2,05% 2,32% 2,53% 2,81% 3,75% 2,95% 6,46% 6,13% 4,89%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 4,05% 4,07% 4,08% 3,45% 4,37% 4,24% 5,84% 5,77% 4,84%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 3,77% 3,82% 3,85% 4,01% 4,66% 4,61% 6,34% 6,11% 4,91%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 2,44% 2,50% 2,55% 2,44% 3,33% 2,83% 5,16% 4,88% 3,64%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 5,53% 5,61% 5,67% 5,10% 5,87% 5,35% 7,71% 7,69% 7,13%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 6,07% 6,31% 6,50% 6,64% 7,58% 8,04% 9,64% 9,54% 7,34%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,50% 1,68% 1,82% 1,90% 2,79% 2,34% 4,89% 4,59% 3,32%
EUR Erste Group Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 152.660 160.249 181.703 197.323 200.519 214.158 201.411 204.167 201.710
Risk-weighted assets 75.078 79.247 94.129 92.660 95.091 102.331 103.663 107.834 106.383
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 6.461 9.037 10.904 11.368 8.452 12.046 11.095 13.293 16.123
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 4.129 6.865 7.979 8.387 5.501 8.911 8.079 10.098 12.709
Minority Interest 2.332 2.172 2.925 2.981 2.951 3.135 3.016 3.195 3.414
Tier 1 capital 5.112 7.757 6.185 5.901 6.674 7.090 7.448 9.038 11.450
Preference shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 900 900 1.250 1.250 1.248 1.248 1.256 1.256 1.174
Core Tier 1 capital 1.880 4.685 2.010 1.670 2.475 2.707 3.176 4.587 6.862
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 2.780 5.585 3.260 2.920 3.723 3.955 4.432 5.843 8.036
Tier 2 capital 3.381 3.245 3.820 4.226 3.820 4.279 4.335 4.312 4.326
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 8.611 11.104 10.111 10.202 10.825 11.764 12.185 13.730 16.182
Goodwill & other intangibles 498
Tier 1 ratio 6,81% 9,79% 6,57% 6,37% 7,02% 6,93% 7,18% 8,38% 10,76%
CAR 11,47% 14,01% 10,74% 11,01% 11,38% 11,50% 11,75% 12,73% 15,21%
Core Tier 1 ratio 2,50% 5,91% 2,14% 1,80% 2,60% 2,65% 3,06% 4,25% 6,45%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 4,23% 5,64% 6,00% 5,76% 4,22% 5,62% 5,51% 6,51% 7,99%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 3,35% 4,84% 3,40% 2,99% 3,33% 3,31% 3,70% 4,43% 5,68%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 1,82% 3,49% 1,79% 1,48% 1,86% 1,85% 2,20% 2,86% 3,98%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 8,61% 11,40% 11,58% 12,27% 8,89% 11,77% 10,70% 12,33% 15,16%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 5,64% 6,93% 5,56% 5,17% 5,40% 5,49% 6,05% 6,72% 8,02%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,23% 2,92% 1,11% 0,85% 1,23% 1,26% 1,58% 2,25% 3,40%
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Appendix 15: Comparison of the Figures between Q4/2005 and Q4/2009 in USD 
 
 
 
 
  
EUR RZB Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 93.863 103.189 115.629 126.057 137.402 159.161 156.921 155.938 147.938
Risk-weighted assets 47.968 54.981 70.656 79.286 93.638 98.090 89.040 80.716 74.990
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 4.950 5.217 6.637 7.246 8.422 8.933 8.587 9.997 10.308
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 3.520 3.697 4.743 5.150 5.667 5.935 5.912 7.496 7.735
Minority Interest 1.430 1.520 1.894 2.096 2.755 2.998 2.675 2.501 2.573
Tier 1 capital 3.982 3.955 5.652 5.662 7.341 7.153 7.471 8.760 8.813
Preference shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 819 809 819 809 819 809 1.075 809 819
Core Tier 1 capital 1.733 1.626 2.939 2.757 3.767 3.346 3.721 5.450 5.421
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 2.552 2.435 3.758 3.566 4.586 4.155 4.796 6.259 6.240
Tier 2 capital 1.306 1.710 1.723 2.104 2.722 3.072 3.603 3.583 3.718
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 5.199 5.851 7.614 8.035 10.508 10.466 11.362 12.659 12.823
Goodwill & other intangibles 383
Tier 1 ratio 8,30% 7,19% 8,00% 7,14% 7,84% 7,29% 8,39% 10,85% 11,75%
CAR 10,84% 10,64% 10,78% 10,13% 11,22% 10,67% 12,76% 15,68% 17,10%
Core Tier 1 ratio 3,61% 2,96% 4,16% 3,48% 4,02% 3,41% 4,18% 6,75% 7,23%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 5,27% 5,06% 5,74% 5,75% 6,13% 5,61% 5,47% 6,41% 6,97%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 4,24% 3,83% 4,89% 4,49% 5,34% 4,49% 4,76% 5,62% 5,96%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 2,72% 2,36% 3,25% 2,83% 3,34% 2,61% 3,06% 4,01% 4,22%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 10,32% 9,49% 9,39% 9,14% 8,99% 9,11% 9,64% 12,39% 13,75%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 5,54% 5,67% 6,58% 6,37% 7,65% 6,58% 7,24% 8,12% 8,67%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 1,85% 1,58% 2,54% 2,19% 2,74% 2,10% 2,37% 3,49% 3,66%
EUR UniCredit Bank Austria Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Total Assets 158.879 160.626 154.255 203.049 209.170 228.631 222.152 207.648 194.459
Risk-weighted assets 75.263 77.751 73.136 100.739 117.993 139.925 133.239 127.073 114.386
Total Shareholders equity (incl. Minorities 7.521 8.196 10.140 14.310 15.333 15.986 14.237 14.133 14.388
Shareholders' funds (excl. Minorities) 6.871 7.576 9.927 13.633 14.675 15.305 13.504 13.613 13.849
Minority Interest 650 620 213 677 658 681 733 520 539
Tier 1 capital 6.236 6.120 8.501 10.436 9.678 9.079 9.081 9.254 9.923
Preference shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hybrid Tier 1 (esp. Innovative Tier 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Core Tier 1 capital 5.586 5.500 8.288 9.759 9.020 8.398 8.348 8.734 9.384
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorty Interest) 5.586 5.500 8.288 9.759 9.020 8.398 8.348 8.734 9.384
Tier 2 capital 3.646 3.345 3.158 4.214 12.559 2.925 2.870 2.510 2.468
Total Capital (after supervisory deduction 9.152 8.691 10.773 13.548 13.165 12.244 12.390 12.014 12.634
Goodwill & other intangibles 579
Tier 1 ratio 8,29% 7,87% 11,62% 10,36% 8,20% 6,49% 6,82% 7,28% 8,68%
CAR 12,16% 11,18% 14,73% 13,45% 11,16% 8,75% 9,30% 9,45% 11,05%
Core Tier 1 ratio 7,42% 7,07% 11,33% 9,69% 7,64% 6,00% 6,27% 6,87% 8,20%
Shareholders Equity to Total Assets (LR1) 4,73% 5,10% 6,57% 7,05% 7,33% 6,99% 6,41% 6,81% 7,40%
Tier 1 capital to Total Assets (LR2) 3,92% 3,81% 5,51% 5,14% 4,63% 3,97% 4,09% 4,46% 5,10%
Tier 1 capital (excl. Minorities) to Total 
Assets 3,52% 3,42% 5,37% 4,81% 4,31% 3,67% 3,76% 4,21% 4,83%
Shareholders Equity to RWA 9,99% 10,54% 13,86% 14,21% 12,99% 11,42% 10,69% 11,12% 12,58%
Total capital to Total Assets (LR3) 5,76% 5,41% 6,98% 6,67% 6,29% 5,36% 5,58% 5,79% 6,50%
Core Tier 1 capital to Total Assets 3,52% 3,42% 5,37% 4,81% 4,31% 3,67% 3,76% 4,21% 4,83%
in USD
Q4/2009
Total 
Assets
Risk-
Weighted 
Assets
RWA in % 
of Total 
Assets
Goodwill 
& other 
intangible
s
Minoriti
es
preferr
ed 
shares
other 
hybrid 
instrumen
ts+innovat
ive Tier 1
Tier 1 
Capital
Total 
Capital
Goodwill 
in % of 
Tier 1 
Capital
Minorities 
in % of 
Tier 1 
Capital
Pref. 
Shares in 
% of Tier 1 
Capital
European Banks 10.294.968 2.529.703 25% 97.886 125.162 54.010 24.354 325.132 379.388 30% 38% 17%
US Banks 7.636.756 5.077.956 66% 251.597 25.284 39.512 42.840 536.798 733.989 47% 5% 7%
Austrian Banks 907.661 502.948 55% 2.206 7.994 28 3.549 50.046 69.275 4% 16% 0,1%
Q4/2005
European Banks 6.903.811 1.923.973 28% - 27.161 28.802 14.018 161.428 225.036 - 17% 18%
US Banks 4.561.195 3.194.773 70% - 13.387 1.721 21.767 271.542 376.663 - 5% 1%
Austrian Banks 568.849 284.585 50% - 6.603 23 2.790 21.391 31.994 - 31% 0,1%
EUR/USD GBP/USD CHF/USD
2009-12-31 1,43322 1,59257 0,96340
2005-12-31 1,17426 1,72039 0,75993
Source: OANDA Currency Converter
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Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Tier 1 RATIO
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 8,88% 7,61% 7,55% 7,50% 7,42% 7,29% 9,09% 10,04% 9,29% 14,13%
Deutsche Bank AG 9,56% 8,72% 8,68% 8,55% 8,45% 8,61% 9,29% 10,10% 11,02% 12,58%
Credit Agricole 8,73% 8,33% 8,88% 8,19% 8,87% 8,11% 8,86% 8,61% 9,21% 9,50%
Barclays PLC 8,59% 7,02% 7,22% 7,72% 7,69% 7,75% 7,85% 8,60% 10,50% 12,97%
UBS 12,13% 12,87% 12,16% 11,85% 12,32% 8,81% 11,60% 10,97% 13,16% 15,40%
Mean 8,91% 8,90% 8,76% 8,95% 8,12% 9,34% 9,66% 10,64% 12,91%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 8,48% 8,35% 8,33% 8,64% 8,52% 6,87% 4,13% 9,15% 11,93% 10,40%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 9,26% 8,52% 8,48% 8,66% 8,38% 8,44% 9,15% 10,94% 9,69% 11,10%
Citigroup Inc 9,56% 8,79% 8,59% 8,59% 7,91% 7,12% 8,74% 11,92% 12,74% 11,67%
Wells Fargo & Co 8,14% 8,26% 8,35% 8,95% 8,55% 8,12% 4,12% 7,84% 9,80% 9,25%
US Bancorp 8,96% 8,21% 8,86% 8,75% 8,53% 8,25% 8,46% 10,59% 9,36% 9,61%
Mean 8,43% 8,52% 8,72% 8,38% 7,76% 6,92% 10,09% 10,71% 10,41%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 8,09% 7,50% 7,70% 7,86% 6,83% 7,19% 7,49% 7,56% 10,72% 9,96%
Hypo Group 6,39% 5,15% 5,26% 5,35% 5,93% 6,26% 5,81% 8,37% 8,15% 7,23%
Erste Group 7,76% 6,81% 9,79% 6,57% 6,37% 7,02% 6,93% 7,18% 8,38% 10,76%
RZB 8,53% 8,30% 7,19% 8,00% 7,14% 7,84% 7,29% 8,39% 10,85% 11,75%
UniCredit Bank Austria 8,40% 8,29% 7,87% 11,62% 10,36% 8,20% 6,49% 6,82% 7,28% 8,68%
Mean 7,21% 7,56% 7,88% 7,33% 7,30% 6,80% 7,66% 9,08% 9,68%
Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 CAR
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 12,69% 11,69% 11,85% 11,73% 12,46% 11,16% 13,19% 14,11% 11,85% 16,13%
Deutsche Bank AG 12,53% 13,49% 12,86% 12,46% 11,81% 11,57% 12,13% 12,15% 12,45% 13,87%
Credit Agricole 9,32% 8,49% 9,51% 8,76% 9,78% 8,61% 9,58% 9,37% 10,01% 9,74%
Barclays PLC 12,85% 11,33% 11,59% 11,65% 11,78% 12,06% 12,60% 13,55% 14,46% 16,58%
UBS 15,43% 14,15% 14,35% 14,73% 15,51% 11,95% 15,68% 15,01% 17,69% 19,82%
Mean 11,83% 12,03% 11,87% 12,27% 11,07% 12,64% 12,84% 13,29% 15,23%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 11,73% 11,22% 11,25% 11,88% 12,11% 11,02% 6,30% 13,00% 14,11% 14,66%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 13,04% 12,04% 12,02% 12,32% 12,03% 12,57% 13,44% 14,84% 13,31% 14,78%
Citigroup Inc 13,01% 12,02% 11,65% 11,65% 11,23% 10,70% 12,29% 15,70% 16,62% 15,25%
Wells Fargo & Co 11,51% 11,68% 11,82% 12,51% 11,71% 11,28% 5,62% 11,83% 13,84% 13,26%
US Bancorp 12,89% 12,50% 13,10% 12,58% 13,00% 12,19% 12,50% 14,26% 12,96% 12,95%
Mean 11,89% 11,97% 12,19% 12,02% 11,55% 10,03% 13,93% 14,17% 14,18%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 11,67% 10,70% 11,66% 12,40% 11,23% 11,26% 10,63% 10,29% 13,39% 13,51%
Hypo Group 10,27% 8,28% 8,70% 9,04% 9,82% 10,18% 10,14% 12,72% 12,72% 10,80%
Erste Group 12,20% 11,47% 14,01% 10,74% 11,01% 11,38% 11,50% 11,75% 12,73% 15,21%
RZB 12,20% 10,84% 10,64% 10,78% 10,13% 11,22% 10,67% 12,76% 15,68% 17,10%
UniCredit Bank Austria 11,25% 12,16% 11,18% 14,73% 13,45% 11,16% 8,75% 9,30% 9,45% 11,05%
Mean 10,69% 11,24% 11,54% 11,13% 11,04% 10,34% 11,37% 12,80% 13,53%
Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Core Tier 1 ratio
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 2,96% 2,79% 2,57% 2,53% 2,81% 0,00% 0,00% 3,48% 4,53% 7,96%
Deutsche Bank AG 6,93% 7,04% 6,86% 6,65% 6,77% 6,48% 6,36% 6,58% 7,42% 8,22%
Credit Agricole 4,99% 5,41% 6,05% 5,28% 6,23% 5,66% 6,41% 3,37% 2,66% 3,79%
Barclays PLC 4,64% 3,31% 3,45% 4,03% 4,18% 3,81% 3,44% 4,74% 6,35% 8,41%
UBS 6,77% 7,06% 6,66% 6,54% 7,71% 5,23% 6,79% 5,88% 6,90% 8,19%
Mean 5,12% 5,12% 5,01% 5,54% 4,24% 4,60% 4,81% 5,57% 7,31%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 6,08% 6,93% 7,09% 6,86% 6,75% 5,12% 2,46% 4,80% 6,90% 7,81%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 7,41% 7,03% 7,05% 7,27% 7,10% 7,01% 7,76% 6,98% 7,69% 8,79%
Citigroup Inc 5,95% 7,90% 7,49% 7,49% 6,68% 4,91% 4,43% 2,30% 2,75% 9,60%
Wells Fargo & Co 7,20% 8,18% 8,21% 8,86% 8,41% 8,02% 4,05% 4,76% 6,15% 8,20%
US Bancorp 6,07% 6,44% 6,61% 6,01% 5,84% 5,56% 5,64% 5,11% 6,68% 6,76%
Mean 7,29% 7,29% 7,30% 6,95% 6,12% 4,87% 4,79% 6,03% 8,23%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 3,27% 2,41% 2,47% 2,63% 1,97% 1,88% 3,12% 3,45% 6,37% 5,13%
Hypo Group 3,76% 2,05% 2,32% 2,53% 2,81% 3,75% 2,95% 6,46% 6,13% 4,89%
Erste Group 3,49% 2,50% 5,91% 2,14% 1,80% 2,60% 2,65% 3,06% 4,25% 6,45%
RZB 4,42% 3,61% 2,96% 4,16% 3,48% 4,02% 3,41% 4,18% 6,75% 7,23%
UniCredit Bank Austria 7,83% 7,42% 7,07% 11,33% 9,69% 7,64% 6,00% 6,27% 6,87% 8,20%
Mean 3,60% 4,15% 4,56% 3,95% 3,98% 3,63% 4,68% 6,07% 6,38%
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Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Leverage Ratio 1 (Shareholders Equity/Total Assets)
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 3,96% 4,56% 4,45% 4,62% 4,11% 3,20% 3,56% 2,65% 3,39% 5,11%
Deutsche Bank AG 2,14% 3,02% 2,75% 2,11% 1,95% 1,92% 1,60% 1,45% 1,98% 2,53%
Credit Agricole 2,89% 2,89% 2,75% 2,72% 3,01% 2,88% 2,47% 2,86% 3,09% 3,34%
Barclays PLC 2,65% 2,64% 2,59% 2,75% 2,48% 2,65% 2,40% 1,78% 3,15% 3,43%
UBS 2,27% 2,14% 2,09% 2,12% 2,02% 1,86% 2,52% 2,01% 2,60% 3,06%
Mean 3,05% 2,92% 2,86% 2,71% 2,50% 2,51% 2,15% 2,84% 3,49%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 9,24% 8,53% 8,85% 9,27% 8,85% 8,56% 9,48% 9,44% 10,03% 10,17%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 8,10% 8,94% 8,33% 8,57% 8,18% 7,89% 7,50% 7,67% 7,64% 8,14%
Citigroup Inc 6,91% 7,53% 7,10% 6,36% 5,75% 5,19% 6,49% 7,31% 8,24% 8,22%
Wells Fargo & Co 8,65% 8,68% 8,52% 9,51% 8,75% 8,28% 7,87% 7,57% 9,45% 9,20%
US Bancorp 9,35% 9,59% 9,57% 9,67% 9,14% 8,86% 8,85% 9,89% 9,37% 9,23%
Mean 8,65% 8,47% 8,67% 8,13% 7,75% 8,04% 8,38% 8,95% 8,99%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 4,25% 4,08% 4,81% 4,22% 3,95% 3,75% 3,06% 4,20% 5,81% 4,41%
Hypo Group 4,52% 4,05% 4,07% 4,08% 3,45% 4,37% 4,24% 5,84% 5,77% 4,84%
Erste Group 5,72% 4,23% 5,64% 6,00% 5,76% 4,22% 5,62% 5,51% 6,51% 7,99%
RZB 5,82% 5,27% 5,06% 5,74% 5,75% 6,13% 5,61% 5,47% 6,41% 6,97%
UniCredit Bank Austria 6,49% 4,73% 5,10% 6,57% 7,05% 7,33% 6,99% 6,41% 6,81% 7,40%
Mean 4,48% 4,93% 5,32% 5,19% 5,16% 5,11% 5,49% 6,26% 6,32%
Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Leverage Ratio 2 (Tier 1 Capital/Total Assets)
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 3,51% 3,63% 3,47% 3,45% 3,08% 2,68% 3,38% 3,15% 3,70% 5,02%
Deutsche Bank AG 1,74% 2,21% 2,15% 1,49% 1,37% 1,47% 1,42% 1,41% 1,88% 2,29%
Credit Agricole 1,91% 1,95% 1,89% 1,71% 1,96% 1,98% 1,94% 1,86% 1,86% 1,99%
Barclays PLC 2,34% 2,04% 2,13% 2,31% 2,11% 2,23% 2,03% 1,81% 2,76% 3,60%
UBS 1,84% 1,94% 1,76% 1,73% 1,84% 1,44% 1,80% 1,65% 2,04% 2,37%
Mean 2,35% 2,28% 2,14% 2,07% 1,96% 2,11% 1,98% 2,45% 3,05%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 6,34% 6,25% 5,88% 6,24% 6,19% 4,86% 5,91% 6,65% 7,89% 7,21%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 5,96% 6,04% 5,65% 6,00% 5,84% 5,68% 5,56% 6,26% 6,03% 6,54%
Citigroup Inc 5,42% 5,21% 5,59% 4,82% 4,16% 4,08% 5,09% 6,13% 6,86% 6,84%
Wells Fargo & Co 7,13% 6,77% 6,78% 7,63% 7,10% 6,81% 6,97% 6,60% 8,00% 7,54%
US Bancorp 7,87% 7,23% 7,89% 7,77% 7,58% 7,38% 7,55% 9,19% 8,18% 8,04%
Mean 6,30% 6,36% 6,49% 6,17% 5,76% 6,22% 6,96% 7,39% 7,24%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 4,24% 3,60% 3,79% 3,95% 3,47% 3,52% 3,28% 4,75% 6,19% 5,64%
Hypo Group 4,68% 3,77% 3,82% 3,85% 4,01% 4,66% 4,61% 6,34% 6,11% 4,91%
Erste Group 3,89% 3,35% 4,84% 3,40% 2,99% 3,33% 3,31% 3,70% 4,43% 5,68%
RZB 4,85% 4,24% 3,83% 4,89% 4,49% 5,34% 4,49% 4,76% 5,62% 5,96%
UniCredit Bank Austria 4,51% 3,92% 3,81% 5,51% 5,14% 4,63% 3,97% 4,09% 4,46% 5,10%
Mean 3,78% 4,02% 4,32% 4,02% 4,30% 3,93% 4,73% 5,36% 5,46%
Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Tier 1 Capital excluding Minorities to Total Assets
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 2,43% 3,36% 2,97% 2,84% 2,59% 0,36% 0,95% 2,17% 2,70% 3,91%
Deutsche Bank AG 1,68% 2,14% 2,09% 1,44% 1,33% 1,40% 1,33% 1,36% 1,81% 2,20%
Credit Agricole 1,55% 1,55% 1,54% 1,34% 1,58% 1,57% 1,58% 1,61% 1,49% 1,69%
Barclays PLC 1,61% 1,29% 1,37% 1,55% 1,44% 1,48% 1,26% 1,29% 2,05% 2,79%
UBS 1,47% 1,57% 1,49% 1,43% 1,59% 1,14% 1,42% 1,25% 1,54% 1,80%
Mean 1,98% 1,89% 1,72% 1,71% 1,19% 1,31% 1,54% 1,92% 2,48%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 6,32% 6,25% 5,88% 6,24% 6,19% 4,86% 5,91% 6,55% 7,81% 7,19%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 5,04% 4,99% 4,69% 5,04% 4,95% 4,72% 4,72% 5,46% 5,18% 5,58%
Citigroup Inc 5,33% 5,17% 5,52% 4,77% 3,99% 3,89% 5,01% 6,06% 6,80% 6,74%
Wells Fargo & Co 7,03% 6,77% 6,78% 7,63% 7,10% 6,81% 6,97% 6,35% 7,47% 7,33%
US Bancorp 7,63% 7,13% 7,79% 7,45% 7,27% 7,09% 7,27% 8,93% 7,91% 7,80%
Mean 6,06% 6,13% 6,22% 5,90% 5,48% 5,98% 6,67% 7,04% 6,93%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 2,41% 1,98% 1,94% 1,98% 1,57% 1,48% 1,82% 2,88% 4,38% 3,68%
Hypo Group 3,31% 2,44% 2,50% 2,55% 2,44% 3,33% 2,83% 5,16% 4,88% 3,64%
Erste Group 2,37% 1,82% 3,49% 1,79% 1,48% 1,86% 1,85% 2,20% 2,86% 3,98%
RZB 3,15% 2,72% 2,36% 3,25% 2,83% 3,34% 2,61% 3,06% 4,01% 4,22%
UniCredit Bank Austria 4,21% 3,52% 3,42% 5,37% 4,81% 4,31% 3,67% 3,76% 4,21% 4,83%
Mean 2,49% 2,74% 2,99% 2,63% 2,86% 2,56% 3,41% 4,07% 4,07%
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Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Core Tier 1 Capital to Total Assets
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 1,17% 1,33% 1,18% 1,16% 1,17% 0,00% 0,00% 1,09% 1,80% 2,83%
Deutsche Bank AG 1,28% 1,78% 1,70% 1,16% 1,10% 1,11% 0,97% 0,92% 1,26% 1,50%
Credit Agricole 1,10% 1,27% 1,29% 1,11% 1,38% 1,38% 1,40% 0,73% 0,54% 0,79%
Barclays PLC 1,26% 0,96% 1,02% 1,20% 1,15% 1,10% 0,89% 1,00% 1,67% 2,33%
UBS 1,03% 1,06% 0,97% 0,95% 1,15% 0,86% 1,06% 0,88% 1,07% 1,26%
Mean 1,28% 1,23% 1,12% 1,19% 0,89% 0,86% 0,92% 1,27% 1,74%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 4,52% 5,18% 5,00% 4,95% 4,90% 3,62% 3,52% 3,48% 4,56% 5,42%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 4,78% 4,99% 4,69% 5,04% 4,95% 4,72% 4,72% 4,00% 4,78% 5,18%
Citigroup Inc 3,44% 4,68% 4,87% 4,20% 3,51% 2,81% 2,58% 1,18% 1,48% 5,63%
Wells Fargo & Co 6,36% 6,70% 6,67% 7,55% 6,98% 6,74% 6,85% 4,00% 5,02% 6,68%
US Bancorp 5,33% 5,67% 5,89% 5,34% 5,19% 4,97% 5,03% 4,43% 5,83% 5,65%
Mean 5,44% 5,43% 5,42% 5,11% 4,57% 4,54% 3,42% 4,33% 5,71%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 1,75% 1,16% 1,22% 1,32% 1,00% 0,92% 1,36% 2,17% 3,68% 2,91%
Hypo Group 2,76% 1,50% 1,68% 1,82% 1,90% 2,79% 2,34% 4,89% 4,59% 3,32%
Erste Group 1,76% 1,23% 2,92% 1,11% 0,85% 1,23% 1,26% 1,58% 2,25% 3,40%
RZB 2,50% 1,85% 1,58% 2,54% 2,19% 2,74% 2,10% 2,37% 3,49% 3,66%
UniCredit Bank Austria 4,21% 3,52% 3,42% 5,37% 4,81% 4,31% 3,67% 3,76% 4,21% 4,83%
Mean 1,85% 2,16% 2,43% 2,15% 2,40% 2,15% 2,95% 3,64% 3,62%
Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 Leverage Ratio 3 (Total Capital/Total Assets)
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 5,05% 5,58% 5,44% 5,39% 5,17% 4,11% 4,90% 4,42% 4,72% 5,73%
Deutsche Bank AG 2,32% 3,42% 3,19% 2,17% 1,91% 1,98% 1,86% 1,70% 2,12% 2,53%
Credit Agricole 2,03% 1,99% 2,03% 1,83% 2,16% 2,10% 2,10% 2,02% 2,02% 2,04%
Barclays PLC 3,49% 3,30% 3,42% 3,48% 3,23% 3,47% 3,25% 2,86% 3,80% 4,60%
UBS 2,35% 2,13% 2,08% 2,15% 2,31% 1,96% 2,44% 2,25% 2,74% 3,05%
Mean 3,28% 3,23% 3,00% 2,96% 2,72% 2,91% 2,65% 3,08% 3,59%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 8,83% 8,39% 7,94% 8,58% 8,80% 7,79% 9,03% 9,44% 9,33% 10,17%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 8,40% 8,54% 8,00% 8,53% 8,39% 8,47% 8,17% 8,49% 8,28% 8,71%
Citigroup Inc 7,38% 7,12% 7,58% 6,54% 5,91% 6,13% 7,16% 8,07% 8,95% 8,94%
Wells Fargo & Co 10,06% 9,58% 9,60% 10,66% 9,72% 9,47% 9,51% 9,95% 11,29% 10,81%
US Bancorp 11,33% 11,01% 11,67% 11,17% 11,55% 10,91% 11,16% 12,37% 11,31% 10,83%
Mean 8,93% 8,96% 9,10% 8,87% 8,56% 9,00% 9,67% 9,83% 9,89%
Austrian Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
ÖVAG 6,09% 5,13% 5,73% 6,23% 5,70% 5,51% 4,65% 6,47% 7,73% 7,65%
Hypo Group 7,52% 6,07% 6,31% 6,50% 6,64% 7,58% 8,04% 9,64% 9,54% 7,34%
Erste Group 6,11% 5,64% 6,93% 5,56% 5,17% 5,40% 5,49% 6,05% 6,72% 8,02%
RZB 6,94% 5,54% 5,67% 6,58% 6,37% 7,65% 6,58% 7,24% 8,12% 8,67%
UniCredit Bank Austria 6,04% 5,76% 5,41% 6,98% 6,67% 6,29% 5,36% 5,58% 5,79% 6,50%
Mean 5,63% 6,01% 6,37% 6,11% 6,49% 6,02% 6,99% 7,58% 7,64%
Q4/2005 - Q4/2009 ROE
European Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 15,24% 16,23% 15,89% 16,70% 15,66% 5,66% -43,44% -41,81% -5,28%
Deutsche Bank AG 12,64% 14,46% 19,08% 19,95% 18,54% 9,07% -11,32% -6,27% 14,77%
Credit Agricole 13,99% 15,63% 14,96% 16,70% 10,67% 2,73% 2,48% 1,15% 2,58%
Barclays PLC 20,71% 22,96% 24,56% 25,14% 20,50% 16,19% 12,61% 13,16% 22,39%
UBS 35,99% 38,12% 26,16% 29,33% -12,12% -54,09% -61,35% -32,52% -7,44%
mean 19,71% 21,48% 20,13% 21,56% 10,65% -4,09% -20,20% -13,26% 5,40%
US Banks Q4/2005 Q2/2006 Q4/2006 Q2/2007 Q4/2007 Q2/2008 Q4/2008 Q2/2009 Q4/2009
Bank of America 16,35% 15,68% 18,08% 16,59% 10,81% 6,02% 1,81% 2,12% -1,32%
JP Morgan Chase & Co 8,40% 7,98% 10,96% 12,96% 14,65% 12,86% 8,63% 3,82% 2,48%
Citigroup Inc 20,16% 21,52% 22,01% 18,66% 18,06% 3,08% -13,28% -31,90% -19,48%
Wells Fargo & Co 19,51% 19,61% 19,72% 19,77% 20,09% 17,39% 15,52% 4,95% 6,21%
US Bancorp 22,36% 22,66% 23,57% 23,35% 23,86% 21,19% 20,24% 14,60% 7,48%
mean 17,36% 17,49% 18,87% 18,26% 17,49% 12,11% 6,59% -1,28% -0,93%
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Abstract 
English Version: 
This master thesis examines the role of leverage in commercial banks. Under Basel I 
and II, banks have to fulfil minimum capital requirements for taking certain risk. This 
became evident under the first pillar of the Basel II framework. For calculating certain 
capital ratios, the Basel Committee set different types of capital and divided it into 
Tiers. The minimum capital is specified as a percentage of the risk-weighted assets 
of a bank. Moreover, this risk-weighted approach got criticized during the recent 
financial crisis. A lot of banks reported high capital ratios, but went into trouble and 
some of them into bankruptcy. This could be seen as a regulatory failure. In the end 
of the last year the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published consultative 
documents to strengthen the liquidity of the global banking sector which was widely 
named ‘Basel III’. One of the big topics was the introduction of a leverage ratio which 
is already applied in some countries. In this paper I discuss different types of 
leverage ratios and compare such naïve ratios to the risk-weighted ratios. 
Furthermore I look deeper into the definition of bank’s capital. For the analysis, I 
examine five global banks in the US and in Europe and compare them to each other 
and to the biggest Austrian banks. Furthermore, empirical research is also done on 
the relationship between leverage growth and asset growth. Are those leverage 
ratios a good predictor of bank failure over time and do simpler ratios outperform the 
complex ratios? 
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German Version: 
Diese Magisterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema „Leverage in Banken“. Unter 
den Basler Akkord von 1988 und den überarbeiteten Vorschriften 2006 (Basel II) 
mussten Banken bisher bestimmte Mindestkapitalanforderungen für die eingegangen 
Risiken erfüllen. Unter der ersten Säule, der drei Säulen von Basel II, wurden die 
Bestimmungen zu den Mindestkapitalanforderungen für Banken umgesetzt. Der 
Basler Ausschuss für Banken teilte für die Berechnungen das Eigenkapital in 
sogenannte „Tiers“, je nach Haftungsqualität. Das Eigenkapital wurde dabei in 
Relation zu den risikogewichteten Aktiva gestellt. Der risikogewichtete Ansatz wurde 
jedoch in Folge der aktuellen Finanzkrise von vielen Experten kritisiert. Einige 
Banken veröffentlichten hohe Kernkapitalquoten, obwohl die kurzfristige Liquidität oft 
fehlte. Ende des letzten Jahres veröffentlichte der Basler Ausschuss für Banken zwei 
Konsultationspapiere um den Bankensektor global zu verändern und der aktuellen 
Entwicklung entgegenzuwirken. Diese Vorschläge, die unter Basel III angeführt 
wurden, beinhalteten unter anderem eine Einführung eines Leverage Ratios. Die 
Berechnungen sollen vor allem, entgegengesetzt dem risikogewichteten Ansatz, 
keine Gewichtungen der Risiken beinhalten, um mögliches Hedging der 
eingegangenen Risiken zu vermeiden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden dabei 
verschiedene Berechnungsmöglichkeiten eines Leverage Ratios analysiert und mit 
den bisherigen Kapitalquoten verglichen. Um die Analysen durchzuführen, wurden 
fünf weltweit führende Großbanken in Amerika und Europa miteinander verglichen 
und den großen österreichischen Banken entgegengestellt. Die Fragen, die sich 
dabei stellten sind, ob ein Leverage Ratio tatsächlich ein guter Indikator für die 
finanzielle Situation der Bank ist und ob ein solches Verhältnis zwischen Eigenkapital 
zu den Aktiva die tatsächliche Entwicklung einer Bank besser spiegelt, als die bisher 
verwendeten risikogewichteten Berechnungen?  
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